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Executive Summary 
 
Regulators need to rely on science to understand problems and predict the consequences of 
regulatory actions, but overreliance on science can actually contribute to, or at least deflect 
attention from, incoherent policymaking. In this article, we explore the problems with using 
science to justify policy decisions by analyzing the Environmental Protection Agency's recently 
revised air quality standards for ground-level ozone and particulate matter, some of the most 
significant regulations ever issued.  In revising these standards, EPA mistakenly invoked science 
as the exclusive basis for its decisions and deflected attention from a remarkable series of 
inconsistencies. For example, even though EPA claimed to base its standards on a singular 
concern for public health, it set its standards at levels that will still lead to hundreds, if not 
thousands, of deaths each year. In other ways, EPA's positions were like shifting sands, changing 
at points that apparently were expedient for the agency. Such an outcome should not be 
unexpected when an agency misuses science as a policy rationale, but it also need not be 
inevitable if agencies learn to respect the limits of science in justifying risk standards. We 
conclude by offering a set of principles to give direction to standard setting by EPA and other 
agencies. In the case of EPA's air quality program, Congress will likely need to amend the Clean 
Air Act to enable EPA to break free of the conceptual incoherence in which it now finds itself 
mired. Decisionmakers in any setting, though, can avoid the problem of shifting sands by 
carefully understanding what science can and cannot do. 
   1
Shifting Sands: 
The Limits Of Science In Setting Risk Standards 
 
Cary Coglianese and Gary E. Marchant 
 
Introduction 
   
    Administrative law aspires to bring reason to agency policymaking.
1  The Administrative 
Procedure Act
2 requires agencies to specify the basis for the rules they promulgate, and in 
exercising their review of agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
3 courts have 
repeatedly demanded that agencies justify their decisions with careful reasoning.
4  In striving to 
meet administrative law’s demands and aspirations, agencies have applied their expertise to 
gather facts and invest in sustained scientific research.  For regulatory decisionmakers, science 
provides a systematic basis for understanding policy problems and the consequences of different 
                                                           
1  See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORN. 
L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) (Administrative law principles “require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their 
policy determinations and, in particular, to articulate the standards for those determinations.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORD. L. REV. 
17 (2001) (arguing that the demand for reason is stronger in administrative law than even in judicial 
decisionmaking); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 31 
(1999) (“Much of administrative law consists of an effort to ensure reason-giving by regulatory agencies. . .The 
agency. . . must generate a convincing explanation.”). 
2  5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994). 
3  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994). 
4  See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (referring to the “strict and demanding requirement” that “an agency must cogently explain why it has 
exercised its discretion in a given manner.”).  See also  AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d729, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(invalidating FCC rule because the agency “has considered this question on several occasions, each time applying a 
test different from that applied here”); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (an agency cannot 
“refuse to define the criteria it is applying,” and “it must be possible for the regulated class to perceive the principles 
which are guiding agency action.”); American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93  (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“[U]nless [the Administrator] describes the standard under which she has arrived at this conclusion, ... we have no 
basis for exercising our responsibility to determine whether her decision is ‘arbitrary [or] capricious.’”); Hall v. 
McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Reasoned decisionmaking requires treating like cases alike; an 
agency may not casually ignore its own past decisions. . . .   Divergence from agency precedent demands an 
explanation.”); Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“By 
EPA’s logic, adverse health effects would permit it to justify any lead standard at all, without explaining why it 
chose the level it did.  We cannot accept such incomplete reasoning.”); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 
F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S.Ct. 2229 (1971) (“But an agency changing its course must supply 
a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored, 
. . . and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line from the 
tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.”).   2
policy options, and thus scientific evidence needs to play a key role in agency decisionmaking.
5  
But even though science is valuable for what it can tell administrators about policy problems and 
their possible solutions, science does not by itself provide a complete reason for a policy decision 
because it does not address the normative aspects of administrative policymaking.
6  To fulfill 
administrative law’s aspiration of reason, agencies need to explain their decisions by reference 
not only to scientific evidence but also to policy principles that speak to the value choices 
inherent in their decisionmaking. 
    In this article, we examine the role and limitations of science in the important policy 
domain of environmental risk management.  In particular, we offer a detailed account of the use 
– and misuse – of science by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its efforts to justify 
recent changes to its national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate 
matter (PM).
7  Environmental risk management is an area of public policy where science plays a 
vital role for what it reveals about the health effects associated with human exposure to different 
substances.
8  It is also an area, however, where agencies have often exaggerated the role of 
science and thus have escaped responsibility for giving careful reasons for the value judgments 
implicit in their decisionmaking.
9 
    EPA’s recent revisions to its air quality standards hold enormous implications for society 
in terms of their impact on both public health and the economy.
10  These revisions generated 
substantial political controversy
11 and led to several rounds of litigation.
12  In the initial round in 
                                                           
5  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES 24 (2000) (“In the absence of sound scientific information, 
high-risk problems might not be adequately addressed, while high-profile but lower-risk problems might be targeted 
wastefully.”); CHRISTOPHER  F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW: RETHINKING  JUDICIAL  CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY  14 (1990) (highlighting science as one of the three central aspects of administrative 
decisionmaking); Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from 
Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOL. L.Q. 269, 270 (1992) (“Scientific information about the human health risks 
of exposure to toxic chemicals is critical to making sound regulatory decisions.”). 
6  See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
7  EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) 
[hereinafter “EPA, Ozone Final Rule”]; EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter; Final 
Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,651 (July 18, 1997) [hereinafter “EPA, PM Final Rule”]. 
8  See infra notes 35, 410 and accompanying text. 
9  Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COL. L. REV. 1613 (1995). 
10  See infra notes 366-67 and accompanying text. 
11  See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
12   The standards were the subject of multiple decisions in the D.C. Circuit Court in addition to a major decision in 
the Supreme Court.  For discussion of the litigation, see infra notes 13-18, 405-09 and accompanying text.   3
the United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the majority rejected 
EPA’s revised standards, holding that the Agency’s application of the Clean Air Act violated the 
constitutional non-delegation doctrine.
13  Congress delegated authority to the EPA to set air 
quality standards that “protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety,”
14 language 
that the majority held could meet constitutional muster only if EPA applied an “intelligible 
principle” to cabin its discretion in setting air quality standards.
15  The D.C. Circuit’s novel 
constitutional ruling generated considerable attention and seemed even possibly to cast other 
regulatory statutes into some doubt.
16  On appeal, in the much-heralded case of Whitman v. 
American Trucking Associations,
17 the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s constitutional 
analysis, holding that the Clean Air Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine.
18 
    The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Act -- and by implication EPA’s revised 
standards -- against constitutional challenge resolved what had become one of the most 
significant and controversial issues in environmental, health, and safety regulation to have 
emerged in recent years.  Although the constitutional issues raised by the case have been settled, 
the revised ozone and particulate standards remain one of the EPA’s most significant 
                                                           
13  American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
14  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
15   American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1037. 
16  The constitutional issues presented in Whitman received extensive academic and legal analysis. E.g., Craig N. 
Oren, Run Over By American Trucking Part I; Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 
10,653 (Nov. 1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303 (1999) 
[hereinafter “Sunstein, Unconstitutionality”]; Richard J. Pierce, The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency 
Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63 (2000); C. Boyden Gray, The 
Search for an Intelligible Principle: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
1 (2000).; Ernest Gellhorn, The Proper Role of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. 10232 (2001); 
Thomas O. McGarity, The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding Administrative 
Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks 
After ATA, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 [hereinafter “Sunstein, Regulating Risks”]; Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and 
the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121 (2001); Cary Coglianese, The Constitution and the Cost of 
Clean Air, 42 ENVT. 32 (2000); Bressman, supra note 1. 
17  531 U.S. 457 (2001).  
18   Id. at 475-76.  The Supreme Court also rejected industry’s statutory argument that the EPA can consider costs in 
setting air quality standards, affirming a string of D.C. Circuit decisions holding likewise.  Id. at 464-71; see also 
Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); 
American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 134 F. 3d 388, 389 (1998); NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F. 2d 962, 973 (1990), 
vacated in part on other grounds, NRDC v. EPA, 921 F. 2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991); American Petroleum Institute v. 
Costle, 665 F. 2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  The Supreme Court did leave open the possibility for separate 
consideration of the EPA’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard on further review in the D.C. 
Circuit.  Id.  at 476.  Given the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the adequacy of EPA’s decision making on 
constitutional grounds, it came as little surprise that the D.C. Circuit subsequently (although not necessarily   4
environmental policy decisions of all time.  Not only will the standards have important impacts 
on public health, but these two standards alone are expected to impose more costs on the 
economy than all other air pollution regulations combined.
19   The policy significance of these 
standards makes all the more salient another vital issue raised by this case, one that was not 
explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court and which has also escaped much scrutiny in the 
academic commentary on the case.
20  That is the issue of the appropriate role of science in setting 
risk standards. 
    Agencies like EPA must rely on science to make well-informed and effective policy 
decisions, but they cannot rely on science exclusively to justify policy decisions, such as where 
air quality standards should be set.
21  This article explains how EPA’s invocation of science in 
defense of its new air quality standards contributed to, or at least deflected attention from, a 
remarkable series of inconsistencies in EPA’s positions.  Given the way EPA and the courts have 
interpreted the Clean Air Act, the Agency has been able to, if not even forced to, cloak its policy 
judgments under the guise of scientific objectivity, with the consequence that the Agency has 
evaded accountability for a shifting set of policy positions having major implications for public 
health and the economy.
22  In short, EPA’s use of a science-based rhetoric enabled it to avoid 
responsibility for providing any clear, consistent reasons for its policy choices in setting air 
quality standards.
23  The Agency’s shifting and incoherent approach to its NAAQS decisions 
ultimately fails to live up to the aspiration for reasoned decisionmaking that undergirds 
contemporary administrative law.
24 
    In Part I of this article, we show how EPA invoked science to justify its NAAQS 
revisions and we explain why such an approach misconceived the role of science in regulatory 
decisionmaking.
25   Drawing on the conventional distinction between risk assessment and risk 
management, we show how EPA’s retreat behind the cloak of science mistook the normative 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
correctly) found EPA’s decisionmaking to withstand the arbitrary and capricious test.  American Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc. v. Whitman, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
19  See infra notes 367 and accompanying text. 
20   The academic literature has focused predominantly on the constitutional issues raised in Whitman.   See supra 
note 16.  
21  See infra notes Part I.B. 
22  See infra Part II. 
23  Id. 
24  On administrative law’s aspirations for reason, see supra notes 1, 4 and infra notes 395-99. 
25  See infra Part I.   5
nature of risk management decisions, such as those involved in setting air quality standards.  We 
also show how policy choices enter into standard setting even more starkly for non-threshold 
pollutants (such as ozone and particulates), where it appears there is no level of exposure that is 
free from all health effects.   
    In Part II, we show how EPA’s positions on various aspects of its NAAQS 
decisionmaking have shifted over time, even during the course of its most recent rulemakings on 
ozone and particulate matter.
26  When agencies rely on science as a justification for how they set 
risk standards, they neglect to offer a principled justification for their policy decisions.
27  Indeed, 
EPA has quite explicitly argued that it should be able to approach each NAAQS rulemaking in 
an ad hoc manner.
28  With such an ad hoc approach to risk management, inconsistencies are to be 
expected as an inevitable result, as we show in the incoherent positions EPA adopted in its recent 
revisions to its air quality standards.   
    Finally, in Part III we review several alternative principles for justifying risk standards, 
showing what direction EPA and other regulatory agencies need to take in order to develop more 
principled approaches to risk management.
29  We conclude that in order to bring greater clarity 
and coherence to air quality standard-setting, Congress will need to step in and direct EPA to use 
clear policy principles in justifying its decisions.  This will almost certainly require a repudiation 
of a fundamental fiction, endorsed by both EPA and the Supreme Court in Whitman, that risk 
standards can be set without consideration for the costs or feasibility of complying with them.
30  
By amending the underlying statute, Congress can enable and encourage the Agency to live up to 
the aspirations for reason embedded within contemporary administrative law. 
 
I. Science and Setting Risk Standards 
    Throughout its recent ozone and particulate matter rulemakings, EPA attempted to justify 
its selection of its air quality standards based on scientific evidence, namely evidence of the 
                                                           
26  See infra Part II. 
27  By “principled justification” we simply mean an explicit reason or explanation for why, given what is known 
about the world, a standard should be set at a particular level, such that in situations with similar conditions a similar 
result should follow. 
28  See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
29  See infra Part III. 
30   See supra Part III.B.   6
health effects of pollution.
31  In the early stages of the rulemaking, EPA’s emphasis on science 
was more restrained, and Agency documents sometimes noted obliquely that there was some 
room for policy inputs in risk management.
32  However, as the Agency’s rulemaking proceedings 
progressed, and as the amount of controversy surrounding them increased, EPA’s reliance on 
science to justify and defend its standards became more pronounced. 
    EPA initially emphasized its scientific evidence partly in response to a campaign by 
opponents who questioned the soundness of the science underlying EPA’s standards.
33  EPA 
understandably responded to these attacks by attempting to defend the validity of its scientific 
findings.  Yet in addition to defending the Agency’s scientific research on its own merits, the 
EPA soon came to inflate the role of science, using science to justify its standards in order to 
provide greater support for EPA’s position in the political arena and the courts.
34 
    In this Part, we show how EPA appealed to a science-based rhetoric in its ozone and 
particulate matter rulemakings and we explain why such an exclusive reliance on science is 
fundamentally mistaken.  Science does properly play a vital role in environmental regulatory 
decisions and regulatory agencies do need to develop credible and relevant scientific analysis of 
                                                           
31  Throughout this article, we use the terms “science” or “scientific evidence” to refer to the natural sciences, 
though our discussion would in theory apply to positive social science as well.  In addition, while we refer to “EPA” 
repeatedly in this article in its capacity as a legal entity, we recognize that government organizations are not unitary 
actors, but instead are comprised of many individuals with views that may or may not be in agreement with the 
Agency’s official rulemaking documents and court briefs.  
32  See infra notes 162 and accompanying text. 
33  See, e.g., Allan Freedman, Latest Fight on Clean Air Rules Centers on Scientific Data, CONG. QUART., March 1, 
1997, at 530; Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA Says, 
27 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997) (“Industry officials ... continued to hammer EPA proposals as lacking a 
sound scientific basis.”); Joby Warrick, Panel Seeks Cease-Fire on Air Quality But Gets a War, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 
1997, at A21 (describing opponents of EPA air quality standards carrying placards reading “EPA – Show me the 
science.”). 
34  A telling anecdote of this shift in EPA’s emphasis is can be found in Professor Craig Oren’s contrasting of two 
statements by EPA Administrator Carol Browner.  Oren, supra note 16.  In November 1996, at the time the ozone 
and fine PM standards were first proposed, the EPA Administrator was quoted as stating that “[t]he question is not 
one of science, the real question is one of judgment.”  Air Pollution: Agency Announces Proposals to Toughen 
Regulations for Ozone, Particulate Matter, 27 Env't Rep. 1571 (Nov. 29, 1996). Four months later, at the height of 
heated public, congressional, and regulatory debate on the standards, Administrator Browner made a 180-degree 
reversal, stating that “I think it is not a question of judgment, I think it is a question of science.”  Air Quality 
Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA Says, 27 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 
2068 (Feb. 14, 1997).  As we outline infra in Part I.A, the EPA never emerged from its retreat behind the cloak of 
science and indeed only covered itself still further behind its apparent shield.  Of course, this is not the first time that 
EPA has made an about-face on the role of science and policy in its decision-making.  See Sheila Jasanoff, The 
Problem of Rationality in American Health and Safety Regulation, IN ROGER SMITH & BRIAN WYNNE, EDS., EXPERT 
EVIDENCE: INTERPRETING  SCIENCE IN THE LAW  151, 168-69 (1989) (describing EPA’s contradictory 
characterization of its cancer principles in the context of proceedings involving the pesticides heptachlor and 
chlordane in the 1970s).   7
environmental risks.
35  Yet for whatever reason, regulatory agencies have too often invoked 
science in order to answer questions that science is not designed to answer.
36  By purporting to 
rely on science to justify normative policy decisions, agencies succumb to a category mistake, 
since science speaks to what is rather than to what should be.
37  Relying exclusively on science, 
as EPA has done in its ozone and particulate rulemakings, is as misguided as it would be to 
disregard relevant scientific information altogether.
38  
 
A. “Listen to the Science:” EPA’s Use of Science as a Policy Rationale 
    Science has considerable rhetorical appeal when it comes to defending regulatory 
decisions, as science is often described and perceived as being “objective.”
39  Because of its 
perceived objectivity, as well as the extensive advancements in science and technology that have 
emerged over the past century, science is viewed by the public as highly credible if not even 
infallible.
40  Politicians and advocates regularly call for government to use “sound science” in 
                                                           
35  See EPA, Safeguarding the Future: Credible Science, Credible Decisions, EPA/600/9-91/050 (Mar. 1992), at 2 
(“Scientific knowledge has assumed an increasingly critical role as the environmental issues faced by the nation and 
the world grow in complexity and cut across all environmental media.”). See also id. at 15 (“Sound science provides 
the foundation for credible environmental decisionmaking.”); EPA, 2003 Strategic Plan (Draft, Mar. 5, 2003), at 
Cross-Goal Strategies 23 (“Sound science is the foundation of EPA’s work.”) (quoting speech by Administrator 
Christine Todd Whitman); MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 8 
(1999) (noting that science plays “an important part in environmental regulatory decisions”). 
36  Wagner, supra note 9. 
37  This is not to say, of course, that normative judgments cannot affect the way that questions of scientific research 
are framed nor how scientific research is interpreted.  On the contrary, especially with policy-relevant research, the 
ways in which normative judgments enter into the research process can themselves be “disguised in the cloak of 
objectivity.”  Peter Brown, Ethics and Policy Research, POLICY ANALYSIS 325, 340 (1976).   See also infra notes 
107-08 and accompanying text. 
38   For an argument that agencies sometimes disregard scientific evidence, see James W. Conrad, Jr., The Reverse 
Science Charade, 33 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,306 (April 2003). 
39  Whether the “objectivity” of science even makes sense as a philosophical or sociological matter is certainly 
subject to debate.  SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 207 
(1995) (“There is no way for the law to access a domain of facts untouched by values or social interests.”).  See also 
SCIENCE WARS (Andrew Ross, ed. 1996); AFTER THE SCIENCE WARS (Keith M. Ashman & Philip S. Baringer, eds. 
2001).  Regardless of where one stands on this issue, the fact that science is perceived by many people to be 
“objective” does lend persuasive strength to scientific claims when they are made in political and legal fora.  See, 
e.g., James Wilson & J.W. Anderson, What the Science Says: How We Use It and Abuse It to Make Health and 
Environmental Policy, in WALLACE  OATES,  ED., THE  RFF READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT  3, 4 (1999) (“To many laymen, certainty and precision is the essence of science: as they understand 
it, a scientific question can have only one right answer.”); American Trucking, 175 F. 3d at 1059 (asserting that 
because members of the EPA’s Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC) bring “scientific methods to their 
evaluation of the Agency's Criteria Document and Staff Paper, CASAC provides an objective justification for the 
pollution standards the Agency selects.”) (J. Tatel, dissenting).  
40  See, e.g., Samuel J. McNaughton, What Is Good Science?, NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT, Spring 1999, 
at 513, 519 (“[S]cience in our society has come to have a quality of infallibility attached to it.”); National Science   8
making regulatory decisions.
41   For regulators, invoking science to defend a regulatory decision 
can be an effective and expedient political strategy.
42   Professor Wendy Wagner has dubbed this 
practice a “science charade,” which occurs when agencies overstate the role of science in 
regulatory decisionmaking in order to escape scrutiny.
43  Given the political appeal of science, 
regulatory decisionmakers, as well as other participants in the regulatory process, have an 
incentive to exaggerate the determinacy of science in an effort to mask more contested policy 
choices.
44 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Foundation, Public Attitudes Toward Science and Technology, in Science and Engineering Indicators 2000 (2001) 
(available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind00/access/c8/c8s2.htm#attitude) (describing general trust by public in 
scientists and medical researchers); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 569-75 (1992) (discussing the “allure of science” in 
environmental decisionmaking).  
41  See, e.g., Testimony of James M. Harless, Techna Corporation, before the House Small Business Committee, 
April 15, 1997 (“A common refrain today among all stakeholders in the regulatory process is ‘use good science.’”). 
42  Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable 
Public Administration, 20 OX. J. L. STUD. 109, 130 (2000) (noting tendency for increased reliance on science in 
standard-setting because of its perceived objectivity and legitimacy); KAREN  T. LITFIN, OZONE  DISCOURSES: 
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL  ENVIRONMENTAL  COOPERATION 4 (1994) (observing that science is a “key 
source of legitimation”); POWELL, supra note 35, at 6 (noting that science “is a favorite weapon in political battles 
over environmental policy”).  Not only can policymakers use science to defend decisions to issue new regulatory 
standards, as in the EPA did in the case of its revised NAAQS, but the use of science for legitimation can also be 
used to defend decisions to defer issuing new standards as well.  For an argument that science has been used as a 
political defense for regulatory inaction over food safety, see MARION  NESTLE, SAFE  FOOD: BACTERIA, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOTERRORISM 46 (2003) (noting “the invocation of ‘science’ as an obstructive measure” 
thwarting the development of regulations on the use of antibiotics in animal feed).  
43  Wagner, supra note 9, at 1617. 
44  E.g., RICHARD  N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING  OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 269 (1999) (EPA risk-based decisions “in effect used scientific language to 
mask fundamentally political decisions, and to allow policy to be controlled by an EPA subgovernment rather than 
by a broader political process.”); David L. Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SCIENCE 277, 278 (1979) 
(“[S]cientists are tempted to disguise controversial value decisions in the cloak of scientific objectivity, obscuring 
those decisions from political accountability.”); Giandomenico Majone, Science and Trans-Science in Standard 
Setting, 9  SCI. TECH. & HUMAN  VALUES 15, 15 (1984) (“Traditionally, government regulators have sought 
legitimacy for their decisions by wrapping them in a cloak of scientific respectability.”); Mark E. Rushefsky, The 
Misuse of Science in Governmental Decisionmaking, 9 Sci., Tech. & Human Values 47, 47 (1984) (“Some 
policymakers have attempted also to legitimize decisions by clothing them with the ‘respectable neutrality’ of 
science.”); Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Role of Science in Policy, ENVIRONMENT, June 1999, at 17, 19 (“[I]f the level 
of uncertainty is high enough, science may become the principal lever that all sides use to justify positions reached 
primarily on other grounds.”); Andrew D. Siegel, The Aftermath of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC: A 
Broader Notion of Judicial Deference to Agency Expertise, 11 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 331, 377 (1987) (“One possible 
result of the deference [to scientific findings] rule is that agencies will strain to characterize their policy decisions, 
especially if they are controversial, as resting on technical or scientific judgments.”); JASANOFF, supra note 39, at 
207 (1995) (noting “the law’s desire to cloak morally difficult judgments with the ‘objective’ authority of experts 
and instruments”); National Environmental Policy Institute, Enhancing Science in the Regulatory Process 5 (1998) 
(observing that policymakers can blame science “instead of acknowledging social, political, or economic bases for 
policy decisions and taking responsibility for including those factors in their decisions”); LITFIN, supra note 42, at 4 
(“[T]he cultural role of science as a key source of legitimation means that political debates are framed in scientific   9
    Perhaps no agency has so mistakenly advanced science as a justification for its policy 
decisions as prominently as did the EPA in justifying and defending its recent revisions to air 
quality standards for ozone and particulate matter.  In its rulemaking documents, in the courts, in 
Congress, and before the general public, EPA invoked science as its exclusive justification for 
revising its air quality standards.
45  The EPA Administrator repeatedly argued that she simply 
“listened to the science” in establishing new air quality standards.
46  The Agency generally 
avoided describing its decisions as policy judgments that required the articulation of a principled 
explanation for why the standards should be lowered to the level they were.  Instead, EPA sought 
to defend its decisions as ones that were determined exclusively by scientific evidence.
47 
    The Clean Air Act specifies the steps the EPA is to take in setting or revising its air 
quality standards.
48  The Act provides, in section 108, that the first step in promulgating a new or 
revised NAAQS is for the Agency to prepare a “criteria document” for the relevant pollutant.  
The criteria document is required to report “the latest scientific knowledge” on “all identifiable 
effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in 
the ambient air.”
49  Section 109 of the Act then directs the EPA Administrator to use her 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
terms; questions of value become reframed as questions of fact, with each confrontation leading to the search for 
further scientific justification.”). 
45  The EPA and other regulatory agencies have had a long history of invoking science as a policy rationale, under 
both Democratic and Republican Administrations, as have other agencies.  See Wagner, supra note 9.  For example, 
former Administrator William Reilly, working in a first Bush Administration, called generally for more “science-
based regulation,” arguing that “EPA must and will continue to rely on a rational, science-based process for 
determining when to take risk management actions.”  William Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking the 
Nation’s Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVTL. L.  1359, 1364 (1991).  Since EPA’s decisions to revise the ozone and 
particulate standards were some of the most costly and controversial  risk management decisions in the Agency’s 
history, the extent to which EPA used science as a shield appeared to be particularly acute in this instance. 
46  See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text. 
47  See infra Part I.A.  The science-based rationale deployed by EPA was not merely an example of political rhetoric, 
as serious legal scholars have also argued for a similar normative justification for environmental standard-setting.  
For example, Dan Tarlock has suggested, with only some qualifications, that “environmental law and management 
should derive their primary political power and legitimacy from science, not ethics.”  A. Dan Tarlock, 
Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 193, 194 (1996).  See also Susan Buck, 
Science as a Substitute for Moral Principle, in JOHN MARTIN GILLROY & JOE BOWERSOX, EDS., THE MORAL 
AUSTERITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING: SUSTAINABILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENT 
IN POLICY AND LAW 25, 27-30 (2002) (arguing that most decisions made by environmental regulators are properly 
based on “scientific and technical information” rather than on “moral principle”).  For additional examples, see also 
infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
48  The Act directs EPA to issue both primary and secondary standards.  Primary standards aim at protecting human 
health, while secondary standards address non-human biological and physical effects.  Although we focus in this 
article on EPA’s decisions to revise its primary standards for ozone and particulates, our discussion of the limits of 
science also applies to secondary standards. 
49  42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(2).  The criteria documents for the most recent revisions of the ozone and particulate matter 
standards were voluminous, spanning over 1500 and 2400 pages respectively.  Although the stage of preparing these   10
“judgment” to select a primary NAAQS that is “requisite to protect the public health” based on 
the criteria document and allowing for “an adequate margin of safety.”
50 
    In July 1997, EPA promulgated revised primary NAAQS for ozone and particular matter.  
The Agency revised the previous 0.12 ppm, 1-hour average primary ozone standard to an 0.08 
ppm, 8-hour average standard.
51  It also added two new fine particulate matter standards -- a 15 
￿g/m
3 annual standard and a 65 ￿g/m
3 daily standard for PM2.5
52-- while retaining the existing 
PM10 standard with only minor technical changes.
53  In explaining its decision, EPA stressed the 
sources of information on which it based its decision, principally the risk assessments conducted 
by the Agency’s staff and the advice given by the Agency’s Clean Air Science Advisory 
Committee (CASAC), a panel that is dedicated to providing EPA with scientific input on air 
pollution issues.
54  Yet a statement of information sources is not a statement of principles, and 
nothing in any of these information sources explicated a policy justification for the revised 
standards.
55 
    After EPA promulgated its revised ozone and particulate standards, industry groups and 
three States filed petitions seeking judicial review of the standards in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.   In the initial round of this litigation, EPA argued 
that the Agency’s “scientific review” led it “to the inescapable conclusion” that the existing 
NAAQS were not protecting the public health with an adequate margin of safety.
56  After a panel 
of the Court of Appeals rejected the EPA’s decisions on nondelegation grounds, finding that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
criteria documents can be thought of akin to the stage of risk assessment discussed infra in Part I.B, it is interesting 
to note that, on its face, the language of the Clean Air Act seems to acknowledge that certain policy considerations 
need to enter into the Administrator’s decisionmaking even in the process of listing criteria pollutants and 
developing the criteria documents.  Section 7408(a) directs the Administrator (a) to add to the criteria list those air 
pollutants “which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare;” (b) to ensure that the criteria documents “reflect” the useful and current 
scientific knowledge (though arguably not necessarily be based solely on such knowledge); and (c) to include in 
these documents information about the impact of atmospheric patterns, interactions with other pollutants, and any 
possible impacts on welfare – but only “to the extent practicable.”  42 U.S.C. §7408 (emphasis added). 
50  42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1). 
51  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,857. 
52  PM2.5 refers to particles that are equal to or smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter. The term  “Fg/m
3” means 
“micrograms per cubic meter.” 
53  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,652.  PM10 refers to particles that are equal to or smaller than 10 
micrometers in diameter. 
54  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859; EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,655-56. 
55  For a further discussion of the Agency’s science-based argument in the rulemaking process, see infra Part II.A. 
56  Brief for Respondent U.S. EPA, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, No. 97-1440 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1998), at 
3-4 [hereinafter “EPA, D.C. Cir. PM Brief”].   11
Agency failed to articulate an intelligible principle to guide its NAAQS selection, EPA appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court.  The Agency argued before the Supreme Court that its 
decision under the Clean Air Act did not offend the nondelegation doctrine because the Agency 
had been constrained by three types of factors that together effectively constituted an 
“intelligible principle.”
57  The three factors were the Agency’s criteria documents reflecting “the 
latest scientific knowledge,” the advice from the CASAC, and the rulemaking requirements of 
section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act.  The first two factors – the criteria documents and CASAC 
advice – emphasized scientific inputs exclusively.
58  Since the last of these factors was merely a 
procedural limitation, EPA in effect argued that science alone provided the Agency with an 
intelligible principle for selecting a NAAQS standard. 
    EPA offered other statements in its briefs to the Supreme Court that claimed or suggested 
that its revised standards could be justified on the basis of science alone.  For example, EPA 
argued that “Congress has unambiguously indicated its intent that NAAQS should be based on 
scientific evidence regarding the health and welfare effects of ambient pollution.”
59 In addition, 
the Agency argued “that Congress made a policy choice to cabin EPA’s discretion by requiring 
the Agency to set NAAQS on the basis of a specific body of information: the latest scientific 
knowledge on the public health and welfare effects caused by the presence of criteria pollutants 
in the ambient air.”
60  In its opening brief to the Supreme Court,
61 EPA repeatedly referred to 
scientific evidence as the basis for its NAAQS standards: 
 
•  “EPA revised the PM standards based on new scientific studies that had emerged since 
EPA’s last PM review.”
62 
                                                           
57  Brief for Petitioners U.S. EPA, Browner v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., at 23-24 (No. 99-1257) (July 20, 
2000) [hereinafter “EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief”]. 
58  See supra notes 49, 54 and accompanying text.  Section 109(d)(2)(C) (iv) requires CASAC to provide advice on 
other issues that go beyond scientific matters, but EPA takes the position that “neither CASAC’s recommendations 
nor EPA’s decisions on NAAQS revisions may be influenced by § 109(d)(2)(C)(iv).”  Brief of Respondent United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, No. 97-1441 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 
1998), at 53 [hereinafter “EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief”].  Thus, under EPA’s interpretation of the statute, CASAC’s 
advice in NAAQS proceedings is limited to scientific matters. 
59  Brief for the Federal Respondents, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Browner, at 18 (No. 99-1426) (Sept. 8, 
2000) [hereinafter “EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief”]. 
60  Reply Brief for Petitioner U.S. EPA, Browner v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., at 9 (No. 99-1257) (Oct. 5, 
2000) [hereinafter “EPA, Supreme Court Reply Brief”]. 
61  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 57.   
62  Id.   12
•  “To select the levels requisite to protect public health, with an adequate margin of safety, 
the Administrator relied chiefly on epidemiological studies that employed direct 
measures of fine particles.”
63 
•  “The scientific evidence convinced the Administrator that she should revise both the 
averaging time and the concentration level of the 1979 one-hour ozone standard.”
64  
•  “EPA must consider the factors that the Act prescribes and provide a reasoned 
explanation, based on scientific evidence, for its decision.”
65 
 
EPA even suggested that the Supreme Court should be highly deferential to the Agency under 
the Court’s Baltimore Gas
66 decision precisely because the selection of NAAQS standards was, 
it argued, a “scientific determination.”
67  
    After the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s decision on constitutional and statutory 
grounds, the litigation returned to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration of 
challenges to the rule under the arbitrary and capricious standard.  Again, EPA stressed the 
scientific basis for the standards.  The Agency argued that it had “revised the PM standards 
                                                           
63  Id. at 10. 
64  Id. at 12. 
65  Id. at 30. 
66  Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
67  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra  note 57, at 27 (“When examining this kind of scientific 
determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”) 
(quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).  The type of “scientific determination” that 
the Supreme Court referred to in Baltimore Gas appears to have been much closer to a science-based prediction than 
to a more obviously policy-based judgment such as selecting an air quality standard.  In that case, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission estimated that the long-term environmental impact of nuclear waste disposal was zero, an 
action that the Supreme Court characterized as “making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the 
frontiers of science.”  Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103.  In its reply brief filed with the Supreme Court, EPA 
responded to arguments advanced in various amici  briefs, including one we wrote on behalf of twenty law 
professors and scientists, that the EPA had mistakenly claimed that science by itself could justify its standard-setting 
decisions. Brief for Amici Gary Marchant et al., Browner v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., No. 99-1257 (Sept. 11, 
2000). EPA asserted that “[t]hose amici simply ignore the rulemaking record,” but tellingly the government cited no 
policy justification for its decision in the Federal Register or elsewhere to support its assertion that the Agency had 
indeed recognized a need to make a policy rather than a scientific determination.  EPA, Supreme Court Reply Brief, 
supra note 60, at 6 n.10 (“Those amici simply ignore the rulemaking record.”)  Instead, the Agency only cited two 
supporting EPA staff papers, neither of which provide any policy justification for the Agency’s decisions.  Id. at 6-7 
n.10 (“For example, EPA prepared a detailed ‘Policy Assessment of Scientific and Technical Information’ in each 
rulemaking ‘to evaluate the policy implications of the key studies and scientific information contained in [the 
Criteria Document].’ See PM Staff Paper, at I-1 (lodged with the Clerk); accord Ozone Staff Paper; see also Pet. 
Brief 4 (describing Staff Papers).”).  It speaks volumes that EPA could cite only these supplementary documents, 
which do not provide a policy principle for setting NAAQS standards and which, in any case, are not part of the   13
based primarily on scientific studies that had emerged since EPA’s last review, including an 
extensive body of epidemiological studies on exposure to PM pollution.”
68  Similarly, in 
defending its ozone decision, EPA repeatedly invoked scientific factors for its decision, 
emphasizing in particular that “[s]ignificant new clinical studies provided ‘conclusive evidence’” 
in support of the Agency’s action.
69  
    EPA also took its science-based rhetoric into the halls of Congress, where the Agency 
faced intense opposition to its proposed revisions to the ozone and particulates standards.
70  At a 
legislative hearing in February 1997, Administrator Browner testified that “[c]learly, the science 
calls for action.”
71  “In a most compelling way,” she continued, “the science leads us to the new, 
stronger standards that EPA has proposed for smog and soot.”
72  She argued that “[s]cience now 
tell[s] us that our air pollution standards are not adequate to protect the public’s health.  Let us 
listen to science.”
73  
    At another hearing held a few months later, following completion of the public comment 
period but before announcement of the final standards,  Administrator Browner testified to 
Congress that, “[a]s you can see from the description of the process I went through to choose 
proposed levels on ozone and particulate matter, the focus has been entirely on health, risk, 
exposure and damage to the environment.”
74  On questioning at the same hearing, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Administrator’s actual decision published in the Federal Register nor defended in the Agency’s extensive briefs 
filed with the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court. 
68  Brief for Respondent U.S. EPA, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, No. 97-1440 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2001), 
at 4 [hereinafter “EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. PM Brief”].  See also id. at 2 (“In developing the PM2.5 standards, EPA 
relied primarily on studies.”) and 5 (“To select the levels requisite to protect public health, with an adequate margin 
of safety, the Administrator relied chiefly on epidemiological studies.”).  
69  Brief for Respondent U.S. EPA, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, No. 97-1441 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2001), 
at 8 [hereinafter “EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief”].  See also id. at 4 (asserting that EPA relied on scientific 
criteria as the basis for its decision) and 6 (characterizing the Administrator’s decision as “[b]ased on the extensive 
new science”). 
70  Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 7, 63-65 (2000) (describing the 
intense congressional hearings as “no picnic, especially for Browner”); James D. Wilson & J.W. Anderson, What the 
Science Says: How We Use It and Abuse It to Make Health and Environmental Policy, Summer 1997, RESOURCES 5, 
6 (1997) (“In congressional hearing after hearing, EPA’s Administrator, Carol Browner, defended her proposed 
standards as merely reflecting ‘the science.’”).  Again, this strategy may have also helped defend against critics who 
attacked the credibility of EPA’s scientific analysis.  See supra notes 39, 42 and accompanying text. 
71  Testimony of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA, before the Senate Comm. on Env’t & Public Works, Feb. 
12, 1997, at 4. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 6. 
74  EPA’s Particulate Matter and Ozone Rulemaking: Is EPA Above the Law?, Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the House. Comm. on Government Reform   14
Administrator claimed that “[t]he proposal that we have taken comment on is based on 250 peer-
reviewed, published scientific studies” and that “the best available current science ... forms the 
proposal we have made to the American people.”
75  When urged by one member of Congress to 
keep an open mind on the multiple alternatives that might meet the statutory requirements, the 
Administrator replied succinctly: “We will go where the science takes us.”
76  
  Shortly  after  finalizing  the ozone and PM standards, Administrator Browner appeared 
before Congress to explain her decision.  But in that setting, she identified only scientific factors 
in her decision-making:  
 
Clearly, the best available science shows that the previous standards were not 
adequately protecting Americans from the hazards of breathing polluted air. . . . 
These updated standards are based on more than 250 of the latest, best scientific 
studies on ozone and PM – all of them published, peer-reviewed, fully-debated 
and thoroughly analyzed by the independent scientific committee, CASAC.   
We’re talking literally peer review of peer review of peer review.  It is good 
science.  It is solid science.
77 
 
At another legislative hearing, Administrator Browner stated that “we have to go where the 
science takes us,”
78 suggesting on that and other occasions that the science “determined” or 
“warranted” the new standards.
79 
    EPA continued to invoke science in public speeches, media interviews, and press 
releases.
80  For example, when EPA proposed the revised ozone and PM standards, its press 
release claimed that the proposed standards were required by Congress to be “based solely upon 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Oversight, 105
th Cong., 1
st Sess. (April 23, 1997) [hereinafter “April 23, 1997 Hearing”], at 380 (prepared 
statement of EPA Administrator Carol Browner). 
75  Id. at 396-97. 
76  Id. at 409. 
77  Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator, Before the House Comm. on Commerce (Oct. 1, 1997). 
78  Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator, Before the Subcomms. on Health and Environment and 
Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Commerce (May 15, 1997). 
79  E.g., id. at 1 (“[T]o achieve the goal, set forth in the Clean Air Act, that every American shall breathe clean, 
healthy air – as determined by the latest and best scientific information.”); id. at 2 (“if the science warrants a 
revision to the standards”); Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator, Before the Subcomm. on Energy 
and  Environment of the House Comm. on Science (May 21, 1997)(“if the science warrants a revision in the 
standards”). 
80  Moreover, the Administrator was not the only EPA official to invoke science as the Agency’s justification for its 
NAAQS revisions.  In an interview, EPA’s General Counsel was likewise quoted as saying: “Even without the 
consideration of cost, there are sound scientific reasons for setting the standards at a particular level.”  David 
Rubenstein, Legions of Business Groups Take on the Clean Air Act, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2000, at 96 (quoting 
EPA General Counsel Gary Guzy).   15
the best current scientific opinion on public health effects” and that accordingly the Agency “will 
use the very best science to do what is necessary to protect public health in common-sense, cost-
effective ways.”
81  The Agency’s press release also quoted Administrator Browner as stating that 
“EPA has based its proposal on a thorough review of the best available science.”
82   
    In defending her selection of the proposed standards to the public, the Administrator told 
reporters at a briefing at the Agency that “I think it is not a question of judgment, I think it is a 
question of science.”
83  In Philadelphia, she told the local Chamber of Commerce that “[t]he 
Clean Air Act clearly requires levels of smog and soot to be based solely on health, risk, 
exposure and damage to the environment, as determined by the best available science.”
84  The 
Administrator continued that “[t]he current best science must prevail in determining the level of 
protection the public will be guaranteed.  Nothing else can take precedence.”
85  In a speech to the 
American Enterprise Institute on the proposed air quality standards, Administrator Browner 
stated that “[t]he science is clear and compelling.... We have to go where the best available 
science leads us.”
86  Claiming that science determined the adequacy of the Agency’s revised 
standards, Administrator Browner would typically end her speeches on the ozone and PM 
NAAQS with the admonition: “Let us listen to the science.”
87  
                                                           
81  EPA, EPA Proposes Air Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone, EPA Press Release R-159, Nov. 27, 1996. 
82  Id. 
83  Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA Says, 27 Env’t 
Rep. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997). 
84  Carol M. Browner, Administrator U.S. EPA, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the Greater Philadelphia Chamber 
of Commerce, Philadelphia, PA, May 12, 1997, at 6-7 (available at http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/admspchs/) 
(“Browner Philadelphia Speech”). 
85  Id. at 7.  See also Carol M. Browner, Administrator U.S. EPA, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to Society of 
Environmental Journalists, Peninsula, Ohio, May 17, 1997, at 6 (available at 
http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/admspchs/) (“Browner SEJ Speech”) (urging that “[t]he current best science must 
prevail in determining the level of protection the public would be guaranteed.”). 
86  Carol M. Browner, Administrator U.S. EPA, Remarks Prepared for American Enterprise Institute Conference 
“Clearing the Air: An Examination of EPA’s Proposed Regulations for Particulate Matter and Ozone,” Washington, 
D.C., Feb.. 10, 1997, at 4 (available at http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/admspchs/). In a speech to the City Club of 
Cleveland, the Administrator stated that the EPA was being “truthful” to the American people by telling them that 
science dictated the new standards.  Carol M. Browner, Administrator U.S. EPA, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to 
The City Club of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, March 25, 1997, at 5 (available at 
http://www.yosemite.epa.gov/admspchs/) (“Browner Cleveland Speech”) (claiming that “science now tells us that 
our air pollution standards are not adequate to protect the public’s health” and arguing that EPA needed to revise its 
“standards in order to ensure that we are being truthful with the American people about the quality of the air they are 
breathing and what it is doing to them.”). 
87  Browner SEJ Speech, supra note 85, at 8; Browner Philadelphia Speech, supra note 84, at 7; Browner Cleveland 
Speech, supra note 86, at 10.  See also John H. Cushman, Jr., On Clean Air, Environmental Chief Fought Doggedly,   16
 
B. Standard-Setting, Science, and the Management of Risk 
    Although EPA invoked science as its core defense for its NAAQS revisions, doing so 
mistook the ability of science to serve as a principle for setting environmental policy standards.  
Science describes; it does not prescribe.  As such, scientific claims are empirical rather than 
normative.  Science seeks to supply verifiable descriptions of -- and explanations and inferences 
about -- what is, rather than imposing judgments about what should be.
88  While science provides 
valuable information needed for regulatory decisions, science cannot on its own dictate the 
appropriate decision to be made about where to set environmental standards.
89  
    To clarify the role of science in setting environmental policy, in this section we 
distinguish between two aspects of the standard-setting process: “risk assessment” and “risk 
management.”  The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Won, July 5, 1997, NEW YORK TIMES, A8 (quoting Administrator Browner as stating that “[w]hat we have done 
is follow the science”). 
88  See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, The Distinctive Functions of Science and Law, 24 INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE REV. 87, 
87 (1999) (“The function of science is to enlarge our knowledge and understanding of both the natural and cultural 
environments in which we live.... Thus, the role of science is to learn, to report, and to teach – but only facts.”); Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2002) (“[A]ll empirical research seeks to 
accomplish one of three ends, or more typically some combination thereof: amassing data for use by the researcher 
or others; summarizing data so they are easier to comprehend; and making descriptive or causal inferences.”); Peter 
Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4-5 (1993) (“Science 
appeals to the capacity of technical rationality and specialized expertise to generate and test empirically falsifiable 
propositions.”); Marcia R. Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 385 (1974) (“Science is concerned with describing physical relationships 
and thus with drawing inferences from observed to unobserved behavior.”).  See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (noting that science “is a process for proposing and refining 
theoretical explanations about the world”) (quoting Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science 
et al. as Amici Curiae). 
89  See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW 
DIRECTION FOR EPA (1995) (“Technical information can inform EPA’s decisions, but the decisions remain policy 
judgments with political and ethical components.”) [hereinafter “SETTING  PRIORITIES”]; John S. Applegate, A 
Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1643 (1995) (“Risk is appropriately the starting point of much standard setting and priority setting for health-
based environmental regulation, but other factors must have equal weight...[I]t is the business of public policy, not 
of science, to decide how these problems should be handled.”); JOHN D. GRAHAM, LAURA C. GREEN & MARC J. 
ROBERTS, IN  SEARCH OF SAFETY 218 (1988) (observing that “science cannot answer the ultimate regulatory 
questions”); Paul Fischbeck et al., The Challenge of Improving Regulation, in PAUL  FISCHBECK  & R. SCOTT 
FARROW, EDS., IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 1, 4 (2001) (“Even in the 
best of worlds, good science is rarely sufficient for informed regulatory decisionmaking.”).  To say that science 
alone is not sufficient is not to say that science is not helpful, or even essential, for setting regulatory policy.  Setting 
regulatory standards requires both ethical or policy analysis as well as scientific information.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 69 (1989) (acknowledging that science is not a sufficient basis for setting public 
policy but noting that “both moral understanding and instrumental knowledge are always necessary for policy 
judgments, neither alone can ever be sufficient”).    17
(NAS/NRC) recognized this distinction between risk assessment and risk management in its 
influential 1983 report known as the “Red Book,”
90 which established a framework for risk-
based decision-making that regulatory agencies continue to follow today.  The Red Book defined 
risk assessment as “the characterization of the potential adverse health effects of human 
exposures to environmental hazards.”
91  Risk assessment is based extensively on scientific 
information, supplemented with what have been termed “risk assessment policy” judgments to 
bridge gaps and uncertainties in the scientific evidence.
92  Risk assessment is therefore 
considered to be predominantly – though not exclusively
93 – based on scientific evidence and 
analysis.
94 
                                                           
90  N ATIONAL  ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL  RESEARCH  COUNCIL, RISK  ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) [hereinafter “NAS/NRC RED  BOOK”].  See also  STEPHEN  A. 
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 9 (1993) (noting that risk regulation “has two basic parts, a technical part, 
called ‘risk assessment,’ designed to measure the risk associated with the substance, and a more policy-oriented part, 
called ‘risk management.’”). 
91  NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 12.  See also 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N ON RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND RISK  MANAGEMENT, FINAL  REPORT: RISK  ASSESSMENT AND RISK  MANAGEMENT IN 
REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING 2 (1997) [hereinafter “RISK COMMISSION”) (“Risk assessment is the systematic, 
scientific characterization of potential adverse effect] of human or ecological exposures to hazardous agents or 
activities.”). 
92  NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 37.  Such risk assessment policy judgments include factors such as 
which health effects to consider and to group together, the type of models and assumptions to use in the risk 
assessment, how to extrapolate data from one small segment of a population to the entire population, and how to 
compute, present, and account for uncertainties.  Id. at 29-33. See generally REGULATORY  IMPACT  ANALYSIS 
PROJECT, CHOICES IN RISK  ASSESSMENT: THE  ROLE OF SCIENCE  POLICY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL  RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS 1 (1994) (noting “the gaps and uncertainties in scientific knowledge, data, and methodology 
that arise in assessing the risks to human health and the environment of exposure to substances, conditions, 
activities, and sites.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of 
Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEORGETOWN L. J. 729, 732-747 (1979) 
(discussing a range of science policy issues that arise in risk regulation). 
93  E.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195, 211 (1987) 
(noting that analysts have “agreed that very little in a typical risk assessment could be labeled as pure science”); 
DANIEL M. BYRD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO 
SCIENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING 6-8, 330-34 (2000) (risk assessment inherently and inevitably involves some 
judgment); Mark E. Rushefsky, Assuming the Conclusions: Risk Assessment in the Development of Cancer Policy, 4 
POL. & LIFE SCI. 31 (1985).  Even the NRC, in its “1983 report and accompanying working papers acknowledged 
that risk assessment unavoidably combined elements of both science and policy.”  Sheila Jasanoff, Science, Politics, 
and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA, 7 OSIRIS 195, 209 (1992).  See also infra note 108 and accompanying 
text.     
94  See Frank Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 889-90 & n. 5 (1994) (Even though “purely 
scientific judgments contain underlying values[, i]n the case of risk assessment...the overriding value is accuracy” in 
determining “the objective probability of an event’s occurrence.  Value judgments are largely irrelevant to the 
probabilistic determination of scientific risk.”); Gail Charnley, Democratic Science: Enhancing the Role of Science 
in Stakeholder-Based Risk Management Decision-Making (July 2000) (available at 
http://www.riskworld.com/Nreports/2000/Charnley/NR00GC00.htm) (“[R]isk assessment generally constitutes the 
vehicle for including science in risk management decision-making...[R]isk assessment is based on science to the 
extent possible and on judgment when necessary.”)   18
    Risk management, on the other hand, is “an agency decision-making process that entails 
consideration of political, social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related 
information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory options and to select the appropriate 
regulatory response to a potential chronic health hazard.”
95  Risk management “necessarily 
requires the use of value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the 
reasonableness of the costs of control.”
96  As a subsequent National Research Council report 
reiterated, “science alone can never be an adequate basis for a risk decision” because “[r]isk 
decisions are, ultimately, public policy choices.”
97  The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise 
recognized that the risk management decision of selecting the level at which to set health and 
environmental standards is primarily a policy rather than scientific undertaking.
98  
    While risk assessment is thus conventionally understood to be predominantly (but not 
exclusively) a scientific undertaking, risk management decisions, including the selection of 
regulatory standards, require making value judgments that extend beyond the scope of science.
99  
                                                           
95  NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 18-19.  See also 2 RISK COMMISSION, supra note 91,  at 2 (risk 
management “is the process of identifying, evaluating, selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to human 
health and to ecosystems,” for the purpose of adopting “scientifically sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that 
reduce or prevent risks while taking into account social, cultural, ethical, political, and legal considerations.”); 
SETTING PRIORITIES, supra note 89, at 37 (Risk management “includes a wide array of actions such as writing and 
enforcing regulations, providing information and technical assistance, and establishing market incentives for risk 
reduction.”).  
96  NAS/NRC Red Book, supra note 90, at 19. See also Oren, supra note 16, at 10,660 (“the decision of who should 
be protected, and what effects they should be protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific one”). 
97  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 26 
(1996).  
98  In the Court’s 1980 review of OSHA’s benzene occupational exposure standard, Justice Marshall’s dissenting 
opinion stated: “[W]hen the question involves determination of an acceptable level of risk, the ultimate decision 
must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as well as empirically verifiable facts.  Factual determinations 
can at most define the risk in some statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable cannot be based solely 
on a resolution of the facts.” Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 706 
(1980).  The plurality opinion quoted Justice Marshall’s statement, and then responded: “We agree.  Thus, while the 
Agency must support its finding that a certain level of risk exists by substantial evidence, we recognize that its 
determination that a particular level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy considerations.”  Id. at 655 
n.62 (plurality opinion).  See also  EDLEY, supra note 5, at 75 (noting that in setting new OSHA standards “[s]cience 
alone ... cannot determine what to do with [the] uncertainties” and that “[t]he science is inseparable from the value 
choices which are the familiar grist of political decision making”). 
99  See WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 75-76 (1976) (“Determining safety, then, involves two 
extremely different kinds of activities... Measuring risk - measuring the probability and severity of harm–is an 
empirical, scientific activity; Judging safety– judging the acceptability of risks, is a normative, political activity.”); 
Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Public 
Administration, 20 OX. J. L. STUD. 109, 130 (2000) (Risk “standards are normative prescriptions which require the 
balancing of different social and political factors and the consideration of scientific and other specialist information 
in the context of scientific uncertainty.”).  See also Showdown Over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE July 25, 1997,   19
The NAS/NRC’s Red Book recommended that regulatory agencies “maintain a clear conceptual 
distinction between assessment of risks and consideration of risk management alternatives; that 
is, the scientific findings and policy judgments embodied in risk assessments should be explicitly 
distinguished from the political, economic, and technical considerations that influence the design 
and choice of regulatory strategies.”
100 
    In other contexts, EPA has endorsed and relied on the NAS/NRC’s distinction between 
risk assessment and risk management.
101  For example, in a recent EPA guidance document on 
conducting risk analysis, EPA directed Agency staff to separate risk assessment from risk 
management, with risk assessment involving the selection, evaluation, and presentation of 
“scientific information,” but not “decisions on the acceptability of any risk level for protecting 
public health or selecting procedures for reducing risks.”
102  In contrast, EPA noted that risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
466, 469 (“Deciding whether to set a stringent standard... ‘becomes a value judgment.  It’s not a scientific 
question.’”) (quoting environmental health scientist Arthur Upton). 
100  NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 7.  Even though the authors of the Red Book argued for conceptual 
clarity in distinguishing between risk assessment and risk management, this does not mean that they did not 
acknowledge that policy considerations entered into the risk assessment process.  Id. (noting “the scientific findings 
and policy judgments embodied in risk assessments”).  See also Jasanoff, supra note 34, at 171 (arguing that the 
NRC Red Book “definitively established that most of the determinations made in the process of carcinogenic risk 
assessment involve a mixture of science and policy”).  
101  EPA describes the “risk assessment/risk management paradigm” as an “important Agency organizing principle.” 
EPA, Office of Research and Development, available on-line at http://www.epa.gov/ord/htm/risk.htm (accessed Oct. 
14, 2002).  See also EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Characterization 2 (Feb. 1995) (available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ORD/spc/rcguide. 
htm) (“In 1984, EPA endorsed these [NAS/NRC] distinctions between risk assessment and risk management for 
Agency use, and later relied on them in developing risk assessment guidelines.”) (endnotes omitted) [hereinafter 
“EPA Risk Characterization Guidance”]; EPA, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996) (citing NAS/NRC 
report in adopting risk assessment guidelines “to ensure that the risk assessment process was maintained as a 
scientific effort separate from risk management.”); EPA, Final Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk 
Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63798 (Dec. 5, 1991) (“Risk assessment ... defines the potential adverse health 
consequences of exposure to a toxic agent,” while risk management “combines risk assessment with ... 
socioeconomic, technical, political, and other considerations.”); EPA Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 
63 Fed. Reg. 26,926, 26,928 (May 14, 1998) (“Risk assessment ... defines the potential adverse health consequences 
of exposure to a toxic agent.  The other component, risk management, combines risk assessment with ... 
socioeconomic, technical, political, and other considerations, to reach decisions about the appropriate regulation of 
the suspected toxic agents.”); EPA, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,222, 38,225 (June 3, 2002) (noting that EPA’s overall approach 
to research on drinking water contaminants “is closely aligned with the 1983 National Research Council (NRC) risk 
assessment/risk management paradigm”); EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 
33,992-93 (1986) (stipulating that risk assessment should “use the most scientifically appropriate interpretation” and 
“be carried out independently from considerations of the consequences of regulatory action.”); EPA Guidelines for 
Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846, 26,852 (1998) (“[R]isk assessment and risk management are two 
distinct activities. The former involves the evaluation of the likelihood of adverse effects, while the latter involves 
the selection of a course of action in response to an identified risk that is based on many factors (e.g., social, legal, 
political, or economic) in addition to the risk assessment results.”).  Accord William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, 
and Democracy, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 1985, at 19, 28 (former two-time EPA Administrator advocates “strict 
distinction” between risk assessment and risk management under all statutes dealing with risk). 
102  EPA Risk Characterization Guidance, supra note 101, at 3.   20
management decisions should be based on, to the extent permissible, a consideration of 
“technological feasibility (e.g., treatability, detection limits), economic, social, political, and 
legal factors,” in addition to the output of the risk assessment process.
103  According to the EPA 
guidance document, “risk assessors and risk managers should understand that the regulatory 
decision is usually not determined solely by the outcome of the risk assessment.”
104   In order to 
make risk assessments “transparent,” EPA has further stated that it is important “that conclusions 
drawn from the science are identified separately from policy judgments and risk management 
decisions.”
105  Risk management, the Agency has acknowledged, “goes beyond scientific 
consideration alone.”
106 
     Of course, in practice the distinction between risk assessment and risk management is 
surely not as clear cut as the distinction made in Red Book might suggest.
107  This is because 
policy considerations almost invariably underlie, and may even dominate, many of the choices 
made in conducting a risk assessment, just as they inherently must pervade risk management 
determinations.
108  For this reason, a subsequent National Research Council report has cautioned 
against making a strict separation in practice between the conceptually distinct aspects of risk 
assessment and risk management, because non-scientific considerations, including policy 
                                                           
103  Id.  See also EPA, Science Policy Council Handbook: Risk Characterization (EPA 100-B-00-002, Dec. 2000), at 
51 (“The scientific risk assessment and its peer review provide the sound scientific underpinnings for a decision.  
However, it is only one of many factors that a decision maker considers in arriving at a final environmental 
decision.”). 
104  Id. 
105  EPA, Draft Water Quality Criteria Methodology Revisions: Human Health, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,756, 43,769 (Aug. 
14, 1998). 
106  56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (Dec. 5, 1991); 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926, 26,928 (May 14, 1998).  
107  See Jasanoff, supra note 93, at 209 (noting the “impracticability of cleanly separating science from policy”). 
108  See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 123, 129 (1993); 
Sheila Jasanoff, Relating Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Complete Separation of the Two Processes Is a 
Misconception, EPA  JOURNAL, Jan.-March, 1993, at 35; Mary R. English, Can Risk Assessment and Risk 
Prioritization Be Extricated from Risk Management?, in J. BONIN & D. STEVENSON (EDS), RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES (1989), at 495, 499-500; MARC LANDY, MARC ROBERTS & STEPHEN THOMAS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 186 (2d ed. 1994) (“[T]here is no way to 
make a simple separation between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘policy’ aspects of labeling a compound ‘carcinogenic.’”); 
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING 
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 69 (1993) [hereinafter “CARNEGIE COMMISSION”] (“The lines between science, 
science policy, and policy are fuzzy and wavering.”); Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Science, Values, and Risk, 
545 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 119 (1996) (discussing “the subjective and value-laden nature of 
risk assessment”); Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment 
Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 59, 95 (1997) (“Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a 
blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors.”).   21
concerns and deliberation, are relevant to risk assessment.
109  That said, agencies and 
commentators continue to maintain that, notwithstanding the unavoidable intrusion of certain 
policy considerations, the process of risk assessment remains primarily a scientific undertaking 
that should be treated as largely distinct from the policy-dominated domain of risk 
management.
110  
    For the purpose of this article, the debate over how strictly to distinguish risk assessment 
from risk management is not crucial because it is a debate that focuses on how to characterize the 
risk assessment enterprise.
111  Those who reject a strict dichotomy between risk assessment and 
risk management do so because they conclude that social values inevitably enter into (or should 
enter into) risk assessment judgments, not because they believe risk management decisions can 
be based solely on science.
112  In the debate over the separation of risk assessment and risk 
                                                           
109  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 34. 
110  See, e.g., EPA, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926, 26,950 (May 14, 1998) (distinguishing risk characterization (assessment) 
from risk management and noting that “[t]he risk manager uses the results of the risk characterization along with 
other technological, social, and economic considerations in reaching a regulatory decision.”); USDA Food Safety & 
Inspection Service, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,760, 37,770-71 (May 30, 2002) (defining risk assessment as “[a] scientifically 
based process” and risk management as a “process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing policy alternatives ... 
and, if needed, selecting appropriate prevention and control options); Ruckelshaus, supra note 101, at 28; Bernard 
D. Goldstein, If Risk Management Is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment?, EPA JOURNAL, Jan.-March, 1993, at 37; 
Howard Raiffa, Science and Policy: Their Separation and Integration in Risk Analysis, in HOWARD  C. 
KUNREUTHER & ERYL V. LEVY,  EDS., THE RISK ANALYSIS CONTROVERSY: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 35 
(1982).  See also GRAHAM, GREEN & ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 218 (calling for a “neoseparationist” approach 
which would entail “a good-faith attempt by regulatory institutions to address separately and explicitly the extent of 
risks from chemical exposures and the acceptability of such risks”). 
111  See, e.g., LANDY, ROBERTS, & THOMAS, supra note 108, at 200 (“Risk assessment is an enterprise that is neither 
wholly scientific nor wholly independent of science.”); CARNEGIE  COMMISSION,  supra  note 108, at 79 
(acknowledging that risk assessment can be “assumption- and value-laden”); Terry Davies, Risk Assessment in 
Environmental Policy, EARTH MATTERS, March 1999, p. 8 (noting that “the practice of risk assessment has, from the 
beginning, been a hybrid mixture of science and non-science”). 
112  See, e.g., Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 
147(challenging the conventional separation between risk assessment and risk management by arguing that “social 
policy considerations must play as prominent a role in the choice of risk estimates [i.e., risk assessment] as in the 
ultimate determination of which predicted risks should be deemed unacceptable [i.e., risk management]”).  In part 
this criticism emerges because the conventional separation between risk assessment and risk management serves to 
draw a boundary that may make it appear as if risk assessment is a purely scientific enterprise.  See, e.g., DANIEL M. 
BYRD AND C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS (2000) (noting that risk assessors at times 
“attempt to disguise ... values and ethics in some decisions with scientific or technical labels.”).  Of course, 
demarking where science ends and policy begins, sometimes referred to as “boundary work,” is seldom easy or 
uncontestable.  See generally, THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE 
(1999); Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundaries of Science, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 393 (Sheila 
Jasanoff et al., eds., 1995).    22
management, neither side disputes that risk management decisions are normative ones or that 
they require reference to policy principles in addition to scientific findings.
113 
    We have highlighted the distinction between risk assessment and risk management here 
because deciding where to set an air quality standard is a decision that falls squarely in the 
domain of risk management.
114   EPA’s national ambient air quality standards represent the core 
risk management objectives for the nation, with significant regulatory ramifications depending 
on the levels at which these standards are set.  Areas of the country that do not attain a level of 
air quality that meets the NAAQS are subject to more stringent regulatory controls, such as 
standards for reformulated gasoline, automobile inspection and maintenance programs, and 
tighter federal standards for the development of new sources of pollution.
115  In setting NAAQS, 
or any other regulatory standard, EPA officials need to draw upon the available scientific 
evidence on the health effects of different pollutants, but ultimately they must make a decision 
based on factors other than just the science.  Scientific data on ozone and particulate matter do 
                                                           
113  See generally Ralph L. Keeney, The Role of Values in Risk Management, 545 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. SOC. 
SCI. 126, 134 (discussing how “values are crucial to risk management”). 
114  The development of a regulatory standard is the quintessential risk management decision.  See, e.g., SETTING 
PRIORITIES, supra note 89, at 37 (noting that risk management includes “writing and enforcing regulations”); RISK 
COMMISSION, supra note 91, at 1 (describing the “traditional definition” as referring “to the process of evaluating 
alternative regulatory actions and selecting among them,” though arguing for a still broader conception of risk 
management to include voluntary, private sector initiatives); Fisher, supra note , at 113 (“risk regulation standards 
are regulative and thus normative prescriptions”) (emphasis in original).  EPA has frequently characterized air 
quality standard setting as a risk management process.  See, e.g., EPA Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,840 (Sept. 30, 1999) (characterizing decisions about “the 
protectiveness of the MACT standards” as “national risk management decisions”); EPA NESHAP for Pesticide 
Active Ingredient Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,550, 33,553 (June 23, 1999) (noting that “[t]he EPA's risk management 
strategy could include the development of risk based emission standards under the CAA”); EPA, Revision to 
Particulate Matter NAAQS, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38668 (July 18, 1997) (referring to the “risk management for a 
short-term standard”); EPA, Revised Monitoring Requirements for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,764, 38,780 
(July 18, 1997) (noting EPA’s “risk management approach” in setting NAAQS); EPA, Proposed Monitoring 
Requirements for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,780, 65,792 (Dec. 13, 1996) (referring to “the risk 
management approach of the proposed new PM sub 2.5 NAAQS”); EPA, ANPRM for Ozone and Particulate Matter 
NAAQS Revisions, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,723, 29,719 (June 12, 1996) (describing EPA’s decision as one of “selecting a 
suite of standards that would focus risk management approaches”); EPA Arsenic NESHAPS, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,956, 
27,957-58 (Aug. 4, 1986) (describing EPA’s “risk management approach” to selecting standards); EPA, 
Radionuclides NESHAPS, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,906, 43,909 (Oct. 31, 1984) (“[T]he individual facts, calculational 
operations, scientific judgments, and estimates of uncertainty [are] documented and integrated in a clear and logical 
manner to provide a risk assessment that can be used as a scientific basis for risk management purposes, i.e., 
standard-setting.”). 
115  42 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a) & (c), 7507, 7511a, 7512-7512a, 7513-7513(b), 7545.   23
not and cannot, without more, provide a principled justification for the level at which the 
respective air quality standards are set.
116   
 
C. The Clean Air Act and the Problem of Non-Threshold Pollutants  
    Given the way the Clean Air Act has been written and interpreted, scholars have 
sometimes suggested that EPA not only can, but legally must base its NAAQS decisions solely 
on science.  For example, Professor Lisa Heinzerling has argued that EPA properly revised its 
standards “based on mounting scientific evidence of the harmfulness of these pollutants at levels 
allowed by the existing standards.”
117  Similarly, Professor Robert Percival has argued that 
“EPA’s determination of what levels of air pollution harm health has consistently been 
understood to require a judgment based on science, not economics.”
118   The Clean Air Act does 
specify the steps the EPA is to take in setting or revising its air quality standards,
119 and these 
steps have been interpreted to preclude the consider of cost considerations.
120  But even though 
EPA may be constrained in certain ways by the statute, this does not negate the inherent 
necessity of making risk management policy judgments when setting air quality standards.   
                                                           
116  See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (the selection of a NAAQS  “presents 
complex questions of science, law, and social policy under the Act”); Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham, 
former Director of Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14, 1999) (1999 WL 
27595650) (“[S]cientific information (alone) does not typically provide an intelligible basis for the setting of safe 
(yet non-zero) amounts of air pollution.”); Oren, supra note 16, at 10,660 (“the decision of who should be protected, 
and what effects they should be protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific one.”); Morton Lippman, 
Role of Science Advisory Groups in Establishing Standards for Ambient Air Pollutants, 6 AEROSOL SCI. TECH. 93, 
114 (1987) (with respect to setting NAAQS standards, “[s]cience and scientists cannot solve all of the EPA’s 
problems”).  For a discussion of policy principles applicable to setting air quality standards, see infra Part III.A. 
117  Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS  UNIV. L. REV. 121, 122 (2001).  
Heinzerling also has claimed that EPA’s “standards [were] promulgated based on this body of scientific evidence.” 
Id.  See also David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to Replace Basic Technologies 
with Cleaner Technologies, 32 ENVT. L. REP. 10,277 (Mar. 2002) (noting that “[t]he revised standards reflect new 
health data”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding 
Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 2 (2000) (stating that 
each time EPA has established or revised a NAAQS “the Agency based its decision on one or more air quality 
criteria documents that set out in considerable detail the available scientific information on the adverse health effects 
of the relevant pollutants”).  To be sure, science could demonstrate that health effects occurred at levels of exposure 
below current standards, but this scientific evidence by itself cannot be used to justify a decision about where a 
standard should be set.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
118  Robert V. Percival, Joint Center Amici Brief Misses the Mark, Policy Matters 00-11 (Aug. 2000) (available at 
www.aei.brookings.org/publications/policy/policy_ 
00_11.asp). 
119  See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
120  Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); 
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 464-470.   24
    As noted earlier, the Clean Air Act provides that in promulgating a new or revised 
NAAQS the EPA must draw upon a “criteria document” that reflects “the latest scientific 
knowledge” of the health effects of the relevant pollutant.
121  Then, under section 109 of the Act, 
the EPA is to set a standard that is “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate 
margin of safety.”
122  The legislative history of the Clean Air Act provides some additional 
guidance for construing the brief statutory language.  In 1970, when the current language of 
section 109 was enacted, the Senate Report stated that the objective of air quality standards was 
to ensure “an absence of adverse effects on the health of a statistically related sample of persons 
in sensitive groups.”
123  NAAQS were intended to protect susceptible groups such as “bronchial 
asthmatics and emphysematics who in the normal course of daily activity are exposed to the 
ambient environment.”
124  Based on this language, EPA and the courts have construed section 
109 to require air quality standards to “be set at a level at which there is ‘an absence of adverse 
effect’ on .... sensitive individuals.”
125 
  Moreover,  NAAQS  must  provide a “margin of safety” to ensure that “a reasonable degree 
of protection is to be provided against hazards which research has not yet identified.”
126  Thus, at 
least as reflected in the Senate Report in 1970, EPA was required to set NAAQS at a level that 
would ensure no detectable adverse health effects in even susceptible sub-groups of the 
population, and then to add an additional margin of safety to protect against unknown health 
risks that may be discovered in the future.  In short, the NAAQS were apparently intended to 
provide near-absolute protection against adverse health effects. 
                                                           
121  42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(2). 
122  42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1). 
123  S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91
st Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (1977).  The Senate explained that an adequate sample is “the 
number of persons necessary to test in order to detect a deviation in the health of any person within such sensitive 
group which is attributable to the condition of the ambient air.”  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1153 (stating and approving EPA’s position).  See also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 464-
65 (agreeing with the approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Lead Industries). 
126  Sen. Rep. No. 1196, 91
st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970); Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1150.  See also id. at 1155 
(observing that the margin of safety requirement was intended to protect against health effects “research has not yet 
uncovered”); EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,857 (“The margin of safety requirement was intended to 
address uncertainties associated with inconclusive scientific and technical information available at the time of 
standard setting, as well as to provide a reasonable degree of protection against hazards that research has not yet 
identified.  Both kinds of uncertainties are components of the risk associated with pollution at levels below those at 
which human health effects can be said to occur with reasonable scientific certainty.”); EPA, PM Final Rule, supra 
note 7, at 38,653 (same).   25
    The statutory provisions for adopting NAAQS, initially enacted in their present form in 
1970, are based on the assumption that pollutants have thresholds for which it is possible to set a 
“safe” level.
127  Such a “threshold pollutant” causes adverse effects only above a certain 
exposure level, designated as the threshold level.  In contrast, a “non-threshold” pollutant is one 
that may cause adverse effects at any level above zero exposure.
128   
    For threshold pollutants, it would appear as if science alone might almost be sufficient to 
determine the level at which an air quality standard should be set.  If a pollutant shows a clear 
threshold, the science would presumably provide the basis for using this threshold as a “safe” 
point below which the regulator could be assured the complete protection of public health.  Yet 
even with threshold pollutants, some  judgments would still be required on the part of the 
Administrator.  Some of these judgments would call for the kind of gap-filling policy judgments 
that often arise in the risk assessment process, while others would call for the kind of core policy 
choices that are inherent in risk management decisionmaking, such as even whether it is 
worthwhile to achieve an absolute level of safety.
129  Moreover, the Administrator must make a 
clear policy judgment in selecting an “adequate margin of safety” to protect against uncertain or 
unknown health effects at lower exposure levels.
130  Science can play an extensive role in setting 
a bright line standard for a threshold pollutant, but even with such pollutants, a regulator must 
make some policy judgments when setting an air quality standard and determining an adequate 
margin of safety. 
                                                           
127  See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Environmental Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Health, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 at 8 (1977) (Sen. Muskie) (“The 
Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a 
threshold.”); Joseph Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 823 (1994) (“A 
critical ... assumption underlies ... the structure of the Clean Air Act. ... The assumption is that, for each pollutant of 
concern, there is a threshold concentration, represented by the NAAQS, above which the pollutant is a threat to 
health or welfare and below which it is not”); William K. Reilly, Foreward to ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN, SENSITIVE 
POPULATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS vii, vii (The Conservation Foundation, 1981) (“The Clean Air Act 
incorporates the notion of threshold values of pollutants, levels below which there are presumed to be no adverse 
health effects, and requires that standards be set on the basis of the threshold, with a margin of safety.”). 
128  See Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (a “non-threshold” 
pollutant is one that “appears to create a risk to health at all non-zero levels of  emission”).  A non-threshold 
pollutant is always defined provisionally, because it is “impossible to scientifically prove the absence of a threshold, 
as one can never prove a negative.”  David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in CASARETT & 
DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS (C. Klaassen, ed., 6
th ed. 2001), at 11, 21.  
129  Judgment would be needed in evaluating the scientific evidence indicating that a threshold exists, in determining 
that the threshold has been adequately specified, and in defining what counts as an “adverse effect” covered by the 
threshold.  Judgment would also be needed to determine whether the threshold protected susceptible groups and 
accounted for inter-individual variability in response to the pollutant in question.  
130  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).   26
    The need for making a policy judgment is still clearer for non-threshold pollutants.   
Unlike with threshold pollutants, where a standard can be set at a level below the threshold to 
provide complete health protection, the only way to protect against all adverse health effects 
from a non-threshold pollutant would be to set a standard at the level of zero.  Given the 
continuum of health effects for the non-threshold air pollutants, no standard other than one set at 
zero can provide complete and certain protection against all health effects.
131  As a result, when 
regulators set standards for non-threshold pollutants at levels other than  zero, they must at least 
implicitly do so based on some criteria other than the science, since the science indicates that 
health effects likely occur at levels below the standard selected by the regulators. 
    It turns out that few, if any, criteria pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act exhibit a 
clear threshold.
132  The scientific data for ozone and fine PM indicate a continuum of health 
effects down to background (or natural) concentrations of the pollutants in the air, at which point 
the health effects associated with the pollutants cannot be distinguished from effects caused by 
other factors.
133  In other words, there is no identifiable threshold below which a standard for 
ozone or particulates could be set to avoid all health effects.
134   
                                                           
131  See Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 314 (noting that the apparent continuum of biological 
responses to ozone “means that the paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and then 
providing an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is not possible.”). 
132  National Academy of Sciences & National Academy of Engineering (“NAS/NAE”), Air Quality and Automotive 
Emission Control, A Report Prepared for the Senate Committee on Public Works, Serial No. 93-24, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess 17 (1974) (“[I]n no case is there evidence that the threshold levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the 
sense that there are genuine adverse health effects at or above some level of pollution, but no effects at all below that 
level.  On the contrary, evidence indicates that the amount of health damage varies with the upward and downward 
variations in the concentration of the pollutant, and with no sharp lower limit.”). 
133  See, e.g., EPA’s Updated Clean Air Standards: A Common Sense Primer (September 1997) (available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/primer/science.htm) (stating that “[t]he scientific community, EPA, Congress and the courts 
have long recognized there is no health threshold for ozone and other air pollutants -- in other words, no specific-
level at which all people can be fully-protected”); Heinzerling, supra note 117, at 122 (acknowledging that, at the 
time of EPA’s decision, “the existing evidence seemed to point to the possibility that there is no level at which 
ozone exerts no effect whatsoever on the human body.”).  See also infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. 
134   Lisa Heinzerling has sought to downplay the inherent policy judgment called for in NAAQS decision-making 
by arguing that EPA never definitively determined that ozone and particulate matter had adverse health effects down 
to zero.  She has written that  
EPA’s observation that particulate matter and ozone may be ‘nonthreshold’ pollutants was nothing more 
than an admission that the Agency had not proven the existence of a level at which these pollutants had 
no effects on human health. ... It was also not a claim that the Agency would regard all such effects on 
health, if detected, to be sufficiently ‘adverse’ to warrant a regulatory response.  Nor was it a claim that 
the Agency would regard all such effects to be effects on public health within the meaning of the Clean 
Air Act. 
Heinzerling, supra note 117, at 126-27 (footnotes omitted).  This argument misses the point.  Even though the 
Agency did not definitively demonstrate health effects all the way to zero, its own analyses indicated that there   27
    In its rulemaking, EPA acknowledged that there is no known threshold level for either 
ozone or fine PM. With respect to ozone, EPA stated that ozone “may elicit a continuum of 
biological responses down to background concentrations” and that “in the absence of any 
discernable threshold, it is not possible to ... identify a level at which it can be concluded with 
confidence that no ‘adverse’ effects are likely to occur.”
135  EPA specifically rejected the 
comments of some industry groups that the health evidence for ozone indicated the existence of a 
threshold, arguing that the available evidence suggested a linear relationship “down to a 
background level of 0.04 ppm.”
136  For fine PM, EPA speculated that a threshold might exist, but 
acknowledged that “the level or even existence of population thresholds below which no effects 
occur cannot be reliably determined by an examination of the results from the available 
studies.”
137  
    EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, a scientific advisory committee   
required by statute to review the scientific basis of EPA’s criteria document and NAAQS 
standards,
138 concurred with EPA that “the weight of the health evidence indicates that there is 
no threshold concentration for the onset of biological responses due to exposure to ozone above 
background concentrations.”
139  Rather, “it appears that ozone may elicit a continuum of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
were health effects below the levels at which it chose to set its standards, including in the case of PM, a substantial 
number of premature deaths every year which certainly must be considered “adverse.”  Moreover, EPA most 
certainly did need to make a policy judgment in deciding that some effects were not “sufficiently ‘adverse’” to 
warrant protection.  The Agency knew that there would be many individuals who would suffer health effects at 
levels of exposure permitted by the EPA’s standards, and it strongly suspected that there would always be such 
individuals so long as there was some level of ozone or particulate matter in the air.  See infra Parts II.B & II.C.  
Choosing to disregard these effects in setting its regulatory standard may well have been reasonable and even 
justified, but it was a clear policy choice that EPA failed to acknowledge openly and explain adequately.  For 
further criticism of Heinzerling’s argument, see Richard Pierce, The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental 
Regulation 54 Admin L. Rev. 1237, 1261-65 (2002). 
135  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted).  EPA further acknowledged that 
“no standard within the range of levels and forms considered in this review, including the selected standard, is risk-
free, due to the continuum of risk likely posed by exposures to ambient O3 potentially down to background levels.”  
Id. at 38,873. 
136  EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the 1996 Proposed National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Ozone (July 1997) [hereinafter “EPA, Ozone Response to Comments”], at 81; id. at 84 (“There is clear evidence 
from hospital admission studies that effects continue down to background.”). 
137  PM Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,670.  See also American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034 (“EPA 
regards ozone definitely, and PM likely, as non-threshold pollutants, i.e., ones that have some possibility of some 
adverse health impact (however slight) at any exposure level above zero.”).  
138  42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2). 
139  Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, to Administrator Carol M. 
Browner (Nov. 30, 1995), at 2 (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002).   28
biological responses down to background concentrations.”
140  Likewise, in its review of 
particulate matter, CASAC concluded that “[a]s with ozone, there appears to be no apparent 
threshold for biological responses to PM exposures.”
141  The implication of this lack of a 
demonstrated threshold was, according to CASAC, “that the paradigm of selecting a standard at 
the lowest-observable-effects-level and then providing an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is no 
longer possible.”
142  For ozone, CASAC also concluded that  “there is no bright line which 
distinguishes any of the proposed standards (either the level or the number of allowable 
exceedences) as being significantly more protective of health” and thus “the selection of a 
specific level and number of allowable exceedences is a policy judgment.”
143  In testimony to 
Congress, the Chair of CASAC reiterated that “the decisions to select a given level or number of 
allowable exceedences within [EPA’s] proposed ranges cannot be based on science;” rather, the 
selection of a particular standard was “strictly a policy judgment.”
144 
    The absence of clear thresholds for these pollutants was well known to members of 
Congress at least as early as the deliberation over the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
145  
At that time, Senator Muskie, the primary Senate sponsor of the amendments, observed that for 
nearly all criteria pollutants “[t]here is no threshold health effect which can be used to say that 
above this threshold there is danger to health and below it there is not.”
146  The House likewise 
acknowledged in 1977 that the “safe threshold” concept underlying section 109 was “at best, a 
necessary myth”
147 since “no safe thresholds can be established.”
148  Accordingly, the House 
                                                           
140  Id. 
141  Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, to Administrator Carol M. 
Browner (Jan. 5, 1996), at 3 (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-003). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
144  Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s Clean Air  Scientific Advisory Committee’s Panels on 
Ozone and PM, for the House Comm. on Health and Env’t, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations  (Apr. 10, 
1997) (1997 WL 10569483).  
145  Congress was strongly influenced by a 1974 report prepared for the Senate by the National Academy of Sciences 
and National Academy of Engineering which concluded that, contrary to the assumption underlying the 1970 Act, 
there were no thresholds for criteria pollutants.  NAS/NAE, supra note 132, at 17-18. 
146  Senate Debate on S. 252 (June 8, 1977), reprinted in 3 Legislative History at 781-82 (remarks of Sen. Muskie).  
See also 123 Cong. Rec. S9423 (daily ed. June 10, 1977) (Sen.  Muskie) (“testimony on the health question over the 
last 7 years over and over again has made the point that there is no such thing as a threshold for health effects.  Even 
at the national primary standard level, which is the health standard, there are health effects that are not protected 
against.”). 
147  See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95
th Cong., 1
st Sess. 111 (1977).   29
noted that air quality standards set by EPA had failed to satisfy either of “the two main 
safeguards which have been recognized as necessary in the protection of public health: proof of a 
safe threshold level of exposure and a fully adequate margin of safety beyond harm levels which 
have already been proved.”
149   
    In setting air quality standards at any level other than zero, the EPA Administrator is 
compelled to rely upon some criterion other than the absolute protection against health effects 
which Congress apparently envisioned as the sole criterion for NAAQS when it originally 
adopted the Clean Air Act.  As Senator Muskie recognized in 1977: 
 
I wish it were possible for the Administrator to set national primary and 
secondary standards that fully implement the statutory language ... The fact is, as 
testimony and documents disclose, the standards do not fully protect in 
accordance with the statutory language which gives the Administrator authority to 
provide for additional protection.  He has had to make a pragmatic judgment in 
the face of the fact that he found there is no threshold on health effects, which 
makes it very difficult then to apply absolute health protection, and he has not 
been able to do that.
150 
 
The House recognized that some limits were necessary to prevent the kind of zero-risk standards 
that would follow from strict application of the Clean Air Act to non-threshold pollutants: 
 
Some have suggested that since the standards are to protect against all known or 
anticipated effects and since no safe thresholds can be established, the ambient 
standards should [b]e set at zero or background levels. Obviously, this no-risk 
philosophy ignores all economic and social consequences and is impractical.
151 
 
Congress did not, however, amend the statutory language of section 109 to reflect this 
recognition.  Nor did it provide any further guidance to EPA on how to justify a non-zero 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
148  Id. at 127.  See also id. at 110 (“[I]n no case is there evidence that the threshold levels have a clear physiological 
meaning, in the sense that there are genuine adverse health effects at and above some level of pollution, but no 
effects at all below that level.  On the contrary, evidence indicates that the amount of health damage varies with the 
upward and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant, with no sharp lower limit.”). 
149  Id. at 111-12. 
150  123 Cong. Rec. S9426 (daily ed. June 10, 1977). 
151  H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977).   30
standard for a non-threshold pollutant in way that would satisfy the Clean Air Act’s requirement 
to “protect the public health . . . with an adequate margin of safety.”
152   
    The House’s recognition that a zero-risk approach would “ignore all economic and social 
consequences,” however, implicitly demonstrated the inevitable need to incorporate factors other 
than scientific evidence about health effects in justifying where standards are set for non-
threshold pollutants.  Any non-zero standard for a non-threshold pollutant must inherently take 
into account economic and social considerations in addition to the scientific evidence of health 
effects, since a science-only approach that seeks to prevent all “adverse effects” with an 
“adequate margin of safety” can only be set at zero, which everyone agrees would be 
nonsensical. 
 
II. The Abandonment of Reason in EPA’s Air Quality Standard Setting 
 
    The selection of a NAAQS standard, especially for a non-threshold pollutant, is a 
quintessential risk management decision that, while drawing on scientific evidence, ultimately 
turns on social, political, and economic choices.
153  While science provides relevant information 
on the frequency and severity of adverse effects at various levels, this information by itself 
cannot identify the level at which to set the standard.  As we have detailed, EPA has attempted to 
justify its recent NAAQS decisions (as with past ones) based exclusively on science, when the 
selection of such a standard necessarily requires policy judgments.
154  EPA’s most recent 
revisions to its ozone and fine PM NAAQS not only provide yet another case study of the so-
called science charade, but more importantly they reveal what follows from a regulatory regime 
that permits, and even encourages, agencies to cloak their policy decisions in science.  When 
                                                           
152  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
153  Reilly, supra note 127, at viii (“In the absence of a scientifically definable threshold, the decision makers 
responsible for establishing a standard are inescapably forced to make social, not scientific, judgments.”) (statement 
made before former Administrator Reilly assumed his position as head of EPA). 
154   Wagner, supra note 9, at 1640-44 (EPA’s reliance on scientific and medical evidence alone to justify its 
previous ozone NAAQS is a “vivid illustration” of an “intentional science charade”); R. SHEP  MELNICK, 
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 261 (1983) (“There is, in short, no simple answer 
to the question of how the EPA sets air quality standards.  Medical evidence cannot offer definitive guidance.... The 
EPA itself has refused to deal with the problem in a forthright manner, hiding its policy choices behind its 
interpretation of scientific evidence.”); Kevin D. Hill, Smog, Science & The EPA, 25 N. Ky.  L. Rev. 1, 27 (1997) 
(“Decisions as costly and as important as the ozone standard should not hide behind a charade of science but should 
be part of the public debate.”); Pierce, supra note 16, at 73 (“The ATA case is laced with symptoms of the science 
charade.”).   31
EPA or any other agency invokes science to justify its regulatory decisions, it fails to provide the 
public with a transparent and principled justification for its regulatory decisions.
155     
    In the recent ozone and particulates rulemakings, EPA made a series of inconsistent 
positions that remained largely hidden behind the Agency’s repeated invocation of science as the 
basis for its decisions.  Throughout its rulemakings and subsequent rounds of litigation, EPA’s 
policy positions appeared to be shifting sands.  For example, even though the Agency claimed to 
justify its standards based on a singular concern for evidence of health risks, it explicitly rejected 
options that, according to its own analysis, would have provided still greater protection to the 
public from such risks.
156  In this Part, we present some of the most significant inconsistencies 
that emerged in EPA’s rulemaking documents and its arguments in court.  The EPA’s use of 
science as a rhetorical defense helped to mask the absence of a coherent, principled account for 
why the Agency revised its ozone and particulates standards as it did.
157  
 
A. Science and EPA’s Ad Hoc Policy Making 
    EPA’s reliance on science as a rationale made it easier for the Agency to claim that it 
could make ad hoc policy judgments without the need to provide a consistent set of principles to 
guide its NAAQS decisionmaking.   In the ozone and particulate rulemakings, EPA explicitly 
asserted that it could rely on scientific inputs and therefore did not need to provide any consistent 
set of policy principles to explain its decisions.   
    EPA’s revision of the ozone and PM NAAQS began with the preparation of a Criteria 
Document and then a Staff Paper for each pollutant.  As required by the statute, the Criteria 
Document (“CD”) provided a review of “the latest scientific knowledge” on “all identifiable 
effects on public health or welfare” that may result from ambient levels of a pollutant.
158  As 
EPA and its amici argued to the Supreme Court, the Criteria Document was thus a “descriptive” 
                                                           
155  See Nicholas A. Ashford, C. William Ryan, and Charles C. Caldart, A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of 
Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 311 (1983) (noting that 
“[s]uch an approach frustrates any effort to measure agency decisions against the reasoned decisionmaking 
standard.”). 
156  See infra Parts II.B & II.C. 
157  This is not necessarily to say that no consistent set of reasons could have been offered to justify EPA’s decisions.  
An agency’s decisionmaking may be reasonable, even if inadequately reasoned.   That said, given the wide disparity 
in health benefits achieved between the ozone and PM decisions, we have our doubts about whether EPA’s 
decisions across these rulemakings could ever have been adequately justified.  See infra Part II.D. 
158  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).  See also supra note 49 and accompanying text.   32
document that is “limited” to scientific information.
159  Although the Staff Paper was intended to 
“help bridge the gap between the scientific review contained in the CD and the judgments 
required of the Administrator in setting ambient standards,” it too emphasized “conclusions and 
uncertainties in the available scientific literature” to be considered in setting the standards.
160  
Neither the Criteria Document nor the Staff Paper purported to recommend or justify any 
specific regulatory standard, but instead they identified a range of possible standards that the 
staff believed would protect public health with some margin of safety.
161   
    The EPA Administrator is supposed to select specific standards only after considering the 
information from the Criteria Document and Staff Paper, along with public comments that had 
been filed during the rulemaking process.  In explaining the Administrator’s decisions on ozone 
and particulates, EPA began by making two brief and uncontroversial assertions.  First, EPA did 
acknowledge in passing in the Federal Register that Administrator’s decision was a “policy 
choice,” though one the Agency asserted was “left specifically to the Administrator’s 
judgment.”
162  This latter language seemed to imply that the exercise of the Administrator’s 
judgment did not need to be explained with any meaningful policy reason.  Second, EPA 
affirmed the statements in the 1977 legislative history of the Clean Air Act that the Agency was 
not required to set a zero-risk standard for a non-threshold pollutant.
163  Of course, no major 
participant in environmental policymaking has ever seriously argued that a zero-risk standard is 
                                                           
159  As EPA indicated in its subsequent Supreme Court brief defending its ozone and PM standards, section 
108(a)(2) “limits the kind of information to be included in the ‘criteria’ to ‘the latest scientific knowledge.’”  EPA, 
Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra  note 59, at 19.  Indeed, the criteria documents are intended to be 
“descriptive.”  See Brief for Respondents Massachusetts and New Jersey in Support of Petitioners, American 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Browner, at 18-19 (No. 99-1426) (Sept. 11, 2000) [hereinafter “Massachusetts and New 
Jersey Brief”] (citing statements from early criteria documents that such documents are “descriptive” summaries of 
“scientific knowledge,” and how Congress ratified this understanding of the purpose and content of the criteria 
documents in the 1970 Clean Air Act).  See also S. Rep. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1967) (“Air quality 
criteria are an expression of the scientific knowledge of the relationship between various concentrations of pollutants 
in the air and their adverse effects on man, animals, vegetation, materials, visibility and so on.”). 
160  PM Staff Paper, at I-1S. 
161  EPA, Ozone Staff Paper at 169-170 (recommending primary 8-hour ozone standard in the range of 0.07 to 0.09 
ppm); EPA, PM Staff Paper, at VII-47 (“Staff recommends that the Administrator consider selecting the level of a 
new 24-hour PM2.5 standard from the range of 20 :g/m
3 to approximately 65 Fg/m
3, and the level of a new annual 
PM2.5 standard from the range of 12.5 Fg/m
3 to approximately 20 Fg/m
3.”). 
162  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,857; EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,653. 
163  E.g., EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,857 (“The Act does not require the Administrator 
to establish a primary NAAQS at a zero-risk level, but rather at a level that reduces risk sufficiently so as to protect 
public health with an adequate margin of safety.”);  id. at 38,863 (“a zero-risk standard is neither possible nor 
required by the Act”); id. at 38,867 (“Clearly, for pollutants, such as O sub3, that have no discernible thresholds for   33
required, given that a zero-risk standard for a non-threshold pollutant would result, at a 
minimum, in the end of the industrialized economy as we know it.
164  But as we will see, this 
position has put the Agency in an especially difficult, if not impossible, position when it comes 
to providing a consistent justification for its standards.
165 
    What EPA left unaddressed in its rulemaking was the critical question of what risk 
management principle or criterion the Administrator used to justify her “policy choice” in 
selecting non-zero standards along the continuum of predicted health risks for ozone and fine 
PM.
166  The factors EPA identified in its rulemaking to justify such choices were scientific ones, 
with risk assessments playing a “central role in identifying an appropriate level.”
167  I n  t h e  
preamble for the final ozone standard, EPA summarized its basis for its decision by identifying 
the information which it gathered in the rulemaking process: (1) the Criteria Document, (2) the 
Staff Paper, (3) CASAC’s advice, and (4) public comments.
168  Of course, a simple bibliography 
is not the same as a meaningful explanation, but more importantly these various sources of 
information do not themselves contain any principled justification for the revised standards.  As 
we noted earlier, the Criteria Document is limited to a description of scientific information,
169 
and the Staff Paper was intended to “bridge” the scientific evidence and the Agency’s policy 
determination but did not itself recommend or develop a justification for specific policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
health effects, no standard can be risk-free.”).  EPA made identical statements in the preamble to the final PM 
standard. See, e.g., EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7 at 38,653, 38,656. 
164  See, e.g., American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038 (“No party here appears to advocate this [zero-risk policy], and 
EPA appears to show no inclination to adopt it.”); Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in 
PAUL R. PORTNEY & ROBERT N. STAVINS, EDS., PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11, 17 (2000) 
(“[I]t is impossible to eliminate all traces of environmental pollution without simultaneously shutting down all 
economic activity, an outcome which neither Congress nor the public would abide.”). 
165  See infra notes 359-64 and accompanying text. 
166  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 112 (2002) (“The 
basic problem is that the agency did not explain, in concrete terms, why it chose one level of regulation rather than 
another.”).  For a discussion of risk management principles, see infra Part III.A. 
167  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (quotation omitted).  Later, in a brief defending the 
PM rule, EPA claimed that the Agency’s full risk assessment played only a “limited role,” but that the standards 
“were based primarily on EPA’s analysis of the epidemiological studies in the record,” also a clearly scientific 
consideration.  EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note  68,  at  51.       
168  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859.  Although we focus in this part of the text 
primarily on the justification EPA offered for its revisions to the ozone standard, EPA provided a similar account in 
its preamble to the final rule revising the particulates standards.  See, e.g., EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 
38,655 (“These decisions are based on a thorough review, in the Criteria Document, of the latest scientific 
information on known and potential human health effects associated with exposure to PM at levels typically found 
in the ambient air.”). 
169  See supra notes 49, 158 and accompanying text.   34
determinations.
170  The Staff Paper expressly acknowledged that setting a NAAQS standard was 
“a policy choice left specifically to the Administrator's judgment.”
171 As with the staff materials, 
CASAC’s input was similarly limited, almost by definition, to scientific advice.
172  Finally, while 
public comments may raise policy arguments in addition to scientific conclusions, they reflect 
the opinions of interested individuals and organizations, not the judgment of the Administrator.  
Even though some of these comments undoubtedly discussed policy issues and not merely 
scientific evidence of health effects, EPA did not (and could not) rely on these comments to offer 
the justification the Agency itself is required to give for its exercise of governmental authority.
173   
    Based solely on these sources of information contained in the rulemaking record, EPA 
claimed to have determined that a revision to its current standards was “appropriate.”
174  Once it 
made this determination, EPA needed to decide the specific level at which the revised standards 
should be set.  In its final rule, EPA stated that a revised ozone primary standard set at 0.08 ppm 
based on an 8-hour average was likewise “appropriate.”
175  It offered as its “rationale” for this 
decision its “consideration of” health effects information, human exposure, and risk assessments: 
“[s]pecific conclusions ... that, taken together, would be appropriate to protect public health with 
an adequate margin of safety.”
176  Of course, it is far from clear what the Agency meant by 
“consideration of” scientific information or, more significantly, what made its judgment 
“appropriate.”  The Agency was simply begging the question. 
                                                           
170  See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
171  Ozone Staff Paper at 3.  Id.  at 169 (“In making recommendations, staff notes that the decision ultimately made 
by the Administrator regarding level of the primary O3 NAAQS will be based on a policy judgment as to the degree 
of risk reduction that is necessary to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety.”) 
172  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
173  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Environmental Defense et al., in Support of Cross-Respondents, American 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.  v.  Browner (No. 99-1426) (Sept. 11, 2000), at 21 (“[T]here is no plausible scenario under 
which the requirement that the Agency consider comments could modify the standards defined in the statute for the 
setting of the NAAQS”); Massachusetts and New Jersey Brief, supra note 159, at 34 (describing as “fantastical” the 
argument that “the Administrator must consider anything submitted in the public record as relevant to her decision 
setting the NAAQS,” because “[s]uch a process would allow public commenters to determine the scope and content 
of EPA's obligations in setting the NAAQS”).  Indeed, there is no indication in the rulemaking record that EPA 
adopted any policy criteria for setting NAAQS suggested by a public commentator. 
174  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,859.  EPA took a similar approach in its final rule on particulates.  
See, e.g., EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,666 (“Based on the rationale and recommendations contained in 
the Staff Paper and the advice of CASAC, and taking into account public comments, the Administrator concludes 
that it is appropriate at this time to revise the current PM standards to increase the public health protection provided 
against the known and potential effects of PM identified in the air quality criteria.”)    
175  Id. 
176  Id. (emphasis added).  It also stated that it examined “[a]lternative views of the significance of the effects and 
factors to be considered in policy judgments about the appropriate elements of the standard.”  Id. (Emphasis added).   35
      In the body of its preamble to the final ozone rule, EPA stated that CASAC recognized 
that “the selection of specific standards requires that the Administrator make public health policy 
judgments in addition to determinations of a strictly scientific nature.”
177  But what did such 
judgments entail and what was EPA’s reasoned basis for making them as it did?  EPA claimed 
that its public health policy judgment was “framed by” the scientific information and its view 
that the standards should be set at some “appropriate level.”
178 It also stated that its public health 
policy judgment was “informed by” various “key observations and conclusions,”
179 including the 
results of various health studies, the types of health effects identified in those studies, the levels 
of human exposure, the results of EPA’s risk assessment, and the advice from CASAC.
180  
Again, these types of data are relevant scientific inputs for any risk management decision, but 
even taken together they are categorically different than providing a policy reason that justifies 
setting risk standards at one level rather than another.
181   EPA concluded in its preamble that 
these factors, in particular the fact that no CASAC member endorsed a standard below 0.08 ppm, 
led the Agency to focus on the alternative levels of 0.08 ppm and 0.09 ppm.
182  The remainder of 
EPA’s explanation for its selected standard consisted of a list of factors that simply supported the 
obvious descriptive point that a 0.08 ppm standard provides more health protection than does a 
0.09 ppm standard.
183  
    Other statements EPA made in the preambles to its final rules likewise reflected a 
reliance on scientific factors to justify its decisions and a failure to specify any risk management 
criterion.  For example, the EPA summarized its approach for establishing a “margin of safety” 
(clearly a policy decision) almost entirely in terms of scientific information.  According to the 
                                                           
177  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,863. 
178  Id.  
179  Id. 
180  Id. at 38,863-65.  The only type of public health “policy judgments” that EPA identified were “the nature and 
severity of the health effects involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the types of health information 
available, and the kind and degree of uncertainties that must be addressed.” Id. at 38,883. These factors are an 
integral part of characterizing risks, the final step in risk assessment, but they do not provide any policy principles 
that would justify a risk management decision.   NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT 27 (1994) (such “science-policy” factors “are distinct from the policy choices associated with ultimate 
decision- making.”). 
181  See, e.g., LANDY, ROBERTS, & THOMAS, supra note 108, at 56 (“[T]erms like sensitive group, health, and 
adequate margin of safety are not self-defining.  The science of the situation could not, by itself, produce a 
decision.”).  
182  EPA Final Ozone Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,865.   36
Agency, its task was “to select an approach that best takes into account the health effects and 
other information assessed in the air quality criteria for the pollutant in question and to apply 
appropriate and reasoned analysis to ensure that the scientific uncertainties are taken into account 
in an appropriate manner.”
184  However, this itself is not an explanation of why the Agency 
arrived at its revised standards.  No one can deny that the Administrator should make an 
appropriate decision, but it is not at all clear what reason the Administrator has in mind that 
explains her decision or, by extension, would explain that of any other Administrator in the past 
or the future.  The factors invoked by EPA speak to how the risk is characterized, not to how it 
should be managed.
185  After discussing the scientific data and associated uncertainties, EPA 
then basically stopped and pronounced the standards it had selected, explaining its decisions 
simply by asserting that they were “appropriate.” 
    The lack of any policy justification was all the more striking because the one place that 
EPA clearly should have confronted the need to explain its risk management judgment would 
have been in addressing the margin of safety issue.  Yet, the Agency not only failed to articulate 
any clear or consistent policy principles for establishing a margin of safety, it instead argued 
against the need to provide a principle at all.  The Agency claimed that “no generalized paradigm 
... can substitute for the Administrator’s careful and reasoned assessment of all relevant health 
factors in reaching ... a judgment.”
186  Moreover, because the Agency’s determination is “largely 
judgmental in nature,” it “may not be amenable to quantification in terms of what risk is 
‘acceptable’ or any other metric.”
187  EPA even argued that it can change its approach for setting 
NAAQS on a case-by-case basis, stating that “the Administrator is not limited to any single 
approach to determining an adequate margin of safety and may, in the exercise of her judgment, 
choose an integrative approach, a two-step approach, or perhaps some other approach, depending 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
183  Id. at 38,865, 38,867-68.  Of course, this observation is obvious only if ground-level ozone provides no 
countervailing health benefits.  See infra notes 307-08 and accompanying text. 
184  EPA, Final Ozone Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883.  EPA’s preamble to the revised particulates standard contains 
virtually the same language.  62 Fed. Reg. at 38688-89 (“[T]he task of the Administrator is to select an approach that 
best takes into account the nature of the health effects ... and to apply appropriate and reasoned analysis to ensure 
that scientific uncertainties are taken into account in an appropriate manner.”). 
185  For the distinction between risk characterization and risk management, see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying 
text. 
186   EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,883; EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 32,688.   
187  Id. (emphasis added).  EPA advanced the same argument in litigation, arguing to the D.C. Circuit that it was not 
“required to follow any particular paradigm of decision-making.”  EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69,   37
on the particular circumstances confronting her in a given NAAQS review.”
188  In effect, EPA 
argued that it possessed complete discretion to set standards in any way it wants, without the 
need to offer any consistent, reasoned explanation for its decision.       
    It is not surprising, then, that EPA has in fact been inconsistent in how it sets the margin 
of safety required by the Clean Air Act.  In particular, the Agency has shifted its position on 
whether the margin of safety provision requires the Agency to set primary standards below the 
lowest probable adverse effects identified by scientific studies.  In the recently revised ozone 
standard, EPA set the primary standard at 0.08 ppm, the level at which it claimed that adverse 
health effects were directly observed in clinical studies.
189   In past rulemakings, however, EPA 
has taken the position that the margin of safety requirement directs the Agency to set the 
standards below those at which adverse health effects are found or expected in sensitive 
groups.
190  EPA had earlier argued that “[t]he intent of the margin of safety requirement was to 
direct the Administrator to set air quality standards at pollution levels below those at which 
adverse health effects have been found or might be expected to occur in sensitive groups.”
191  
EPA even acknowledged before the Supreme Court its view that “air quality standards must be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at 29.  It also argued that “nothing in the statute requires [the Administrator] to make any specific ‘findings’ or to 
structure her decision-making in any particular way.”   Id. at 43. 
188  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,688; EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,883.  
189  See, e.g., EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 13-14 (“The Agency’s decision ... is that the 
O3 primary standard should be set with an 8-hour averaging period and at 0.08 ppm, a level at which numerous 
controlled-exposure human studies have reported health effects such as lung function decrements, respiratory 
symptoms, and indicators of inflammation.”); EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,863-64 (noting “clear 
evidence from human clinical studies ... of the following statistically significant responses at 6- to 8-hour exposures 
to the lowest concentration evaluated, 0.08 ppm O sub3 , at moderate exertion: lung function decrements, respiratory 
symptoms..., nonspecific bronchial responsiveness, and biochemical indicators of pulmonary inflammation” and 
admitting that these effects in some individuals are “sufficiently severe and extended in duration to be considered 
adverse.”); EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 15 (“[N]ew clinical studies provided ‘conclusive 
evidence’ that prolonged ozone exposure decreases lung function and causes respiratory symptoms at ozone 
concentrations down to 0.08 ppm.”). 
190  See EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone-Final Decision, 58 Fed. Reg. 13008, 13,009 (Mar. 
9, 1993) [hereinafter “EPA, 1993 Ozone Decision”] (“[T]he ‘margin of safety’ requirement by definition only comes 
into play where no conclusive showing of adverse effects exists”); EPA, National Primary and Secondary Ambient 
Air Quality Standards for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247 (1978) ("It is clear from section 109 that [EPA] should 
not attempt to place the standard at a level estimated to be at the threshold for adverse health effects but should set 
the standard at a lower level in order to provide a margin of safety").  See also supra notes 50, 122, 126 and 
accompanying text.  See generally William F. Pederson, Costs Matter: Effective Air Quality Regulation in a Risky 
World, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 153, 159 (2001) (“A standard that incorporates a ‘margin of safety’ is one that 
goes beyond addressing provable harms.”).  
191  EPA, Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, 
24,641 (July 1, 1987) [hereinafter “EPA, 1987 PM Rule”].  See also Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1154 (Congress 
“specifically directed the Administrator to allow an adequate margin of safety to protect against effects which have 
not yet been uncovered by research and effects whose medical significance is a matter of disagreement.”).   38
‘preventative or precautionary,’ reflecting an emphasis on the ‘predominant value of protection 
of public health’”
192 and being sure to “err on the side of caution.”
193   
    Accordingly, EPA has previously claimed to have set  the primary standard substantially 
below the lowest level of demonstrated adverse effects in order to ensure an adequate margin of 
safety.  For example, in the previous revision of the ozone standard in 1979, EPA concluded that 
“the most probable level for adverse health effects in sensitive persons ... falls in the range of 
0.15-0.25 ppm.”
194  Nevertheless, EPA set the standard at 0.12 ppm, well below the probable 
effects level, based on its statutory interpretation that it was required to make a “[j]udgment of a 
standard level below the probable effect level that provides an adequate margin of safety.”
195  As 
EPA subsequently explained its 1979 decision, it set the ozone standard at 0.12 ppm because of 
“the possibility of adverse effects occurring below 0.15 ppm O3.”
196  When EPA next revisited 
the ozone standard in 1993, it concluded that the controlled human studies failed to show any 
“adverse effects” below 0.15 ppm, and thus retained the existing ozone NAAQS set significantly 
below that level at 0.12 ppm.
197  Likewise, EPA set the annual PM10 standard at 50 ug/m3 in 
1987 to provide a “reasonable margin of safety”  based on evidence showing that long-term 
degradation in lung function was “likely” at 80-90 ug/m3 and possible at concentrations above 
60 to 65 ug/m3.
198   
    When it came to its recent ozone and PM revisions, EPA abandoned its earlier approach.  
It even argued in court that it was not “required to follow any particular paradigm of decision-
making”
199 and that “nothing in the statute requires [the Administrator] to make any specific 
                                                           
192  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 57, at 24 (citing Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1152 (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977) (H.R. Rep. 294)). 
193  Id. (citing Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1155). 
194  EPA, Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical Oxidants, 44 Fed. Reg. 8202, 
8216 (Feb. 8, 1979) [hereinafter “EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule”].  EPA explained that it “uses the terminology ‘probable 
effects level’ to refer to the level that in its best judgment is most likely to be the adverse health effect threshold 
concentration.”  Id. at 8203. 
195  Id. at 8213 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 8217 (“[A]t levels in the range of 0.15-0.25 ppm, adverse health 
effects will almost certainly be experienced by significant numbers of sensitive persons.  Unless the standard is set 
somewhat below that level, the Agency would not be exercising the degree of prudence called for by the ‘adequate 
margin of safety’ requirement of the Clean Air Act.”). 
196  EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Proposed Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 35,542, 35,547 
(Aug. 10, 1992) [hereinafter “EPA, 1992 Ozone Proposal”]. 
197  See EPA, 1993 Ozone Decision, supra note 190, 58 Fed. Reg. at 13,011. 
198  EPA, 1987 PM Rule, supra note 191, at 24,645. 
199  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 29.   39
‘findings’ or to structure her decision-making in any particular way.”
200  EPA’s inconsistent 
application of the margin of safety concept, combined with its assertions that it did not even need 
to try to be consistent, revealed an Agency intentionally or unintentionally dodging its 
responsibility for giving the public a principled justification for its preferred policy outcome. 
 
B. EPA’s Incoherent Disregard of the Health Effects from Particulates 
    EPA could not help but struggle to apply its preventative notion of a margin of safety 
coherently, given that the Agency predicted that adverse health effects would persist at levels 
below the Agency’s new standards.  Although EPA purported to act to protect the public health 
and err on the side of safety, the Agency actually disregarded a range of public health effects in 
both the ozone and particulates rulemakings.  While the Agency might well have had good cause 
for treating some level of health risk as tolerable, the Agency never provided any coherent 
account for why it turned its back on what were, at times, quite substantial health effects in 
making decisions that were ostensibly supposed to protect the public health with an adequate  
margin of safety.
201 
    In its rulemaking on particulate matters (PM), EPA set two standards for fine particulate 
matter  – an annual standard set at 15 ￿g/m
3 and a daily (i.e., 24-hour average) standard set at 65 
￿g/m
3 (after initially proposing a daily standard of 50 ￿g/m
3).
202  The daily standard effectively 
acts as a constraint on the variation around the average annual level of fine PM in any given area, 
and in this way provides its own health protection.
203  Assuming the validity of EPA’s 
interpretation of the scientific data on the health effects of fine PM,
204 EPA could have saved 
                                                           
200  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 43.  After losing in the D.C. Circuit, EPA changed its tune in its 
argument to the Supreme Court, claiming that the Clean Air Act severely constrained its discretion.  We could find 
no statements of unfettered discretion similar to those included in EPA’s D.C. Circuit briefs in the Agency’s 
Supreme Court briefs. 
201  As noted in one recent review of the PM standard, “one must recognize the arbitrariness of the limits set by U.S. 
EPA.  There is little, genuine, data-based or risk-based justification for the specific values chosen by the Agency: 
one might as easily have set a PM2.5 annual standard set at either 10 or 20 Fg/m
3, rather than the 15 Fg/m
3 chosen.”  
Green et al., supra note , at 334. 
202  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,679. 
203   The annual standard could be met by averaging together periods of higher concentrations with periods during 
the year when wind or climate patterns, or fluctuations in industrial or transportation activity, significantly reduced 
the concentration of air pollutants.  The daily standard therefore created an upper bound on those periods of higher 
concentration. 
204  We make such an assumption of the validity of EPA’s risk assessment only for the purpose of our discussion 
here.  Many commentators disagreed with EPA’s conclusion that the available data sufficiently demonstrated 
mortality health risks from PM2.5, leading them to advocate less stringent standards than those ultimately adopted by   40
hundreds, if not thousands, of additional lives per year by setting a more stringent daily standard 
than the one it did.
205  Indeed, some public health advocacy groups claimed that EPA’s PM 
standard left tens of millions of Americans at risk for serious health effects.
206   
    EPA’s risk assessment document reported the Agency’s estimates of the consequences of 
alternative standards for fine PM in two cities: Philadelphia and Los Angeles.
207  In Philadelphia, 
EPA estimated that the incidence of mortality associated with short-term exposure to fine PM 
would be reduced by 60 deaths per year, from 370 deaths per year under the existing standards to 
310 deaths per year under EPA’s new fine PM standard set at 15 ￿g/m
3 annually, 65 ￿g/m
3 
daily.
208  Yet if the EPA had reduced the daily standard even further to 25 ￿g/m
3, without 
changing the annual standard, premature mortality from short-term exposure would have been 
reduced to 110 deaths per year, or a reduction of 200 deaths per year above and beyond the 60 
lives predicted to be saved by the standard EPA adopted.
209  For mortality from long term 
exposure to fine PM in Philadelphia, EPA’s new standard would reduce mortality from 920 
deaths per year under the existing standards to 660 deaths per year, for a net reduction of 260 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EPA.  In the words of EPA’s CASAC Chairman, “[i]f all of the [CASAC] panel members were convinced that the 
reported PM2.5/mortality relationship was causal, I believe we would have come to consensus on PM standards at the 
low end of the EPA’s recommended range.”  George T. Wolff, In Response to the PM Debate, REGULATION, Winter 
1997, at 9.  See also Laura C. Green, et al., What’s Wrong with the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) 
for Fine Particulate Matter (PM2.5)?, 35 REGUL. TOXICOL. PHARMACOL. 327 (2002) (summarizing concerns with 
EPA’s fine PM analysis). 
205  See infra notes 210, 212 and accompanying text. 
206  The American Lung Association, for example, advocated a 24-hour standard set at 18  Fg/m
3, claiming that 
EPA’s proposed standard set at 50  Fg/m
3 would fail to protect the health of 89 million people.  See ALA Calls for 
Tighter Fine PM Standard, Says EPA Proposal Leaves Millions at Risk, Daily Env’t Reptr. (BNA), Jan. 14, 1997, at 
A-6.  A more stringent annual PM standard would also likely result in additional health protection, but EPA did not 
evaluate a more stringent alternative than the 15  Fg/m
3 standard it ultimately adopted.  See EPA, PM Final Rule, 
supra note 7, 38,676) (admitting that “the possibility of effects at lower annual concentrations cannot be excluded”). 
  
207  In the rulemaking, EPA claimed that it relied on the risk assessment “as an aid to the Administrator in judging 
which alternative PM NAAQS would reduce risks sufficiently to protect public health with an adequate margin of 
safety.”  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,656.  While acknowledging uncertainty in the quantitative 
estimates of health effects in the two-city study, EPA stated that “they do represent reasonable estimates as to the 
possible extent of risk for these effects given the available information.” Id.  Moreover, the Agency relied on its risk 
assessment to argue that “the risk remaining after attaining the current PM sub10 standards was on the order of 
hundreds of premature deaths each year, hundreds to thousands of respiratory-related hospital admissions, and tens 
of thousands of additional respiratory related symptoms in children.” Id.   Subsequently, in litigation, EPA 
emphasized that the Agency’s risk assessment played only a “limited role” in EPA’s decisionmaking.  EPA, 2001 
D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 68, at 51.   
208  PM Staff Paper, at VI-48. 
209  Id.   41
deaths per year.
210  Had the Agency’s sole focus been on protecting the public health, 
presumably it should have adopted the more stringent alternative standard it considered, namely 
a standard set at 15 ￿g/m
3 annually and 25 ￿g/m
3 daily.  This more stringent standard would 
have reduced mortality in a city of this size to zero, securing an additional reduction of 660 
deaths per year.
211   
    In total, the standard that EPA adopted was expected to reduce mortality in Philadelphia 
by 320 deaths per year, while the more stringent alternative rejected by EPA would have resulted 
in an additional reduction in overall mortality of 860 deaths per year, or over two and a half 
times the mortality benefits than EPA’s chosen standard.  Similarly, EPA’s risk assessment 
indicated that in Los Angeles the Agency could have prevented an additional 1080 deaths 
annually by adopting a more stringent standard.  These marginal reductions in overall mortality 
in Los Angeles from the more stringent alternative (1080 deaths per year prevented) are slightly 
less than, but still quite comparable to, the incremental mortality reductions expected (1620 
deaths per year prevented) in Los Angeles from the standard that EPA selected.
212   
    In both Philadelphia and Los Angeles, the marginal reductions in non-mortality effects 
(such as respiratory and cardiac health effects) associated with the more stringent alternative 
were greater than the selected standard for every health endpoint evaluated by EPA.
213  EPA’s 
own analysis showed that the Agency could have achieved substantially greater health benefits 
by further reducing the 24-hour fine PM standard from the 65 ￿g/m
3 standard selected by EPA 
to the more stringent 25 ￿g/m
3 daily alternative.
214  As the EPA’s Staff Paper concluded, “rough 
                                                           
210  Id.  EPA later revised its estimates of the mortality effects from long term exposure “to reflect the actual 
statistics used in the study upon which they were based,” noting that these revisions “cumulatively reduce estimates 
of mortality associated with long-term exposures by 20 to 35%.”  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,656.   
The Agency stated that these revisions had “no effect on risk estimates for mortality associated with short-term 
exposures or the estimates for any other effects.”  Id. 
211  Id.  Even if these mortality effects are overstated by 20-35 percent (as the Agency has subsequently claimed), 
this would still mean preventing premature mortality in approximately 430 to 530 persons.   
212  Id. at VI-51.  EPA explained that the greater absolute and relative differences between Los Angeles and 
Philadelphia are based largely on differences in current air quality levels: “As expected, the estimated health risk 
reductions are larger for Los Angeles County than Philadelphia County due to the higher PM air quality levels 
associated with meeting the current PM10 standards (i.e., baseline  air quality in Philadelphia is below the level 
required to meet the current standards).” EPA, PM Staff Paper at 54. 
213  EPA, PM Staff Paper at VI-49, 51. 
214  See also EPA, PM Staff Paper at VII-28 (“Based on the limited risk analyses for two example cities, using base 
case assumptions, a 24-hour PM2.5 standard of 25 Fg/m
3 is estimated to reduce PM-related risks associated with 
short-term exposures for the effects considered by roughly 70% - 85%, relative to risks associated with attaining the 
current standards.  Alternatively, at a 24-hour PM2.5 level of 65  Fg/m
3, risks are estimated to be reduced by roughly 
10% and 40% for the Philadelphia and Los Angeles study areas, respectively.”).   42
estimates of incidences are appreciably lower, but not eliminated in going from a PM2.5 standard 
of 65 to 25 ￿g/m
3.”
215  
    What stopped EPA from further tightening its daily fine PM standard to the more 
stringent level and thereby saving thousands of additional lives?  Certainly not any justification 
based exclusively on a concern for protecting the public from health risks.  The record 
demonstrated that, according to EPA’s interpretation of the data, statistically significant 
increases in premature mortality and significant morbidity effects occurred at levels far below 
EPA’s selected 24-hour standard of 65 ￿g/m
3 for fine PM.  As the EPA’s own Staff Paper 
reported, “[e]pidemiological studies reporting statistically significant associations were 
conducted in areas in which the mean 24-hour PM2.5 concentrations ranged from approximately 
16 to 30 ￿g/m
3 for mortality studies, with hospital admissions and respiratory symptoms studies 
falling within this range.”
216  The paper continued by noting that “[s]everal epidemiological 
studies reporting statistically significant effects include ranges of air quality that may approach 
estimates of background levels in some locations.”
217  The Staff Report also stated that 
“mortality studies show significant associations even when the observed means of 24-hour PM2.5 
concentrations in each of the study locations are approximately at or below 20 ￿g/m
3.”
218   
Furthermore, the EPA Staff Paper noted that the results from the Agency’s quantitative risk 
assessment “suggest a pattern of a continuum of decreasing risk with lower levels of alternative 
PM2.5 standards, extending over and likely below the range of 65 to 25 ￿g/m
3 PM2.5 included in 
the risk analyses.”
219  EPA, in defending its selection of its final fine PM standards, observed that 
short-term exposures appeared to offer the most compelling evidence of a health problem,
220 and 
agreed with the Staff Paper that short-term exposures in the range of 16-21 ￿g/m
3 resulted in 
statistically significant health effects.
221 
    EPA made an attempt to justify its decision not to set a more stringent 24-hour fine PM 
standard.  The Agency argued that “the risk associated with infrequent peak 24-hour exposures 
                                                           
215  EPA, PM Staff Paper at VII-29 (emphasis added).   
216  EPA, PM Staff Paper at VII-26. 
217  EPA, PM Staff Report at VII-30. 
218  EPA, PM Staff Report at VII-30. 
219  EPA, PM Staff Paper at VII-28. 
220  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,676 (“In accordance with EPA staff and CASAC views on the relative 
strengths of the epidemiological studies, the Administrator has placed greater emphasis on the short-term exposure 
studies in selecting the level of the annual standard.”).   43
in otherwise clean areas [that is, those meeting the annual standard] is not well enough 
understood at this time to provide a basis for selecting more restrictive levels in the range of 50 
to 65 ￿g/m
3.”
222   This claim, though, is inconsistent with other EPA conclusions.  EPA’s own 
analysis concluded that it was not merely occasional “peak” concentrations that presumably 
should have been of concern under a 24-hour standard, but more frequent days with below-peak 
concentrations.  EPA’s analysis of the available health data concluded that “most of the 
aggregate risk associated with short-term exposures likely results from the large number of days 
during which the 24-hour average concentrations are in the low- to-mid-range, below peak 24-
hour concentrations.”
223  Moreover, if residual levels of fine PM remaining under EPA’s new 
standard would still result in hundreds, if not thousands, of additional premature deaths, it is hard 
to see how EPA could properly claim that areas meeting the annual standard were “otherwise 
clean” and that there was no basis for adopting the lower standard.
224 
    Science by itself certainly could not explain why EPA did not adopt a more stringent 
daily standard for fine PM, nor could a precautionary approach based solely on a concern for 
avoiding significant health effects.  After all, the scientific analysis relied upon by EPA indicated 
that the Agency could have reduced both mortality and morbidity effects still further than it did.  
EPA’s action was inconsistent with its frequently recited position that it must “err on the side of 
safety” by setting a margin of safety that will protect against “not just known adverse effects, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
221  Id. 
222  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,677.  EPA also argued that an annual standard can “provide the 
requisite reduction in risk associated with both annual and 24-hour averaging times in most areas of the United 
States,” and that a 24-hour standard “would be intended to provide supplemental protection against extreme peak 
fine particle levels that may occur in some localized situations or in areas with distinct variations in seasonal fine 
particle levels.”  Id. at 38,674.  Yet, as the discussion in the text of EPA’s own analysis suggests, EPA’s analysis 
showed that major reductions in premature mortality would be achieved with a more stringent 24-hour standard than 
adopted by EPA, even under EPA’s selected annual standard. 
223  EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter; Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638,  
65,652 (Dec. 13, 1996). 
224  Even after a few rounds of litigation, EPA apparently still could not explain why it found it acceptable, as a 
policy matter, to turn its back on the remaining mortalities it predicted under the PM levels allowed under the 
revised standards.  EPA responded to arguments that it should have adopted more stringent PM standards by noting 
that it revised its risk assessment in a way that “resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of deaths predicted” 
from exposure to levels permitted under the standard.  EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra  note 68, at 54.   
Acknowledging that even under the revised risk assessment the “values of estimated risk are not zero” (that is, that 
the Agency still predicted premature deaths under the new standard), the Agency simply dismissed its own risk 
assessment as “not sufficiently reliable.”  Id.   Without saying anything more, EPA then retreated to its science-
based rhetoric claiming that EPA based its new PM standards on the “analysis of the epidemiological studies 
themselves.”  Id.   44
those of scientific uncertainty or that ‘research has not yet uncovered.’”
225  EPA’s own analysis, 
which the Agency used to defend its decision to tighten the PM standard, predicted that at least 
hundreds of cases of premature mortality nationwide would result from fine PM exposure even if 
all regions in the country were to meet EPA’s new standards.
226 
    Throughout the PM rulemaking, EPA invoked uncertainty as a wild card in an effort to 
defend its regulatory decisions.  The Agency dismissed the sometimes large uncertainties in the 
estimates it used to support its regulatory actions, but it then cited uncertainty as a barrier to 
adopting regulations that it otherwise was not inclined to adopt.  For example, EPA relied on 
results from “key” epidemiology studies showing significant mortality risks from fine PM, but 
did so only for the results at concentrations at and above the standard level EPA selected, 
dismissing similar results for lower concentrations in the same studies as too uncertain to support 
standards.
227  Yet the underlying studies reported no distinctions between the concentration 
ranges in terms of magnitude of effect, statistical significance, or methodological approach.
228  
For EPA, it was as if the same studies could be reliable or unreliable depending simply on what 
was more expedient for the Agency.
229  The uncertainty inherent in setting air quality standards – 
                                                           
225  EPA, D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 56, at 49 (citing Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1153). 
226  See also Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 329-30; Pierce, supra note 16, at 74 (“Even if every 
area of the country were in compliance with the new primary standards the court struck down in ATA, the best 
scientific evidence available suggests that ozone and particulates would continue to kill several thousand people per 
year.”). 
227  See EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, 38,675 (“While placing substantial weight on the results of the key 
health studies in the higher range of concentrations observed, EPA is persuaded that the inherent scientific 
uncertainties are too great to support standards based on the lowest concentrations measured in such studies....”). 
228  Joel Schwartz et al., Is Daily Mortality Associated Specifically with Fine Particles?, 46 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. 
ASS’N 927 (1996); Joel Schwartz et al., Acute Effects of Summer Air Pollution on Respiratory Symptom Reporting in 
Children, 150 AM. J. RESPIRATORY  & CRITICAL  CARE  MED. 1234 (1994); Douglas W. Dockery et al., An 
Association between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993). These 
studies found that each 10 :g/m
3 elevation in fine PM levels was associated with a significant (6-14 percent 
depending on the study) increase in all-cause mortality, with no apparent threshold.  See generally Kenneth A. 
Colburn & Philip R.S. Johnson, Air Pollution Concerns Not Changed by S-Plus Flaw, 299 SCIENCE 66, 665-66 
(2003) (summarizing studies relied on by EPA).  Subsequent to EPA’s rulemaking, one of the authors relied on by 
EPA published an analysis showing that the mortality effects from fine PM decreased in a linear fashion over the 
range from 0 to 35  :g/m
3, supporting the existence of significant mortality at levels permitted by the new standard 
selected by EPA.  Joel Schwartz, Francine Laden & Antonella Zanobetti, The Concentration-Response Relation 
Between PM2.5 and Daily Deaths, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECT. 1025 (2002). 
229  The EPA’s treatment of statistical significance has also, on occasion, appeared to be opportunistic.  In the PM 
rulemaking, EPA claimed to have placed “greatest weight on those studies that were clearly statistically significant.”  
EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,676.  See also EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 68, at 49 (arguing 
that “EPA’s conclusion [on an annual standard] is supported by the fact that epidemiological studies performed in 
areas with annual mean concentrations below 15.7 :g/m
3 did not find a statistically significant relationship between 
daily fine particle concentration and adverse health effects”).  Yet, in 1992 when the EPA set the ozone standard at 
0.12 ppm, the “key study” on which EPA relied to find an “adverse effect” at 0.15 ppm did not contain statistically   45
and any other risk standards – creates the potential for opportunism by any agency that decides to 
engage in post hoc rationalization of its decisions.  Without a principled basis for how it treats 
uncertainty, the EPA’s claim that uncertainty prevented it from taking action to lower the PM 
standard only further served to illustrate the kind of unbounded discretion that the Agency 
effectively claimed for itself.
230        
 
C. EPA’s Incoherent Disregard of the Health Effects from Ozone 
    EPA’s decisionmaking in the ozone rulemaking resulted in still more incoherence.  Even 
though the Agency claimed to set its standards based on a precautionary approach to protecting 
the public health,
231 EPA nevertheless disregarded a range of adverse health effects and failed to 
provide an adequate explanation for why some level of risk was acceptable while another level 
was not.  Indeed, over the course of the ozone rulemaking, EPA even shifted the level of 
remaining risk it found acceptable.  In the proposed ozone rule, EPA argued that the 0.08 ppm, 
8-hour standard would achieve an acceptable level of public health protection even though the 
Agency’s initial risk assessment showed that standard would still result in 1,000,000 occurrences 
of moderate decreases in lung function and 74,000 cases of moderate-to-severe coughs in 
outdoor children in the nine urban areas used in the Agency’s risk assessment.
232  Even though 
EPA implicitly found this level of respiratory risk acceptable in the proposed rule, in the final 
rule EPA rejected the pre-existing 1-hour, 0.12 ppm standard which its revised risk assessment 
showed would result in only 931,000 cases of moderate decreases in lung function and 58,000 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significant findings.  EPA, 1992 Ozone Proposal, supra note 196, at 35,546 (“The key study ... by DeLucia and 
Adams (1977) ... reported symptoms of discomfort and small but statistically-nonsignificant lung function 
decrements ... at concentrations as low as 0.15 ppm O3.”); EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 194, at 8207 (“EPA 
acknowledges that Delucia and Adams failed to demonstrate any statistically significant decrements in pulmonary 
function resulting from exposure to 0.15 ppm for one hour.”). 
230  As the D.C. Circuit stated, “the increasing uncertainty argument is helpful only if some principle reveals how 
much uncertainty is too much.”  American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036.  For a review of systematic ways to account 
for uncertainty in regulatory decisionmaking, see GRANGER MORGAN & M. HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO 
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN RISK AND POLICY  ANALYSIS  (1990); Jonathan Caulkins, Using Models that 
Incorporate Uncertainty, 21 J. POL. ANAL. & MGT. 486 (2002).  
231  In defending its decision to lower the standard to 0.08 ppm, EPA argued in Court that “EPA must ‘err on the side 
of caution’ to protect public with an adequate margin of safety” and therefore that the Agency “considered 
suspected, but not yet demonstrated, chronic effects.”  EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 27.   
232  EPA, Memorandum from Harvey M. Richmond to Karen Martin, Feb. 11, 1997, re: Supplemental Ozone 
Exposure and Health Risk Analysis, at 10.    46
cases of moderate to severe coughs.
233  In other words, the risk remaining from the current 
standard – which EPA claimed needed to be revised – was actually somewhat lower than the 
level of risk that EPA thought would remain when it proposed revising the standard in the first 
place.
234   
    In a brief filed in the D.C. Circuit, EPA essentially acknowledged that it had shifted its 
position on the acceptable level of risk, but argued that this was irrelevant because “[t]he relative 
differences are of greater import than the absolute numbers for purposes of comparing alternative 
standards.”
235  In effect, EPA claimed that its purpose was to adopt a standard more protective 
than the existing standard, rather than to establish any particular level of acceptable health 
protection.
236  Such an approach is inconsistent with the way the Clean Air Act has been 
interpreted, which calls for setting a standard that protects the public health with an adequate 
margin of safety rather than setting a standard that merely achieves greater protection than the 
existing standard, a point that EPA has acknowledged in other contexts.
237 
    More significantly, EPA failed to provide any adequate explanation for why it turned its 
back on harms that some citizens would continue to suffer even under the Agency’s new 
standards.   EPA’s own findings indicated that further reduction of the ozone standard from 0.08 
ppm to 0.07 ppm would have provided additional incremental health benefits, which in at least 
some cases would have been even more substantial than the benefits of the 0.08 ppm standard 
that EPA selected.  In its rulemaking, EPA did not directly dispute those commentators who 
argued “that similarly large improvements in public health protection would result from a 
standard set at 0.07 ppm as compared to the proposed standard, such that, based on the same 
                                                           
233  Id.  For the two other health endpoints EPA evaluated, the 0.08 ppm standard resulted in slightly lower number 
of occurrences that than 0.012 ppm standard.  In considering all four endpoints together, the combined residual 
health effects for the 0.12 ppm standard that EPA found unacceptable in response to its final risk assessment were 
not clearly higher than the residual effects under the proposed 0.08 ppm standard that EPA found acceptable after its 
initial risk assessment. 
234  The only relevant change in the Agency’s risk assessment from the proposed to the final rule came from “several 
technical changes” that were “based on insights gained from the initial analysis.”  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra 
note 7, at 38,861. 
235  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 37 n. 34. 
236  See supra Part I.A. 
237  EPA rejected industry’s argument that the implementation of the current ozone standard would have resulted in 
cleaner air, stating that such a factor “is irrelevant to the issue here, i.e., what the level should be to protect public 
health with an adequate margin of safety.”  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 48 (emphasis in original).  
See also EPA, 1987 PM Rule, supra note 191, at 24,652 (“The overriding consideration in selecting a standard is 
how well it protects public health, not its relative stringency as compared to the previous standard.”).   47
reasoning, the evidence warrants a standard set at 0.07 ppm.”
238  For example, EPA estimated 
that the incremental risk reduction to children would be greater by adopting a 0.07 ppm standard: 
 
[T]he median percent of outdoor children estimated to experience FEV1 
decrements greater than 15 percent is reduced from about 7.7 percent for a 0.09 
ppm, 8-hr standard to about 6.8 percent for a 0.08 ppm, 8-hr standard.  Attaining a 
0.07 ppm, 8-hr standard results in a further reduction to about 3.0 percent of 
outdoor children estimated to experience this effect.
239  
 
In other words, EPA’s own 0.08 ppm standard would reduce the median percentage of children 
experiencing lung function decrements by less than one percent (0.9 percent) relative to a 0.09 
ppm standard (which is roughly equivalent to the pre-existing 0.12 ppm, 1 hour standard).
240  In 
contrast, a 0.07 ppm standard would reduce this same health endpoint by an additional 3.8 
percent, or would provide more than four times the health benefits of the 0.08 standard.  If 
reducing this endpoint by 0.9 percent is “requisite to protect public health,” then consistency 
should have dictated that reducing the same endpoint by 3.8 percent would also be “requisite.” 
    EPA’s attempt to justify its decision to reject the lower 0.07 ppm standard marked a 
departure from the interpretation the EPA and the courts in the past had given to Section 109 of 
the Clean Air Act.   NAAQS have been understood not only to protect healthy persons, but also 
to protect the health of sensitive sub-groups.
241  EPA identified several sensitive groups for 
ozone, including children playing outdoors on hot summer days and in particular children 
suffering from asthma and other respiratory illnesses.  Moreover, even among healthy 
individuals, there is substantial variability in the response to ozone.
242  The existence of 
susceptible subgroups and the variability of responses among even healthy individuals makes it 
                                                           
238  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,868. 
239  EPA, Staff Paper at 165. 
240  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,858 (noting that the 0.09 level would provide about the same level of 
protection as the previous standard). 
241  See supra notes 191, 194-95 and accompanying text. 
242  E.g., EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 15-16 (“approximately 5-20% of healthy individuals appear 
to be unusually sensitive to ozone .... For these ‘hyperresponders,’ even low ozone exposures may trigger responses 
that interfere with normal activity.”) (citations omitted); Ozone Staff Paper at 59 (“there is wide variability in the 
severity of response to O3 among both healthy individuals and those with impaired respiratory systems.”); Ozone 
Criteria Document at 9-4 (“[t]here is a large range of physiological responses among humans, with at least a 10-fold 
difference between the most and least responsive individuals.").    48
impossible to identify an ozone exposure level at which no significant adverse health effects 
would ever occur.   
    EPA purported to justify its selection of an 0.08 ppm standard over an 0.09 ppm ozone 
standard based on its claim that “an estimated 40-65% more children would experience health 
effects that could limit their activity and in some cases require medical treatment.”
243  T h e  
Agency noted that “[t]hese effects would occur an estimated 70-120% more times per year, ... -- 
a significant consideration given concerns about repeated exposures.”
244  The scientific evidence 
relied on by EPA showed that under the 0.09 ppm standard (which approximated the preexisting 
standard) about 41,000 children in nine cities studied would suffer moderate to severe pain on 
deep breathing at least once per year.
245  The Agency estimated that this number would be 
reduced to 27,000 children under the 0.08 standard EPA had selected.
246  However, at the 0.07 
ppm standard rejected by EPA, only about 9,000 children would experience moderate or severe 
pain from breathing.
247  Similar estimates were indicated for large decreases in lung function of 
at least a 20 percent reduction.  At the 0.09 level, 97,000 children in the nine cities would suffer 
such decreases in lung function, while only 58,000 were predicted at the 0.08 ppm level chosen 
by EPA.
248  Yet at the rejected 0.07 ppm level, only about 12,000 children would suffer these 
lung function decreases.
249  EPA never offered the public any reason for why it believed it 
needed to lower the standard to protect 14,000 children from moderate to severe pain, but then 
could reject an even lower standard that would have protected still 18,000 more children from 
the same effects.  Nor did it explain why protecting an additional 39,000 children from decreases 
in lung function justified lowering the standard but protecting still 46,000 more children did not. 
    As the Agency proceeded through several rounds of litigation over the ozone revisions, 
an account did emerge according to which the Agency purported to explain its choice of the 0.08 
ppm standard.  In the initial round of review, a panel of the D.C. Circuit court held that EPA 
                                                           
243  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 23-24 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. at 38868/1, 38865/2-3). 
244  Id. 
245  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,865; EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone; 
Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,716, 65,725 (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter “EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule”]. See also 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Tom Bliley in Support of Petitioners, Browner v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., at 28-29 (No. 99-1257) (Sept. 11, 2000). 
246  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,865. 
247  EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 245, at 65,725. 
248  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,865. 
249  EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 245, at 65,725.   49
failed to articulate an “intelligible principle” to constrain its discretion.
250 Dissenting from the 
panel’s holding, Judge David Tatel signaled what would become a more refined science-based 
argument which EPA would advance in subsequent rounds of litigation.
251  Judge Tatel argued 
that the scientific evidence and advice on ozone did indeed provide a clear basis for EPA’s 
choice of a new NAAQS standard.  Tatel argued that “different types of health effects [are] 
observed above and below 0.08 ppm,” the level selected by EPA.
252  Specifically, he opined that 
the health effects below 0.08 ppm were qualitatively different in that they were “transient and 
reversible.”
253  He also invoked scientific evidence indicating that normal background levels of 
ozone sometimes occur at 0.07 ppm, but not 0.08 ppm.
254   
    In petitioning the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing
255 and advancing arguments on further 
appeal,
256 EPA resurrected Judge Tatel’s arguments in defending its air quality standards.  EPA 
argued that it “sets primary NAAQS at levels that provide protection from medically significant 
risks and not at levels that protect against any and all risks, or any and all effects.”
257  EPA also 
asserted that the standards should be set at the lowest level at which studies indicated a 
statistically significant increase in “adverse effects,” which the Agency re-defined as health 
effects that are not “transient and reversible.”
258   EPA thus argued to the court that the scientific 
evidence on ozone indicated a break point at 0.08 ppm, even though EPA also acknowledged, 
and the record showed, that there was no known threshold for health effects from ozone.   
                                                           
250  American Trucking, 175 F.3d. at 1035 (observing that “EPA’s explanations for its decisions amount to assertions 
that a less stringent standard would allow the relevant pollutant to inflict a greater quantum of harm on public health, 
and that a less stringent standard would result in less harm”). 
251  See Pierce, supra note 16, at 75 (Judge Tatel’s “dissenting opinion in ATA ... contains a typical symptom of the 
science charade.”). 
252  American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting) 
253   Id. 
254  Id. at 1059-60.  Not surprisingly, Judge Tatel accepted these same arguments in the final round of litigation, 
authoring the panel opinion that upheld EPA’s actions under the “arbitrary and capricious” test.  American Trucking, 
283 F.3d at 355.  
255  Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc for the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, at 15-17 (Nos. 97-1440, 97-1441) (D.C. Cir. June 28, 1999) 
[hereinafter “EPA, Petition for Rehearing”].  
256  See, e.g., EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 28-30. 
257  EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra note 59, at 33.  See also id. at 36 (“Section 109(b)(2) clearly 
directs that EPA must set NAAQS at levels requisite to protect the general population, or identifiable groups within 
communities, from medically significant effects.”). 
258  EPA, Petition for Rehearing, supra note 255, at 16.   50
    EPA purported to identify “important and meaningful differences in the character of the 
scientific evidence regarding risks -- including the estimated frequency and duration of adverse 
health effects -- associated with levels above and below 0.08 ppm.”
259  For example, EPA argued 
to the Supreme Court that the scientific evidence did not support setting an ozone standard below 
0.08 ppm: 
 
[T]he record showed that average responses caused by exposures even at 0.08 
ppm were “typically small or mild in nature.”  The Administrator recognized that 
repeated exposures at the 0.08 ppm level could potentially produce adverse effects 
for some unusually sensitive individuals, but the record indicated that the “most 
certain” ozone-related effects at and below that level, even when adverse, are 
“transient and reversible.” Moreover, the quantitative exposure and risk 
assessments showed that a standard set at 0.08 ppm would significantly reduce the 
number of such exposures. As for more serious health effects, EPA lacked clinical 




While rejection of an 0.07 ppm standard may have been sound or even compelling on policy 
grounds, the “character of the scientific evidence” alone did not, nor could not, justify rejection 
of a standard lower than 0.08 ppm.
261  
    After all, according to EPA, there was no scientifically-established threshold at which no 
“adverse effects” occurred.  In promulgating its final ozone standard, the EPA stated that it did 
not “seem possible, in the Administrator's judgment, to identify a level at which it can be 
concluded with confidence that no ‘adverse’ effects are likely to occur.”
262  EPA’s own brief in 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he evidence showed a continuum of risk within the 
                                                           
259  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 57, at 33.   See also EPA, Petition for Rehearing, supra note 
255, at 17 (“[T]he character of the scientific evidence differed for levels above and below 0.08 ppm, and supported 
the selection of the 0.08 ppm level as ‘requisite’ to protect public health.”).   This argument was not made in this 
form in the proceedings below.  In the rulemaking itself, and in the original D.C. Circuit litigation, EPA summarily 
dismissed a 0.07 ppm alternative with the simple assertion that “[b]ecause health impacts below 0.08 ppm were less 
certain and likely to be less serious, the Administrator focused on the 0.08 and 0.09 ppm alternatives.”  EPA, D.C. 
Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 23 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863, 38,868).  As with the PM rulemaking, EPA 
again invoked uncertainty as a wild card.   Even though uncertainty was ostensibly a barrier to the adoption of the 
0.07 ppm standard, it did not keep EPA from defending its decision to lower the standard to 0.08 ppm based on 
“suspected, but not yet demonstrated, chronic effects” and an obligation to “err on the side of caution.”  EPA, 2001 
D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 27. 
260  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 57, at 14 (citations omitted). 
261  For purpose of the following analysis, we assume the validity of EPA’s conclusions on the results and meaning 
of the scientific evidence. 
262   EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,863.   51
range considered [i.e., 0.07 to 0.09 ppm], with statistically significant decreases in risk and 
corresponding increases in public health protection for successively more stringent eight-hour 
ozone standards.”
263  Similarly, in the preamble to the proposed ozone standard, EPA concluded 
that “[w]ithin any given urban area, statistically significant reductions in exposure and risk 
associated with functional and symptomatic effects result from alternative 8-hour standards as 
the level changes from 0.09 ppm to 0.08 ppm to 0.07 ppm.”
264  EPA acknowledged that the 
science showed “no break point or bright line that differentiates between acceptable and 
unacceptable risks within this range.”
265 
  In  rejecting  industry  arguments that there appeared to be a threshold for respiratory 
effects at 0.08 ppm, EPA argued that there were moderate decrements in lung function (FEV1)
266 
in a significant percentage of the population at 0.08 ppm and that, moreover, “the response rates 
at 0.07 ppm are only slightly less than these values.”
267  EPA also found “clear evidence from 
hospital admission studies that effects may continue down to background [0.04 ppm].”
268  
Indeed, although the relationship between ozone levels and hospital admissions appeared 
somewhat less certain at lower levels, the Agency concluded that there was “a consistency 
between studies which supports the associations at all levels studied” (that is, down to 
background levels of 0.04 ppm).
269  Thus, for the very health effects on which EPA based its 
selection of the 0.08 ppm ozone standard, namely respiratory effects and hospital admissions, 
EPA’s own findings in the record demonstrated that such effects occur at ozone levels well 
below 0.08 ppm.   
    Moreover, while the record showed a continuum in the frequency and severity of 
respiratory effects at successively lower ozone levels, it did not show a discernible discontinuum 
at 0.08 ppm between those effects that were “transient and reversible” and those that were more 
                                                           
263  EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra note 59, at 11. 
264  EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 245, at 65,728. 
265  Id. 
266  FEV1 refers to “forced expiratory volume,” which is the volume of air that can be expired in one second by a 
subject, and is a frequently used measure of lung function. 
267  EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 81. 
268  EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 84. 
269   Id.  Moreover, even if the effects at the lower levels may have appeared less certain, EPA was supposed to adopt 
a margin of safety to protect against less certain or even unknown risks. We have already discussed at some length 
EPA’s ad hoc approach to the margin of safety requirement under the Clean Air Act.   See supra notes 184-88 and 
accompanying text.    52
permanent, as Judge Tatel and EPA argued.  Most of the respiratory effects on which EPA relied 
to lower the primary ozone standard down to 0.08 ppm were also transient and reversible.
270  
Most significantly, in invoking a distinction between “transient and reversible” effects and those 
that were not, EPA again was shifting its position without offering any reasons for doing so.  
When EPA last revised the ozone standard in 1979, it relied on the very same types of transient 
respiratory health effects to support its standard, expressly finding that such effects were of 
concern and “adverse,” “[e]ven when reversible” and “even though transitory.”
271  Similarly, 
when the Agency previously revised the PM standard in 1987, it set the standard “in the lower 
portion of the range where sensitive, reversible physiological responses of uncertain health 
significance are possibly, but not definitely, observed in children.”
272  EPA’s attempt to construct 
a scientific demarcation based on whether or not effects are “transient and reversible” was 
therefore neither supported by the record nor consistent with EPA’s own past decisions. 
    EPA has treated health effects as relevant when they could be used to justify the standard 
that EPA preferred, but then discounted the very same health effects in explaining why it did not 
adopt a more stringent alternative.  For example, in deciding in 1993 not to revise the 0.12 ppm 
ozone standard, EPA determined that lung function decrements in the range of 10-20 percent, 
even “when accompanied by symptoms,” were not “adverse effects.”
273  Yet, in revising the 
same standard in 1997, EPA shifted its position and concluded that a moderate lung decrement in 
the range of 10 to 20 percent was indeed an “adverse effect.”
274   In defending its most recent 
                                                           
270  As the majority opinion in the D.C. Circuit noted, “it is far from apparent that any health effects existing above 
the [0.08 ppm] level are permanent and irreversible.”  American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035. 
271  EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 194, at 8207.  One of the key studies relied upon by EPA in 1979 reportedly 
found that subjects were uncomfortable while exercising while exposed to higher levels of ozone, but that “[t]he 
discomfort disappeared shortly after the termination of the experiment.”  See LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF 
SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 104 (1981) (describing the DeLucia and Adams study). 
272  EPA, 1987 PM Rule, supra note 191, at 24,643 (emphasis added). 
273  EPA, 1992 Ozone Proposal, supra note 196, at 35,549 (“[I]ndividuals exposed to lower levels of O3 (e.g., 0.12 to 
0.15 ppm) typically experience only mild and transient functional decrements [-9 to -16 percent decline in FEV1, id. 
at 35548] .... which may be accompanied by symptoms such as cough, chest tightness, pain on deep inspiration, and 
throat irritation.....  Although there is a difference of opinion among the EPA's scientific advisors as to the 
significance of decrements in lung function in the range of 10 to 20 percent when accompanied by symptoms, it is 
the Administrator's judgment that the lesser effects associated with exposure to O3 in the range of 0.12 ppm to 0.15 
ppm observed in the controlled human studies do not constitute adverse effects for purposes of section 109 of the 
Act.”).   
274  See EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 17 (noting that EPA “concluded that ‘moderate’ effects 
... experienced by asthmatics would likely be adverse because they could interfere with normal activity,” with 
“moderate” defined as 10-20 percent FEV1 decrements.).  Similarly, in its 1979 revision of the ozone standard, EPA   53
ozone standard against industry attacks that its standard was based on non-serious and reversible 
lung effects, EPA accused industry of “seek[ing] to trivialize lung function decrements and 
respiratory symptoms, ... [when] these effects can be sufficiently severe to disrupt the normal 
activity of both healthy individuals and asthmatics.”
275 Similarly, when EPA last revised its 
ozone standard in 1979, it concluded that physical discomfort and pulmonary function changes, 
“[e]ven when reversible” and “even though transitory,” were “adverse effects” that needed to be 
taken into account “in selecting the level of the primary standard.”
276  Yet, in defending its 1997 
revision to the ozone standard, EPA argued that it was justified in disregarding the health effects 
that occur at levels below 0.08 ppm since “these effects (e.g., lung function decreases and 
coughs) are less serious because they are ‘transient and reversible.’”
277  The very same kind of 
health effects have  appeared to be relevant when they support EPA’s decision to lower 
standards, but irrelevant when EPA has needed to defend its decision not to lower standards still 
further. 
    EPA also attempted to justify its rejection of the 0.07 ppm standard by stating that the 
lower standard “would be closer to peak background levels that infrequently occur in some areas 
due to nonanthropogenic sources of O3 [ozone] precursors, and thus more likely to be 
inappropriately targeted in some areas on such sources.”
278  Of course, it bears noting initially 
that any argument about setting standards to avoid naturally-occurring background levels departs 
from a purely health-focused justification for a risk standard.   It speaks to the standard’s 
feasibility, a factor which EPA has otherwise claimed is impermissible for it to use in setting air 
quality standards.
279  Indeed, in previous NAAQS rulemakings, EPA specifically rejected 
industry arguments that EPA should consider the feasibility problems created by setting air 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
concluded that lung function decrements in the range of 5 to 15 percent were adverse effects.  EPA, 1979 Ozone 
Rule, supra note 194, at 8207. 
275  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 33 (citing Industry Petitioner’s Brief at 5). 
276  EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 194, at 8207.  Similarly, in its 1987 revision to the PM standards, EPA set 
the standard at a level where “reversible” effects of “uncertain health significance” may “possibly, but not 
definitely” occur.  EPA, 1987 PM Standard, supra note 191, at 24,643. 
277  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58.  Elsewhere in the litigation over its NAAQS revisions, EPA 
emphasized the “transient and reversible” nature of health effects observed at lower levels in defending its decision 
to reject a more stringent standard.  See EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 28-30. 
278  62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868. 
279  See, e.g., EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,683 (“For more than a quarter of a century, EPA has 
interpreted section 109 of the Act as precluding consideration of the economic costs or technical feasibility of 
implementing NAAQS in setting them.”).   54
quality standards too close to the background levels.
280  If health were the only permissible 
consideration under the Clean Air Act, as EPA has argued and the courts have affirmed, then it 
really should not matter whether a standard is set near or even below background levels.
281 
    Even if background levels were considered to be relevant, in this case EPA’s concern 
about a 0.07 ppm standard approaching background levels was not supported by the Agency’s 
own estimates in the rulemaking record.  In conducting its risk assessment, EPA assumed a 
background level of 0.04 ppm – not 0.07 ppm.
282  The Agency’s Staff Paper indicated that “it is 
reasonable to estimate that the 8-hour daily maximum O3 during the summer is also in the range 
of 0.03 to 0.05 ppm.”
283  Moreover, EPA specifically rejected arguments made by industry in the 
rulemaking that background levels may approach 0.08 ppm.
284  In doing so, EPA stated that:  
 
While background concentrations of 03 can be as high as 0.05 ppm, unless O3 
concentrations are affected by anthropogenic VOC and/or NOx emissions, 8-hr 
O3 background concentrations will typically be much lower than 0.05 ppm.  A 
reasonable estimate of the 8-hr daily maximum O3 background during the summer 
season is 0.03-0.05 ppm.
285   
 
EPA did acknowledge that “at remote or rural sites O3 concentrations can exceed 0.076 ppm,” 
but dismissed the relevance of this finding because most of these concentrations were, in the 
                                                           
280  See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1190 (D.C. Cir.  (1981) (upholding EPA refusal 
even to docket evidence submitted by industry claiming that attainment of ozone standard would be precluded by 
background ozone areas in many parts of the country, because “the EPA position that attainability is not central to a 
rulemaking of this type is correct.”). 
281  In other regulatory programs, EPA has sought to reduce pollutants to below background levels.  For example, 
EPA’s recently promulgated standard for arsenic in drinking water primarily controls naturally occurring levels of 
arsenic. See EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and 
New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001).  EPA has also taken steps to address 
radon, another naturally occurring pollutant.  See http://www.epa.gov/iaq/radon/index.html (describing EPA 
activities in addressing radon).  In any case, EPA added a new provision in Appendix I to the ozone standard that 
created a compliance exemption for peak ozone concentrations if they are associated with forest fires, stratospheric 
ozone intrusion, or “other natural events.”  Part 50, App. I; EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 
95.  The existence of an exemption such as this one undercuts the claim that EPA could not set the standard lower 
than 0.08 ppm because of background ozone levels. 
282  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 20 n. 19.  See also id. at 47 (“CASAC agreed that ‘background’ 
was 0.04 ppm ... – not 0.07 ppm as Petitioners imply.”) (citations omitted). 
283  Id. 
284  EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 86. 
285  EPA, Ozone Response to Comments, supra note 136, at 86; see also id. at 93-94 (arguing that background levels 
will be below 0.05 ppm unless affected by anthropogenic emissions).   55
Agency’s view, still caused by human activities.
286  EPA’s claim that it could not adopt a 0.07 
ppm standard because it was too close to background level did not comport with past positions 
taken by the Agency nor with the Agency’s own positions adopted earlier in the rulemaking.
287 
    In its rulemaking and subsequent rounds of litigation, EPA offered one remaining defense 
of its decision to reject the lower 0.07 ppm standard.  The Agency suggested that because no 
member of the EPA’s CASAC supported a standard below 0.08 ppm, this justified EPA’s 
decision not to set a NAAQS below 0.08 ppm.
288  Of course, the statute delegates the authority to 
select a standard to the EPA Administrator, not to CASAC.  In its subsequent brief before the 
Supreme Court, EPA acknowledged that CASAC “did not relieve the Administrator of her duty 
to reach decisions on specific NAAQS levels.”
289  The function of CASAC is to provide 
scientific advice, not to make the risk management choices necessary for selecting a standard.
290  
    Admittedly, some members of CASAC did express their “personal preferences” for 
specific levels for the revised standards, but as EPA has elsewhere recognized these individual 
preferences of CASAC members are distinct from the collective findings of the entire committee 
which comprise the official advice that EPA must consider.
291  CASAC as a whole expressly 
                                                           
286  Id. at 86; see also id. at 94 (asserting that it is “clear that the component consisting of background O3 is only a 
fraction of rural O3 concentrations, which are clearly increased by human activities throughout the U.S.”). 
287  See Oren, supra note 16, at 10,659. 
288  EPA, Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 57, at 33 (noting that “no member of the CASAC panel of 
experts supported a standard set lower than 0.08 ppm”).  Judge Tatel had advanced this point in his dissent in 
American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059, as well as accepted it in writing the panel opinion in the D.C. Circuit’s second 
round of review in the case. See American Trucking, 283 F.3d at 379 (“EPA is entitled to give ‘significant weight’ to 
the fact that no committee member advocated a level of 0.07 ppm.”). 
289  EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra note 59, at 11.  EPA acknowledged that the official CASAC 
consensus view was limited to providing scientific advice, not advising on the ultimate selection of a regulatory 
standard: “Once the Administrator had concluded that the NAAQS required revision, she-- unlike CASAC–had to 
resolve the uncertainties associated with those decisions.”  Id. 
290  See EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the 1996 Proposed National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Particulate Matter (July 1997) [hereinafter “EPA, PM Response to Comments”], at 26-27 (EPA rejected 
comments that CASAC’s failure to reach consensus on the Agency’s chosen standards undermines the basis for 
those standards, because such arguments “appear to rest on questionable assumptions about the role and purposes of 
CASAC review,” noting that the purpose of CASAC is to provide scientific advice that the Administrator must 
consider -- “but is not bound” by.). 
291  EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 37 (“CASAC recognized that these views were just that – 
‘personal preferences’ – and distinguished them from the committee’s consensus view that the selection of a 
standard was a ‘policy judgment’ for the Administrator.”); EPA, PM Response to Comments, supra note 290, at 29-
30 (“[I]t is important to separate the personal opinions that individual members might express on particular policy 
choices such as standard levels from their scientific conclusions on the range of options that is supported by the 
science and should be considered by the Administrator”); April 23, 1997 Hearing, supra note 74, at 370 (prepared 
statement of EPA Administrator Carol Browner) (“While ten of the 16 CASAC members who reviewed the ozone   56
concluded that the selection of the ozone standard was a policy choice for the Administrator, 
rather than a scientific determination within the expertise of the committee.
292  Even though the 
individual views of CASAC members provided no legal basis for, nor limitation on the 
Administrator’s decisions, it is interesting to note that more than half of those members who 
expressed a view actually supported a level higher than 0.08 ppm.
293  In the end, EPA effectively 
claimed that it was entitled to give significant weight to individual views of CASAC members 
when it was helpful to bolster the Agency’s decision not to lower the standard to 0.07 ppm, but 
that it did not need to give them this same weight when it was less helpful for supporting the 
Agency’s position. 
    In sum, EPA’s attempt in litigation to argue that science compelled it to reject any ozone 
standard below 0.08 ppm was inconsistent with numerous other Agency positions.  The Agency 
disregarded the health effects from exposures below 0.08 ppm, abandoning the position it took in 
previous NAAQS rulemakings that transient and reversible effects warranted regulatory 
protection.  The EPA’s position on background levels in litigation was inconsistent with its 
analysis of background levels in the rulemaking record and with the Agency’s previous dismissal 
of industry concerns about background levels.  Finally, EPA’s position was inconsistent with its 
purported health-only construction of the Clean Air Act, as presumably would have been any 
decision to set a standard other than zero for a non-threshold pollutant.  Rejecting a 0.07 ppm 
ozone standard may well have been an appropriate one, but it could only be defended on public 
policy grounds, not solely on scientific evidence or expertise.  EPA identified no such policy 
reason to justify why it effectively turned its back on the adverse effects that some citizens will 
continue to experience even if all parts of the country come into compliance with the Agency’s 
new standards. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
staff paper expressed their preferences as to the level of the standard, all believe it is ultimately a policy decision for 
EPA to make.”). 
292  See supra notes 143-44, 177 and accompanying text. 
293  EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 245, at 65,729 (noting that “while some CASAC members supported the 
choice of the proposed 0.08 ppm, fully half or more of the CASAC panel members expressing views on a specific 
level supported a specific level or range of levels that include 0.09 ppm”).  Furthermore, EPA did not defer in the 
same way to the views of CASAC members when it came to setting the level of its revised PM standard.  Of the 
twenty-two members of the CASAC panel, only four expressed a preference for the more stringent PM alternatives 
in EPA’s proposal.  Robert W. Crandall, The Costly Pursuit of the Impossible, 15 BROOKINGS REV. 45 (Summer 
1997).   57
D. Comparing the Health Benefits of the Ozone and Particulates Standards 
    One of the most striking examples of regulatory incoherence in EPA’s NAAQS revisions 
lies in the disparity between the health benefits from the revised ozone standards and the revised 
particulates standard.
294  In rejecting a more stringent alternative for the PM standard, EPA 
rejected an option that would have achieved a much greater gain in health benefits than the gain 
the Agency anticipated it would achieve by revising its ozone standard.  In other words, the 
Agency rejected an alternative PM standard that it expected would deliver more health protection 
than all the protection that it expected to gain from revising the ozone standard.  As a result, if 
protecting the public health with an adequate margin of safety did not require the Agency to 
lower the PM standard still further, then it is far from clear why the Agency was justified in 
revising its ozone standard as it did.   
    Based on staff analysis and consistent with CASAC’s advice, the Agency assumed in 
revising its ozone standard that the new NAAQS would not achieve any reduction in 
mortality.
295  In quantifying the non-mortality health benefits of the new ozone standard, EPA 
estimated the total monetized value to be $0.06 billion.
296  In contrast, EPA estimated the 
                                                           
294  See, e.g., Lester B. Lave, EPA’s Proposed Air Quality Standards: Clean Air Sense, 15 BROOKINGS REV. 40 
(Summer 1997) (noting that EPA estimated its ozone standard would provide at most $1.5 billion annually in health 
benefits, while its particulate standard would offer as much as $110 billion in health benefits).  EPA’s starkly 
disparate responses to health benefits across the two standards would appear to be an example of comparative 
incoherence.  Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1217 (2002). 
295  In setting the ozone standard, EPA found that there was insufficient evidence of any association between ozone 
exposure and mortality, and therefore EPA did not rely on any reduction in mortality to justify its new ozone 
standard.  E.g., EPA, Ozone Staff Paper at 1870 (concluding that “only limited, suggestive evidence” exists that 
“[a]n increase in daily mortality [is] associated with O sub3 exposure”); id. at 1871 (noting that “associations 
between O sub3 exposure and chronic health impacts have not been sufficiently demonstrated in humans.”).  EPA 
identified and used some recent scientific studies identifying a mortality risk from ozone in its Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, which had the effect of substantially increasing the Agency’s estimate of the benefits of the revised ozone 
standard, but in so doing EPA made clear that “this evidence was not used in the NAAQS standard setting process.”  
EPA, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
and Proposed Regional Hazard Rule 2-8 (July 17, 1997) [hereinafter “RIA”];  see also EPA, Ozone Response to 
Comments,  supra note 136, at 48-49 (“[P]remature mortality associated with O3 was not given substantial 
consideration during this review of the O3 primary NAAQS.  Because some of the new studies were considered in 
the Regulatory Impact Analysis, some commenters may have believed mistakenly that they were considered in 
review of the NAAQS ... EPA did not give significant weight to that mortality evidence.”) 
296  RIA, supra note 295, at 12-68 (assuming a constant annual standard of 15 ug/m3).  In the RIA, EPA claimed that 
some new studies, not reviewed by CASAC, strengthened the evidence for some reduced mortality benefits from the 
ozone standard.  Although the RIA made clear that EPA did not rely on reduced mortality in selecting the ozone 
standard (id. at 12-15, 12-19), it included an estimate of potential mortality reduction benefits in the RIA to produce 
a “high-end” ozone benefits estimate.  Id. at 12-20.  The estimated reduced mortality would increase the health 
benefits of the ozone standard from $0.06 to $1.76 billion.  Id. at 12-68.  Even this latter figure, however, is smaller 
than the incremental benefits of the revisions to the PM2.5 standard we discuss in the text.   58
incremental health benefits of lowering the daily PM2.5 standard from the selected 65 ug/m3 
level to 50 ug/m3 to be $2.9 billion.
297  The incremental benefits of reducing the daily PM 
standard still further to 25 ug/m3 would have been still larger, but they were not calculated by 
EPA. 
  The  EPA’s  analysis  clearly  indicated that the health benefits foregone by EPA’s decision 
not to tighten the PM2.5 daily standard below the 65 ug/m3 level dwarfed the total health benefits 
of the ozone standard (by approximately a factor of 50).
298  EPA claimed that its ozone revision 
was necessary in order to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, but it also 
argued that a further tightening of the PM standard to achieve significantly greater health 
benefits was not necessary to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety.  EPA 




III. Toward More Principled Risk Management 
 
    EPA’s effort to rely exclusively on science may have effectively conveyed the impression 
to its overseers that the Agency provided a sound basis for revising its standards, but in fact by 
relying on science-based rhetoric the Agency effectively disguised a series of ad hoc and 
incoherent decisions.  EPA’s science-based defense not only may have helped it to claim 
deference, but also helped the Agency escape responsibility for confronting squarely and openly 
the policy choices it was making.  As a result, positions adopted in previous rulemakings, or at 
previous points in the same rulemaking, shifted in the course of defending the Agency’s new 
revisions.  Findings or assumptions made in the rulemaking record were put to the side in order 
                                                           
297  RIA, supra note 295, at 12-42. 
298  Furthermore, this inconsistency cannot be explained based on the uncertainty contained in any risk analysis.  
Both the ozone and PM risk assessments involve substantial uncertainty, as EPA acknowledges.  Moreover, the 
PM2.5 risk estimates for the regulatory increments not adopted by EPA come from the same studies and data sets that 
EPA used to justify the PM2.5 standard it did select.  Given that there is no qualitative break point in the extent of 
uncertainty in those data, EPA cannot on one hand say that the data above its selected standard is sufficiently certain 
to support regulation but the data produced with the same method and in the same studies below its standard is too 
uncertain to be treated as credible. 
299  Accord Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 330 (“EPA’s own calculations showed that a tighter 
particulates standard would have produced far greater health benefits than the ozone standard; this leaves a serious 
unexplained anomaly in the two standards taken together.”); Sunstein, Regulating Risks,  supra note 16, at 6 
(“[T]ighter regulation of particulates, going well beyond the EPA’s rule, would appear to do a great deal more to 
protect public health than would the new regulation of ozone.”).   59
to support positions the Agency made in litigation.  Nowhere in the entire process did EPA 
articulate a clear policy rationale to justify how its NAAQS standards should be set, other than 
essentially to assert that they were set at the “appropriate” level.
300  
    Given the way that section 109 of the Clean Air Act has been construed over the years, 
the Agency has found itself navigating untenable conceptual terrain, especially since most, if not 
all, criteria pollutants fail to exhibit thresholds below which they create no adverse health effects. 
Following the dictates of the Clean Air Act, EPA has claimed to select standards that protect the 
public health with an adequate margin of safety and hence has proceeded to revise its standards 
by marshaling scientific evidence of health effects at levels below its current standards.
301  Yet 
similar evidence considered by the Agency showed that health effects would still persist even at 
levels below the revised standards.
302  Indeed, with non-threshold pollutants, these effects will by 
definition persist at any level above zero.
303  The Agency has admitted that it need not, even 
cannot, set its standards at zero, but it has never provided any consistent and meaningful set of 
reasons that justify its decision to lower its standards to protect against one increment of adverse 
effects but not to lower them further to protect against another increment of adverse effects. 
    In this final Part, we highlight what needs to be done if air quality standard setting is to 
proceed in the future with more coherent justifications.  We present four principled approaches 
to standard setting in the section that follows, with the aim of showing what has been missing 
from EPA’s decisionmaking as well as pointing toward better ways of explaining air quality 
standard setting in the future.  Unfortunately, some of the most promising of these approaches 
are no longer permissible under the EPA’s, and now the Supreme Court’s, interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act, raising important implications for future legal developments.  We show how 
achieving a more candid and coherent policy justification for its environmental decisions will 
require a significant change in the existing approach toward setting NAAQS standards, including 
an abandonment of the fundamental fiction that costs do not and should not enter into the 
Agency’s decisionmaking.  Of course, given the Supreme Court’s affirmation of this fiction,
304 
                                                           
300  See Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 327 (“EPA’s presentation of all the relevant data shows a 
reason for concern about adverse health effects at current levels, but leaves many doubts about why EPA chose the 
particular standards it did, rather than standards somewhat higher or somewhat lower.”). 
301  See supra Parts I.A & II.A. 
302  See supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
303  See supra Part I.C. 
304  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465.   60
making a shift toward principled standard setting will now require legislative change, not only to 
overcome the restrictive interpretation EPA and the courts have given to section 109 of the Clean 
Air Act but also to direct the EPA to develop a set of general policy guidelines that it will use in 
making future decisions about its air quality standards. 
 
A. Risk Management Principles 
    Regulatory decisions such as the selection of NAAQS involve enormous stakes, both 
with respect to health consequences and economic burdens.  If EPA is to provide a more 
coherent justification for these significant decisions than it offered in its most recent NAAQS 
revisions, how can it do so?  A regulatory agency such as EPA has four basic approaches 
available that it can use to provide a consistent justification for making risk management 
decisions such as setting ambient standards: (1) Eliminate all risks (or all non-naturally occurring 
risks); (2) Avoid unacceptable risks; (3) Avoid unacceptable costs (sometimes described as the 
feasibility approach); and (4) Balance costs and benefits. 
305  Although these approaches are not 
all equally sound strategies, nor are they all currently permissible under the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, they do illustrate the range of possible ways to provide a 
consistent explanation for risk management decisionmaking.
306  
 
                                                           
305     For a similar taxonomy of approaches, see FRANK CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE 
LAW 69 (1989).  While the four approaches we outline represent the major justificatory strategies available to risk 
regulators, they do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible principled approaches.  Another principled 
approach would be to eliminate all costs of regulation, but this would be as misguided as eliminating all risks.  Some 
level of government intervention is needed to address environmental risk and thereby impose an appropriate level of 
costs on those actors that have not fully internalized all the social costs of their action.  For discussions of the 
rationales for governmental regulation, see  V. KIP  VISCUSI, JOHN  M. VERNON,  AND  JOSEPH  E. HARRINGTON, 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST  (2000); NEIL  KOMESAR, IMPERFECT  ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,  AND  PUBLIC  POLICY  (1994); CASS  R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (1989).  Other principled approaches could take into account issues of distributional equity, deploying 
a consistent strategy to promote fairness and equality in the distribution of costs and benefits across different 
individuals and groups within society.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING 
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 40 (1996) (noting that in some cases “managing environmental risks has 
become a question of fairness, moral responsibility, and distributional equity”); K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK 
AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 183 (1991) (arguing for incorporating 
weights for “egalitarian values, social obligations, and rights” into risk management decisionmaking). 
306    Our focus here is on developing consistent general approaches to risk management decisionmaking, not on 
all the choices that enter into decisionmaking about risk, such as the treatment of uncertainty.  Much has been 
written about the development of principled approaches to risk assessment, and government agencies have issued 
guidelines for assessing and characterizing risk with the aim of increasing consistency.  See, e.g., EPA, Guidelines 
for Carcinogen Risk Assessment (1999).  Our aim, in contrast, is to focus on core principles for deciding the central   61
Eliminate All Risks 
    The first approach would be conceptually straightforward:  eliminate all risk.  This 
principle could be consistently applied if EPA set its standards at levels at which it believed there 
would be no risk to health.  The Agency could also take a consistent risk management approach 
if it chose to minimize risk by setting standards at background levels, thereby opting to eliminate 
all risks except those that are naturally created (a zero additive risk approach).   
    More generally, the zero risk approach could be characterized as one that aims to 
minimize all risk.  Understood this way, a minimize risk approach could in some cases lead to a 
nonzero risk level, if a pollutant provides some beneficial health effects that countervail its 
adverse health effects.  For example, commentators in the ozone rulemaking alleged that even 
though ground level ozone causes adverse pulmonary effects, concentrations of the pollutant also 
provide beneficial health effects by screening out harmful ultraviolet radiation.
307   If a reduction 
of the pollutant would create offsetting risks, such as an increase in skin cancer, then the standard 
that minimizes health risks could be one set well above zero.
308  In cases with such so-called 
risk-risk tradeoffs, the EPA could opt for a standard set at a level that achieves the lowest 
possible adverse health effects, namely at the level at which the marginal adverse health effects 
equaled the marginal beneficial health effects.
309 
    Minimizing risk would appear to resonate with the conventional interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act, with its emphasis on a preventative approach to health protection through a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
risk management question that science by itself simply is unable to answer, namely at what level should ambient risk 
standards be set. 
307  See, e.g., Randall Lutter & Howard Gruenspecht, Assessing Benefits of Ground-Level Ozone: What Role for 
Science in Setting National Air Quality Standards?, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 85 (2001).  The D.C. Circuit Court, in the 
first round of litigation over EPA’s ozone revision, directed EPA on remand to take these possible beneficial health 
effects of ozone into consideration.  American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1051-1053. 
308  This assumes that the dose-response curves of the health benefits and health risks of the pollutants have different 
shapes.  If the two dose-response curves are parallel, it may be that the health risks or the health benefits dominate 
the other at all dose levels as they both decrease in step with exposure, in which case the standard that maximizes 
net health benefits would be set at zero (if health risks > health benefits at all exposure levels) or no standard should 
be set (if health benefits > health risks at all exposure levels).  
309  Cf.  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 495 (Breyer, J. concurring) (“A rule likely to cause more harm to health than it 
prevents is not a rule that is ‘requisite to protect the public health.’”).   See generally LESTER LAVE, THE STRATEGY 
OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 15-17 (1981); JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. 
WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996).  There are obvious affinities between such an approach 
and one that balances all costs and benefits of a risk standard, but because the “maximize risk reduction” approach 
focuses only on costs and benefits as measured in health effects it should be distinguished from an approach that 
aims to maximize net social benefits.  In those cases where the existence of some amount of a pollutant offers no 
offsetting health benefits whatsoever, the “maximize risk reduction” approach equates with the “zero risk” approach.   62
margin of safety.
310  As the D.C. Circuit Court directed in Lead Industries, EPA might set its 
NAAQS in a way that ensured “an absence of adverse effect” on members of the public.
311  Of 
course, for non-threshold pollutants that lack countervailing health benefits, the minimize risk 
principle can be applied consistently only if EPA sets its standards at a zero or background 
concentration level, something which would effectively call for the elimination of all economic 
activities.
312  Quite sensibly, the Agency has expressly disavowed any intention of adopting a 
zero-risk approach and the Supreme Court has also recognized the folly of such an approach.
313  
Moreover, while EPA has raised concerns about background levels when it would appear 
expedient to do so, it has not adopted or applied consistently any principle of eliminating all 
human-created pollution.
314  It has also so far rejected calls for making health-health tradeoffs in 
setting NAAQS standards under a minimize risk principle.
315  What this means is that if EPA is 
to adopt a more coherent approach to its risk management decisionmaking, it will almost 
certainly need to choose some other principle to justify its decisionmaking. 
 
Avoid Unacceptable Risks 
  A second approach would be for the Agency to establish a level of acceptable risk and to 
rely on such a level across its air quality standards.
316  Rather than always try to minimize all 
risks, the Agency would only reduce risks to a certain level, bringing the level of risk down to an 
acceptable level.  As with the minimize risk principle, the acceptable risk approach focuses 
                                                           
310  See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.  The language in the Clean Water Act which commands the 
elimination of all discharges into the nation’s waterways also exemplifies this approach.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
The regulation of food additives under the Delaney Clause also followed this approach for many years.  See Public 
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
311  647 F.2d at 1153. 
312  W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 658-60 (1983).  See 
also supra Part I.C. 
313  See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 495 (Breyer, J. concurring) (noting that 
the Clean Air Act should not be construed as requiring “a world that is free of all risk -- an impossible and 
undesirable objective”); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 642 
(1980) (noting that “safe” does not necessarily mean “risk-free”). 
314  See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text.  
315  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Final Response to Remand, 68 Fed. Reg. 614, 618 (Jan. 6, 
2003) (noting that any increase in risks associated with reductions in ozone levels, such as from increased exposure 
to ultraviolet radiation, is “too uncertain at this time to warrant any relaxation in the level of public health protection 
previously determined to be requisite to protect against the demonstrated adverse respiratory effects of direct 
inhalation exposure to O3 in the ambient air.”). 
316  See Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, 5 RISK 1(1994); Gary E. Marchant & Dawn P. 
Danzeisen, ‘Acceptable’ Risk for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535 (1989).   63
exclusively on the benefits to be reaped from a risk standard.
317  It does not try to maximize 
those benefits, but simply to deliver a desirable level of benefits from risk reduction. 
    The acceptable risk approach has been used in other regulatory contexts.  For example, in 
setting standards for hazardous air pollutants, EPA has presumptively defined “acceptable risk” 
based on a maximum individual mortality risk of no greater than one in 10,000.
318  The Agency 
has similarly set acceptable risk targets in other contexts, including the regulation of water 
quality, hazardous wastes, and pesticides.
319  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
follows a similar approach, using a benchmark of mortality risk of one in 1,000 as the level of 
“significant risk” on which it bases occupational health standards.
320  If the EPA adopted a 
similar, purely health-based approach, it could then apply its acceptable risk criterion to select a 
set of air quality standards that were consistent with each other. 
    Extending an acceptable risk approach to NAAQS decisionmaking would not be easy, 
however, since criteria pollutants such as ozone and PM create varied types of health effects 
other than mortality.  Most “acceptable risk” benchmarks established by EPA under other 
regulatory programs focus exclusively, or at least primarily, on cancer mortality.
321  Mortality is 
a binary effect, but many of the health effects considered by EPA for pollutants such as ozone 
involve continuous health effects (e.g., respiratory irritation) that vary in intensity from serious 
illness to a minor nuisance.  It is generally harder to define an acceptable risk level for such 
continuous effects because it is necessary to address both the frequency and the severity of the 
                                                           
317  See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1664 (2001) (describing the 
acceptable risk approach as “entirely benefits-based”). 
318  EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions From Maleic Anhydride 
Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product 
Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,045 (Sept. 14, 1989) (“The EPA will generally presume that if the risk to 
that individual is no higher than approximately 1 in 10 thousand, that risk level is considered acceptable.”)   This 
risk level slides down towards one in one million as the size of the exposed population increases.  Id.   In addition, 
the Clean Air Act now authorizes the EPA to remove categories of sources of hazardous air pollutants from the list 
of regulated sources whenever it finds “that no source in the category ... emits such hazardous air pollutants in 
quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one in one million to the individual in the 
population who is most exposed to emissions of such pollutants from the source.”  42 U.S.C. § 7412(C)(9)(B)(i). 
319  See March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and 
Environmental Policy, 6 RISK  17 (1995).  The legislative history of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
stipulates that EPA should apply an acceptable risk level of one in one million for certain pesticide residues.  H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-669(II), at 41 (1996). 
320  OSHA, Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168 (Dec, 4, 1987); OSHA, Occupational 
Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,936 (1984); Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 48 Fed. Reg. 
1,864 (1983).  See also Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Int’l Union, 
UAW v. OSHA, 37 F. 3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994).   64
disease.
322 Moreover, a common metric for morbidity is needed to compare alternative standards, 
each of which may vary along multiple dimensions of predicted health effects (such as if 
exposure contributed to circulatory as well as to pulmonary problems).
323 
    Another issue with the acceptable risk approach is whether to rely upon individual or 
population risk – or both.
324  EPA has yet to adopt a clear and consistent position on whether it 
should base its NAAQS decisions on maximum individual risk or population risk.
325  In its recent 
ozone revision, EPA appeared in some ways to accept a population risk approach.
326  Yet, in a 
previous NAAQS rulemaking, EPA explicitly indicated that the number of people exposed was 
not relevant, since “[s]tandards must be based on a judgment of a safe air quality level and not on 
an estimate of how many persons will intersect with given concentration levels.”
327  The problem 
with relying only on levels of risk to individuals, of course, is that this overlooks the number of 
people exposed to the risk, something that clearly affects the level of overall benefits from a 
regulatory standard. 
    To measure and compare the overall benefits of different regulatory alternatives, EPA 
would need to use consistent methods to quantify all the health benefits that it predicted would 
derive from a proposed standard and its alternatives.  Such a careful “benefits analysis,” as 
Professor Cass Sunstein has called it, would enable the Agency to determine whether any given 
regulatory option can be expected to achieve an acceptable level of risk.
328  A benefits analysis 
would detail all the health effects associated with different levels of exposure as well as report 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
321  Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 319. 
322  Cf. Reilly, supra note 45, t 1365-66 (“The search for the Holy Grail of risk management -- the so called “bright 
line” that would let policy makers determine, under any and all circumstances, whether a particular level of risk is 
‘acceptable’ or not -- seems doomed to failure.”).  
323  See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text. 
324  See Sunstein, Regulating Risks, supra note 6, at 9 (“[I]t is not clear if the agency should focus on the probability 
of harm faced by each individual, or instead on some statistical measure of aggregate harms, faced by the population 
as a whole.”). 
325  In defining “acceptable risk” for exposure to hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act in 
the late 1980s, EPA considered options that would consider only maximum individual risk or only total population 
risk, before ultimately selecting a hybrid approach that considered both measures of risk.  See EPA, supra note , at  
38,045. 
326  EPA justified its selection of an 0.08 ppm ozone standard over an 0.09 ppm standard based largely on the 
argument than greater numbers of people would be exposed to unhealthy air quality under the 0.09 ppm standard 
than the 0.08 ppm standard.   EPA argued that under the 0.08 ppm standard “an estimated 40-65% more children 
would experience health effects that could limit their activity and in some cases require medical treatment.”  EPA, 
D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 58, at 23-24 (citing EPA, Final Ozone Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868, 38,865). 
327  EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 194, at 8210. 
328  Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 363-65.   65
the predicted incidence of these effects on all exposed individuals, including those in any 
sensitive subgroups within the overall population.
329  Such a benefits analysis would contain 
EPA’s best range (or point) estimates for the number of people likely to be exposed to the 
pollutant under an alternative standard, the probabilities that they will suffer various health 
effects, and the severity of those effects.
330  These benefits could be monetized using 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures, a standard way of aggregating different kinds of 
environmental health effects across an entire population.
331  Alternatively, EPA could consider 
using other metrics for aggregation, such as quality adjusted life years (“QALY”), a measure 
used more commonly in health care analyses.
332  Whatever their relative merits, measures like 
WTP and QALY serve as a common basis for measuring the total health benefits associated with 
different regulatory standards.
333 
    By using a common measure, EPA could improve the consistency of outcomes across 
different standards.  For example, more explicit and detailed attention to benefits analysis might 
have made clearer to EPA decisionmakers, as well as to the American public, that the Agency 
was passing up an opportunity to secure greater health gains from tightening the particulates 
standard still further than it reaped altogether from its revisions to the ozone standard.
334  In this 
way, a benefits-based approach could help ensure that different standards reduce risks to 
                                                           
329   Id. 
330  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 245 (2002). 
331  For a recent discussion of willingness to pay measures, see James K. Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, 22 RISK 
ANALYSIS 985 (2002).  EPA itself used willingness to pay to estimate the health benefits of its recent ozone and PM 
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& CONT. PROB. 5 (1976).  
333  For comparative assessments of these measures, see Hammitt, supra note 331; Janice Clair Wright, Investments 
that Save Lives: The Norms of Environmental and Medical Decision Making (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University). 
334  See supra Part II.D.   66
comparable (and acceptable) levels, achieving comparable (and desirable) levels of health 
benefits.
335  
    While a benefits-based approach may help in identifying inconsistencies across rules, by 
itself such an approach still skirts the underlying question:  What makes a particular level of risk 
“acceptable” (or a particular level of benefits “desirable”)?  An acceptable risk approach seems 
to envision that a government agency will make risk management decisions in individual 
proceedings in accordance with some predetermined level of acceptable risk.  A benefits analysis 
can reveal whether a particular standard meets any such predetermined level.  It does not, 
however, provide a basis for what the predetermined level should be.  After all, any detailed 
benefits analysis, such as the kind that Professor Sunstein calls f o r ,  i s  r e a l l y  j u s t  a  h i g h l y  
professional risk assessment, not the risk management judgment called for in standard-setting.
336 
Selecting an acceptable risk level still calls for making a reasoned judgment about what an 
appropriate level should be.
337 
    The acceptable risk approach suffers from another notable limitation.  The acceptable risk 
approach means that standards should be set based solely on the level of benefits to be gained -- 
regardless of the costs of meeting those standards.
338  To follow this approach would mean that 
EPA would need to set standards based on benefits even when the costs of compliance were 
disproportionately high.
339  Moreover, the consistent application of this approach would also lead 
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ensure interregulation consistency.”). 
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339  Cf. Roy E. Albert, Carcinogen Risk Assessment in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 24 CRIT. REV. 
TOXICOL. 75, 84 (1994) (“[T]here is no acceptable risk in the absence of benefits.  Risks at virtually any level can be 
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the Agency to reject risk reductions below the “acceptable level” even when the costs of 
achieving them were trivial.
340  
    Of course, however desirable or undesirable an acceptable risk approach may be, EPA 
has so far not even tried to use it in setting or revising any of its NAAQS.  As a result, it is hardly 
surprising that the recently revised ozone and particulate standards will achieve markedly 
disparate levels of health benefits.
341  The Agency has so far eschewed responsibility for offering 
even a consistent benefits-based account of its decisions, claiming that the range of health effects 
associated with criteria pollutants makes it too difficult to follow any “generalized paradigm” in 
explaining its NAAQS decisions.
342 
 
Avoid Unacceptable Costs 
    A third approach to consistent risk management is the mirror image of the acceptable risk 
approach.  Instead of focusing exclusively on benefits, the cost of a regulation would be the key 
factor.  In other words, EPA could set its standards as low as possible without making the costs 
of compliance reach an unacceptable level.   
    This third approach has typically been couched in terms of feasibility, or what can be 
achieved without causing excessively high costs or severe economic disruptions.
343  F o r  
example, OSHA is charged by statute with developing regulations to protect workers from the 
exposure to toxic substances “to the extent feasible.” 
344 To say that a standard is feasible is 
therefore to say that its costs are acceptable.  Of course, just stating that a regulatory standard is 
“feasible” or “infeasible” is rather imprecise and ambiguous.
345  However, just as agencies have 
operationalized the concept of acceptable risk by setting specific risk targets, they could similarly 
                                                           
340  See Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 377 (suggesting that when a nontrivial risk reduction “would 
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develop precise standards establishing acceptable and unacceptable levels of costs.   In other 
words, the agency could apply a consistent decision rule by reducing risk to the point at which 
compliance costs reached a specified level.
346    
    Such an approach, it should be noted, would disregard the benefits of risk standards.  If a 
standard with exceedingly high costs (or which would cause severe economic disruption) would 
also save many thousands of lives, then society almost certainly would be better off with the 
standard even if the costs by themselves might seem unacceptably high.
347  For example, 
government regulations eliminating lead from gasoline resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars 
in annual costs and appeared to threaten not only dislocations for the industrial firms that 
produced lead additives but also potential gasoline shortages during the transition to unleaded 
fuels.
348  But these regulations also resulted in dramatic health benefits for society, benefits that 
dwarfed the costs substantially.
349  If regulatory agencies had consistently adhered to an 
approach that avoided all regulations that imposed costs exceeding a specified level or threatened 
economic dislocation, without any concern for the level of corresponding benefits, they may well 
have delayed or avoided phasing out lead additives in gasoline.
350 
                                                           
346  A cost ceiling used as a trigger for certain legal requirements is already well-known to regulators.  After all, 
when a regulation is expected to impose $100 million or more in annual costs, this triggers a requirement that 
agencies conduct formal regulatory impact analyses.  2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2); Exec. Order 12,866, § 6.  Professor 
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of lead in gasoline.  EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, ES-7, 17 (October 
1997).  These benefits exceeded by about four times the estimated costs of all the regulations EPA issued under the 
Clean Air Act between 1970 and 1990 ($0.5 trillion), not just the costs of the lead phase-out.  Id. at ES-8. 
350  The use of benefit-cost analysis in developing the lead phase-down rule has been credited with hastening the 
elimination of lead emissions.  Nichols, supra note 348, at 78 (“Without quantitative analysis, it would not have 
been possible to make a compelling case for the accelerated phase down because it would not have been possible to 
show how much more important lead in gasoline was relative to the vast majority of other rules competing for 
attention, many of which involved congressional or court-imposed deadlines, in contrast to lead.”).  The lead phase-
down rule also took advantage of market-like trading program designed to make the phase-down more cost-
effective.  Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an 
Old Idea?, 18 ENVTL. L. Q. 1, 17 (1991).   69
    When regulatory agencies justify their risk management decisions based only on costs or 
only on benefits, they can achieve consistent, principled decisionmaking simply by using the 
same level of acceptable costs or risks across different rulemakings.  Nevertheless, the 
approaches we have discussed so far all truncate the range of risk management criteria and may 
therefore lead regulatory agencies in some cases to make decisions that will seem to make little 
sense, even if they are nevertheless consistent.
351  An agency, under the acceptable cost 
approach, can reject opportunities to achieve significant net social benefits simply because costs 
are high, while under the acceptable risk approach it can affirm standards that impose significant 
costs without proportional health protection gains. 
 
Balance Costs and Benefits 
  With precisely these kinds of perverse outcomes in mind, a fourth approach for risk 
management would take both benefits and costs into consideration and seek to achieve a 
consistent balance of the two.
352  By taking both costs and benefits into consideration, regulators 
would be able to set risk management standards so as to achieve positive net benefits, setting 
them at the level at which the benefits outweigh the costs.
353  Several environmental statutes 
other than the Clean Air Act actually direct agencies to balance benefits and costs when they are 
setting risk standards.
354  Indeed, absent statutory prohibitions to the contrary (such as in the 
Clean Air Act), regulatory agencies are directed by Executive Order 12,866 to assess both costs 
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Evidence from U.S. Environmental Regulations, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 348, 367 (1996) (Even though 
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discretion in the weights it assigns to costs and benefits, regulations issued under balancing statutes may still be very 
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and benefits of significant proposed regulations and are supposed to “propose or adopt a new 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify 
its costs.”
355  
    An approach that takes both benefits and costs into account aims for regulatory decisions 
that result in outcomes that will on balance be beneficial for society.  Of course, in practice there 
will be important issues surrounding measurement, valuation, and discount rates that will need to 
be treated consistently.
356  But this is true for any other approach to risk management decision-
making, and regulators have developed guidelines for approaching these kind of operational 
issues in consistent ways.
357  When conducted responsibly, benefit-cost analysis can prove quite 
valuable in understanding and explaining regulatory agencies’ decisionmaking.
358  A benefit-cost 
balancing approach points agencies in the direction of making decisions which maximize overall 
social welfare, offering a consistent and systematic approach to risk management 
decisionmaking. 
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358  Kenneth Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 222 (1996); SUNSTEIN, supra note 166.  This does not mean that a formal benefit-
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uncertainties associated with economic analysis as with any other kind of analysis.  EPA has mistakenly accused 
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decisionmaking process by making it more transparent and the regulatory decision by allowing all relevant 
information to be considered explicitly.”  Brief Amici Curiae of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
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    What is most striking is that EPA has not only rejected a benefit-cost approach but it has 
rejected all of the four general policy principles for risk management.  It has explicitly ruled out 
zero-risk and acceptable risk approaches, and it has successfully argued that the Clean Air Act 
precludes it from adopting a feasibility or benefit-cost balancing approach.
359  Instead, EPA has 
taken an explicitly ad hoc approach.
360  Given this predicament, it is by no means surprising that 
the Agency’s account of its recent NAAQS decisions has been so inconsistent.
361   
    At the core of the EPA’s position lies a fundamental inconsistency.  The Agency rejects 
any need to achieve a level of zero risk,
362 but it also simultaneously disavows giving any 
consideration to feasibility and costs.
363  Yet the reason to reject a zero-risk approach is at base 
its complete infeasibility.
364  As we show in the next section, EPA most certainly does take 
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feasibility and costs into consideration in setting its air quality standards, even though it claims 
otherwise.  Thus, an important step toward achieving a more principled and consistent account of 
EPA’s air quality standard would be to free EPA from the conceptual straightjacket in which it 
now finds itself, acknowledging the fiction that EPA’s risk management decisions are made in 
the absence of any consideration of costs and by amending the Clean Air Act to encourage EPA 
to stake out a clear, systematic policy justification for its NAAQS decisionmaking.
365 
  
B. Abandoning the Fiction of Ignoring Costs 
    The estimated costs of the recently revised ozone and particulate matter standards make 
them among the most expensive federal regulations ever promulgated in the history of the United 
States.  EPA estimated that the standards would impose incremental costs exceeding $45 billion 
per year,
366 an amount larger than the annual cost of all other Clean Air Act programs in effect at 
the time.
367  EPA claims not to have considered costs in setting its recent air quality standards, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of Ozone and Particulate Standards (1997) (unpublished manuscript, available on-line at 
http://www.rppi.org/environment/ps225.html). 
365  Accord Pierce, supra note 134, at 24 (“I do not believe it is possible to make many regulatory decisions in a 
rational manner without considering costs in some way.”). 
366  EPA estimated that the costs of full attainment of its revised ozone and particulate matter NAAQS would be 
about $47 billion per year ($9.6 billion for ozone and $37 billion for PM) by 2010 (in 1990 dollars).   RIA, supra 
note 295, at 9-1.  EPA was able to identify technologies that could only partially attain the ozone and PM standards; 
thus, it simply assumed that new technologies will be developed in the future that will enable full attainment of the 
two standards at a cost of $10,000 per ton.  RIA, supra note 295, at ES-9.  Other cost estimates that relaxed this 
assumption and address technological change empirically were substantially higher.  For example, the President’s 
Council of Economic Advisors estimated that the costs of the ozone standard alone could approach $60 billion per 
year.  See Peter Passell, The Air Standards Are Set, But How Clean Is Clean Enough, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1997, at 
D2.  See also Anne E. Smith, et al., Costs and Economic Impacts of Proposed Ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS, Reason 
Public Policy Institute 2 (May 12, 1997) (estimating that compliance costs will  range from  $20 billion to $60 
billion per year for the ozone standard, and $70 to $150 billion per year for the PM2.5 standard); Randall Lutter, Is 
EPA’s Ozone Standard Feasible?, AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies Regulatory Analysis 99-6 (Dec. 
1999) (finding that compliance with EPA’s ozone standard would be seven-fold more expensive than EPA estimated 
for most cities, and would be infeasible for one city); Darrell A. Winner & Glen R. Cass, Effect of Emissions 
Control on the Long-Term Frequency Distributions of Regional Ozone Concentrations, 34 ENVT’L SCI. TECH. 2612, 
2617 (2000) (compliance with new 0.08 ppm ozone standard physically impossible even with most stringent 
emissions controls).   Of course, some have hypothesized that as a general matter ex ante estimates of regulatory 
compliance costs may tend to be overstated to some extent.  For a discussion of research on the accuracy of 
compliance cost predictions, see Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 UNIV. ILL. L. 
REV. 1111, n. 41-46 (2002); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 21, 45-48 (2001). 
367  EPA has estimated annual costs of $19 billion (1990 dollars) resulting from all of the Clean Air Act’s 
requirements during the period from 1990-2000.  EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1990-
2010 iii (Nov. 1999) (analysis of total compliance costs excluded the costs of the ozone and PM NAAQS revisions).  
In its retrospective study of the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act from 1970-1990, EPA estimated the annual   73
and the high costs associated with them would appear to be consistent with such a claim.
368  Yet 
it is widely recognized that EPA does, and indeed must, at least implicitly consider costs in 
deciding where to set air quality standards, the high costs of the recent ozone and particulate 
standards notwithstanding.
369    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
compliance costs associated with all its air pollution regulations ranged from $19.0-$24.4 billion. EPA, THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990 A-15 (Oct. 1997). 
368  EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra note 59, at 44 (“The Administrator Did Not Base Her NAAQS 
Decisions On Consideration Of Compliance Costs”).  
369  E.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSES OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 183 (1999)(“In 
practice, therefore, despite the legal technicality limiting EPA to promulgating regulations solely to promote health, 
costs are an integral part of the policy-making process at EPA.”); MELNICK, supra note 154, at 297 (“[R]egulators 
inevitably consider cost [in setting air quality standards].  But presently they cannot explain how they do.”); LANDY, 
ROBERTS, & THOMAS, supra note 108, at 238  (“[I]n the absence of any threshold for risk, some balancing between 
costs and benefits had to be implicit in the standard setting decision – a reality EPA neither acknowledged nor 
forced the Congress to confront.”); George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit 
Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE 
FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 229 (1985) (noting that it is a “policy fiction” that costs are not considered 
in setting NAAQS); Oren, supra note 16, at 10,662 ("EPA inevitably must therefore consider costs  in standard-
setting to help decide how stringent to make the standards."); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 
253 (1991) (“The institution has considered costs and benefits, and the advice that the Administrator receives orally 
from subordinates reflects those considerations.”); Gary E. Marchant,  Turning Two Blind Eyes: The EPA’s Failure 
to Consider Costs and Health Benefits in Revising the Ozone Standard, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J.  261, 267-68 (1998) 
(EPA failed “to ‘come clean’ about the true nature of its decision-making”); C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act 
Under Regulatory Reform, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 235, 235 (1998) (“The plain fact is that the EPA has for a long time 
considered costs and benefits in setting ambient standards – only it has done so behind closed doors....”); Sunstein, 
Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 308 (“There is reason to think that at least in some cases, an understanding of 
costs has affected EPA's decision about appropriate standards--but that the cost-benefit balancing has been left 
implicit and free from public scrutiny and review.”); Graham, supra note 116 (“When multi-billion dollar 
rulemaking decisions are made, it is inevitable that regulators will consider the consequences of their actions as well 
as the reasonableness of the relationship between risks, benefits and costs.”); Feller, supra note 127, at 833 (“If all 
costs are truly ignored, then no risk would be acceptable.”); Pierce, supra note 16, at 85 (“I am confident that the 
EPA did, in fact, consider its CBA [cost-benefit analysis] of the ozone and particulate rules, notwithstanding its 
claims to the contrary.”); Alan J. Krupnick and Deirdre Farrell, Six Steps To A Healthier Ozone Policy, Resources 
for the Future Discussion Paper 96-13, at 6 (March 1996) (“costs must implicitly be playing a role”); David W. 
Barnes, Back Door Cost-Benefit Analysis Under a Safety-First Clean Air Act, 23 Natural Res. J. 827, 856 (1983) 
(criticizing the “subterfuge of back door cost-benefit analysis” in setting clean air standards); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Regulating Risks, supra note 16, at 12 (2001) (noting “the apparent fact, urged by credible observers, that the EPA 
had in fact considered costs, although tacitly and without public supervision”); James E. Krier, On the Topology of 
Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System -- and Why it Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1231 n.12 
(1995) (“Congress has nominally insisted that costs be ignored in setting most environmental standards...even 
though everyone knows this is a fiction.”); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the 
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1657-58  (1991) (noting “EPA’s great reluctance to cause serious social 
dislocation, even if that result appears clearly mandated by the statute”); Pierce, supra note 134, at 1239 (“[A]ll 
participants in this decisionmaking process know [that] the EPA Administrator always considers costs in making 
decisions pursuant to CAA section 109.”); Barbara A. Finamore & Elizabeth E. Simpson, Ambient Air Standards for 
Lead and Ozone: Scientific Problems and Economic Pressures, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 274 (1979) 
(“[E]conomic pressures were obviously present and arguably influential in the formulation of the new ozone [1979] 
and lead [1978] standards.”).  Without considering either the academic record or the logical necessity of EPA at 
least implicitly considering costs in setting NAAQS, the Supreme Court dismissed as mere “speculation” that EPA 
was “secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone.”  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471 n.4.   74
  E P A ’ s   o w n   amici in the litigation over its recent standards admitted that the EPA 
Administrator “will naturally have before her the information on the implementation of standards 
even as she sets them.”
370  EPA has also generally acknowledged the significant economic 
impacts of its NAAQS decisions.
371  This knowledge by the Agency appears to have influenced 
EPA’s decision-making by creating a reluctance to make standards too stringent, even when 
doing so would provide still greater protection for public health.
372  After all, as Professor Joseph 
Feller, a former EPA attorney, has noted, “[i]f all costs are truly ignored, then no risk would be 
acceptable.”
373  
    Even if the EPA Administrator does not explicitly invoke the cost estimates that its 
analysts have gone to great lengths to prepare, the Administrator and her staff could not have 
been unaware that the regulations EPA promulgated were among the most expensive regulations 
the Agency had ever adopted.
374  After all, an implicit recognition of cost considerations would 
seem to be the only way to explain EPA’s actions on the new standard for fine PM that it 
adopted.
375  The only apparent reason why EPA would accept thousands of additional predicted 
deaths per year was presumably that it was concerned about the costs of tightening the standards 
further
376 and that it recognized that making the standards even more stringent would likely have 
                                                           
370  Massachusetts and New Jersey Brief, supra note 159, at 44.  See also THOMAS MCGARITY, REINVENTING 
RATIONALITY 162 (1991) (noting “[t]he artificiality of [the EPA’s] attempt to shield the decisionmaking process 
from analysis is apparent.”); EPA History Office, Douglas M. Costle: Oral History Interview (available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/print/costle.htm) (former EPA Administrator acknowledging costs in 
describing his decisionmaking over the 1979 ozone NAAQS revision). 
371  See, e.g., EPA, 1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 194, at 8213 (The Administrator “recognizes that controlling ozone 
to very low levels is a task that will have significant impact on economic and social activities.”); EPA, 1993 Ozone 
Decision, supra note 190, 58 Fed. Reg. at 13,013 (noting that “implementation of the NAAQS can have profound 
economic and social as well as environmental consequences”); Oren, supra note 16, 7, at 10,662 (“EPA 
decisionmakers have admitted that they examine cost data when deciding the levels of the standards.”).  The 
estimated costs of the air quality standards have been included in the Federal Register notice signed by the 
Administrator.  See, e.g., EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 245, at 65,746. 
372  See supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
373  Feller, supra note 127, at 833. See also Eads, supra note 369, at 228 (“No level of ambient exposure above zero 
could be ruled out if consideration was given just to health effects.”) (emphasis in original). 
374  The intensity of the lobbying efforts by industry over these revisions undoubtedly also signaled to EPA the 
economic impact at stake in its decisions.  See generally Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1353 (2002) (deploying a 
game theoretic model to show that even where agency is precluded from taking costs into account, “the agency 
generally will internalize some of the compliance costs its regulation will impose” through the political process of 
rulemaking). 
375  See supra Part II.B. 
376  See Sunstein, Unconstitutionality, supra note 16, at 317 n. 51 ("EPA's failure to require more stringent regulation 
of particulates provides some evidence of cost consideration.  On EPA's own numbers, more stringent regulation   75
imposed unacceptable economic burdens on society.
377  In explaining the Agency’s decision not 
to set more stringent fine PM standards, EPA asserted that setting more stringent standards 
“might result in regulatory programs that go beyond those that are needed to effectively reduce 
risks to public health.”
378  But under a precautionary approach that is supposed to “err on the side 
of safety,” the mere possibility that a standard “might” exceed the level of health protection 
“needed” should not prevent the Agency from adopting it.
379  Indeed, erring on the side of safety 
would require going beyond what might appear to be needed.    
    EPA advanced a similar argument in its petition for rehearing in the D.C. Circuit, stating 
that section 109 requires that a NAAQS standard be set at a level “necessary for public health 
protection: neither more nor less stringent than necessary, but ‘requisite.’”
380  Given that PM 
appears to present a continuum of risk down to background levels (or at least to levels well 
below the EPA’s selected standard), it is far from clear how EPA can show that its selected 
standard was “neither more nor less stringent than necessary.”  Each increment of additional 
stringency will protect against some additional unit of risk (some perhaps unknown or uncertain).  
In the case of fine PM, additional stringency would have protected against additional human 
mortality predicted by the Agency’s risk assessment.
381  If standards are supposed to be set solely 
to protect public health, and if the Agency is supposed to be precautionary by erring on the side 
of safety, then it is not possible under EPA’s risk model for there to have been a PM standard 
that was too stringent.
382  Indeed, a more stringent standard would have been “necessary” to 
prevent thousands of additional lives, according to the Agency’s own analysis.
383  When the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
might have provided $4 billion in increased benefits. . . .  If these benefits were possible, why did EPA not require 
greater stringency, if not because of some cost consciousness?"). 
377  As noted in a recent New England Journal of Medicine editorial accompanying a review generally supportive of 
EPA’s scientific analysis of PM2.5, significant reductions in the 24-hour PM2.5 standard would have been 
particularly burdensome, if not impossible.  See James H. Ware, Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality – Clearing 
the Air, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1798, 1799 (2000) (“[T]he epidemiologic evidence suggests that the association 
between fine-particle concentrations and mortality is linear across the entire range of current concentrations.   
Although substantial reductions can be achieved at a reasonable cost, a reduction in 24-hour exposures to levels 
consistently below the current range would be prohibitively costly, if not impossible, in the foreseeable future.”). 
378  EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 7, at 38,675 (emphasis added). 
379  See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
380  EPA, Petition for Rehearing, supra note 255, at 8 (emphasis in original). 
381  See supra Part II.B. 
382  In the case of non-threshold pollutants, where discernible harm to human health is believed to occur down to 
levels just above zero, then by definition no level can be said to be completely “safe,” thus eliminating any room for 
erring on the side of safety.  See Pierce, supra note 16, at 74; supra notes 128, 131-34 and accompanying text. 
383  See supra Part II.B.   76
evidence before EPA is taken into consideration, there is no escaping that there must have been 
some other consideration – presumably costs – that kept the EPA from lowering the standard still 
further.
384  
    If EPA considers costs implicitly to temper the outcomes of its standards, something 
which it almost certainly has done, the question arises whether society would be better off if the 
Agency considered cost estimates explicitly rather than treating the issue of cost only 
implicitly.
385  Express consideration of cost data may provide important information that can be 
used to set standards that are more cost-effective even without sacrificing health protection.  This 
is because costs and benefits from air quality standards, like other regulatory standards, may 
exhibit discontinuities and non-linearities, which can only be discerned through careful analysis 
of cost functions.  For example, EPA’s draft Regulatory Impact Analysis for ozone, published at 
the time of the Agency’s proposed rule, indicated that an 8-hour ozone standard set at 0.08 ppm 
based on the 5th rather than 4th highest annual concentration would provide roughly equivalent 
health protection but at approximately 20 percent lower cost.
386  This analysis suggests that there 
is a discontinuity in the cost-effectiveness in tightening the standard from the 5th to the 4th 
highest annual concentration.  Had EPA explicitly taken this information into account, it could 
have based the standard on the 5th highest annual concentration and saved the nation over $1 
billion per year without sacrificing health protection.
387
  
                                                           
384  As the National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering concluded in a 1974 report to 
Congress, in setting air quality standards “[t]here is no escape from a reasoned judgment, containing an unavoidable 
subjective element, as to the level at which the possible benefits from reducing pollution further no longer justify the 
high probable costs of bringing about such further reduction.”  NAS/NAE, supra note 132, at 18. 
385  See Barnes, supra note 369, at 857 (“Given the presence of a cost-minded administration, society might be better 
off with explicit cost-benefit analysis in setting the air quality standards from the start and abandoning as giving an 
inferior result the safety-first approach.”). 
386  Partial attainment costs would decrease from $1.10 billion to $0.89 billion per year.  EPA, RIA, supra note 295, 
at 7-11.  EPA’s analysis also indicates that there would be little (if any) health decrement in basing the standard on 
the 5
th rather than 4
thhighest annual concentration. EPA calculated that total monetized health benefits would 
actually increase if the standard was based on the 5
th rather than 4
th highest annual concentration under one method 
of controlling for PM2.5 benefits, while slightly decreasing under an alternative method.  Id. at 12-46.  See also EPA 
Ozone Staff Paper at 168 (“ Risk analyses ... indicate that for most of the health endpoints analyzed there is little 
difference in health risk, at a given level of the standard, within the ranges of 1- to 5-expected-exceedances and the 
second to the fifth highest 8-hr daily maximum concentration forms of the O3 primary standard.”). 
387  EPA’s RIA calculated the cost savings of a standard based on the 5
th rather than 4
th highest annual concentration 
for partial attainment of the ozone standard, but not full attainment.  But given that EPA estimated that the 5
th 
highest concentration would save $0.2 billion of the $1.1 billion attainment costs, it would almost certainly save 
over $1 billion of EPA’s estimated $9.6 billion full compliance estimates.   77
    Such an open consideration of costs would not only likely ensure more cost-effective 
policy decisions, it would also better serve some of the core principles that undergird 
administrative law.
388  As Professor John Graham has noted, EPA’s “legal fiction” of not 
considering costs when setting NAAQS “reduces political accountability for value judgments 
and political choices, [and] hides from public scrutiny claims that are made about risks, benefits 
and costs (since such claims are driven ‘underground’ in the course of regulatory 
deliberations).”
389  Put more simply, as Professor David Faigman has recently argued, the “real 
loser in the PM/ozone drama was candor.”
390  By framing the standard-setting decision as one for 
which costs cannot be taken into consideration, EPA, Congress, and the courts have endorsed a 
misleading and ultimately fictional basis for setting air quality standards.
391
   
    In testimony to Congress on the revised ozone and PM standards, EPA Administrator 
Browner argued that “to allow costs and related factors to influence the determination of what 
levels protect public health would be to mislead the American public in a very fundamental 
way.”
392  Yet as we have indicated, when EPA considers costs at least implicitly in setting air 
                                                           
388  See supra notes1, 4 and accompanying text. 
389  Graham, supra note 116.  See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search 
for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1156 (1999) (concluding, in a related context, that “no one can 
argue that our current system of covert, indirect consideration of costs is better than open and direct consideration”); 
GRAHAM, GREEN & ROBERTS, supra note 89, at  198 (“Although regulators might prefer to pass the buck by hiding 
behind a cloak of quantitative risk assessment, it is important for a representative democracy to deliberate explicitly 
about the political aspects of chemical regulation.  If regulators are not compelled to be explicit about the nature of 
their policy judgments, then it is unlikely that an informed public discussion of ethics and values will occur.”). 
390  FAIGMAN, supra note 369, at 187.  See also id. (“The debate was phrased almost entirely in terms of science 
when the science played a decidedly minor role in the actual decision.... Science should not be used to hide what are 
essentially the true bases for decision.”). 
391  J. CLARENCE DAVIES AND JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE 
SYSTEM  30 (1998) (“Statutory prohibitions of considering costs in setting environmental standards encourage 
dishonest, pseudoscientific debates that are really about policy choices.”); Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in 
PORTNEY & STAVINS,  EDS., supra note 162, at 77, 117 (“[I]t seems disingenuous to have a law that has been 
interpreted to prohibit costs from being considered in setting the NAAQS when, in fact, virtually everyone knows 
that costs do – and should – get factored into decisionmaking anyway.”); LANDY, ROBERTS, & THOMAS, supra note 
108, at 316 (lamenting that EPA has “sought refuge” in “the Clean Air Act’s prohibition against using cost 
considerations to decide on standards” and that “[a]s a result the public often has an unrealistic picture of 
environmental uncertainty”). 
392  EPA’s Administrator Clean Air Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Env't and Pub. Works Comm., 105th 
Cong. 282 (1997) (statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA).   78
quality standards, and then denies that it is doing so, it is actually the Agency’s refusal or 
inability to reveal the full basis for its decisionmaking that “misleads the American public.”
393 
 
C. Reforming EPA’s Air Quality Risk Management 
    What steps can be taken that might lead EPA to adopt a more candid and coherent 
account of its risk management decisionmaking?  One possible option would be to look to the 
courts, while another would be to encourage greater awareness of the limits of science in risk 
management by scientists, policy advisors, and decision makers at EPA.  As we discuss below, 
however, each of these options is unlikely to result in any real improvements in the foreseeable 
future given the prevailing construction of the Clean Air Act.  Under the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Act, the Agency is essentially locked into an ad hoc approach to its standard 
setting.
394  We conclude that if the aspiration of well-reasoned agency decisionmaking is to 
become a reality for risk management of non-threshold air pollutants, Congress will need to step 
in both to authorize and encourage EPA to break free from its current, incoherent approach.  The 
Clean Air Act itself will need to be amended if EPA is ever to pursue a principled approach to air 
quality standard setting.  
    Judicial review would have once been considered an option for encouraging EPA to 
adopt a more candid and consistent justification for its decisionmaking.  The availability of 
judicial review has long been conceived a mechanism for ensuring that regulatory agencies 
provide reasoned explanations for their actions.
395  In judging agency decisions under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,
396 courts are expected to 
                                                           
393  See Eads, supra note 369, at 231 (noting that EPA’s refusal to consider costs explicitly means that the public 
sees “only the shadow, not the substance” of EPA’s decisions). 
394  Admittedly, even under the existing interpretation of the Clean Air Act, EPA could have improved the 
comparative coherence of its recent NAAQS revisions by opting to aim for a consistent level of residual risk (or a 
consistent level of health benefits).  In other words, adhering to a predetermined level of risk could have reduced the 
incoherence between the ozone and PM standards.  See supra Part II.D.  However, this still would leave unanswered 
how to justify the predetermined risk level (as opposed to other levels), a decision that would essentially remain ad 
hoc if costs or feasibility were not considered. 
395  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  See also JERRY MASHAW, 
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 50 (1983) (observing that most of “administrative law has to do with judicial oversight of 
administrative rationality”). 
396  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994) (“The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”).   79
make a “searching and careful” review of the agency record and to dismiss “‘post hoc’ 
rationalizations” offered by the agency.
397  The prevailing doctrine imposes a “strict and 
demanding requirement” on an administrative agency that it “must cogently explain why it has 
exercised its discretion in a given manner.”
398  Moreover, even though many judges may lack the 
capacity to scrutinize scientific research, they should be able to determine where an agency’s 
science ends and where its policy reasoning needs to begin, and then they can compel the agency 
to justify its risk management choices with coherent reasoning.
399   
  Although  an  entrenched  doctrinal  tradition  in American administrative law does require 
agencies to give reasoned explanations,
400 an equally substantial tradition exists of judicial 
deference to agency action.
401  Notwithstanding widely-held claims that judicial review under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard has ossified the rulemaking process, judges actually only 
review a small fraction of agency rules and overall their review tends to give deference to 
administrative agencies.
402  Moreover, even though the courts have required agencies to give 
                                                           
397  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
398  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 48.  See also ABA Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Final Black Letter Statement of Administrative Law (Nov. 3, 2001) 
(noting that courts may reverse agency action when it “is unsupported by any explanation or rests upon reasoning 
that is seriously flawed” or where “[t]he action is, without legitimate reason and adequate explanation, inconsistent 
with prior agency policies or precedents”) [hereinafter “ABA Black Letter Statement”] (available on-line at 
http://www/abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/home.html). 
399  See Bazelon, supra note 44, at 279 (“[A]t the interface of fact and value, courts can help ensure that the value 
component of decisions is explicitly acknowledged, not hidden in quasi-scientific jargon.”); ABA Black Letter 
Statement, supra note 398, at 20 (The courts commonly “review agency findings that may be termed ‘factual’ but 
actually embody a degree of normative judgment.”).  Wendy Wagner suggests an amendment to the Administrative 
Procedure Act requiring regulatory agencies to clearly demark scientific from policy judgments.  Wagner, supra 
note 9, at 1711-1719.  While such an amendment could be helpful, it does not seem necessary, as a reviewing court 
presumably should be able to strike down an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious if the agency misrepresents 
a policy decision as a scientific determination. 
400   This general administrative law tradition has been reflected in judicial decisions reviewing EPA air quality 
standards.  American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93  (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[U]nless [the Administrator] 
describes the standard under which she has arrived at this conclusion, ... we have no basis for exercising our 
responsibility to determine whether her decision is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; ....’”); Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (“By EPA’s logic, adverse health effects would permit it to justify any lead standard at all, without explaining 
why it chose the level it did.  We cannot accept such incomplete reasoning.”). 
401  See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (1976) (characterizing the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review as “a highly deferential one [that] presumes agency action to be valid”); Natural Resources Defense Council 
v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968, 973 (1990) (stating that in reviewing EPA’s NAAQS for particulate matter the standard 
of review must be a deferential one and that EPA need not develop any standard of acceptable risk in establishing its 
NAAQS).  
402   See Coglianese, supra note 366, at 1129-30.  Overall, the D.C. Circuit upholds EPA rulemakings in their 
entirety just about as often as it finds even a single reason to remand the decision to the agency. Cary Coglianese, 
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L. J. 1255, n. 249 (1997)   80
reasons for their regulatory actions, this does not necessarily compel agencies in practice to give 
sound or consistent reasons, even where judges purport to give the agency’s reasoning a “hard 
look.”
403   
    As the litigation over EPA’s recent NAAQS revisions shows, when it comes to reviewing 
decisions that agencies purport to base on highly specialized scientific analysis, judges have 
tended to give agencies a deferential pass.  Particularly in rulemakings that generate a large 
volume of scientific analysis, agencies can readily appeal to the authority of scientific studies 
and can look for (and usually find) some pattern in the scientific evidence that appears to 
rationalize their decision, even if in the next similar rulemaking the pattern of the same kind of 
evidence aligns differently.  By practicing this “science charade,” agencies can escape the need 
to provide a consistent, reasoned account of the core policy issues imbedded in risk 
management.
404  
    That is what happened, in the end, for EPA.  Of course, in the initial round of litigation, 
Judge Stephen Williams recognized that EPA’s emperor had no clothes.  Despite a voluminous 
record of scientific analysis, all of which was reviewed by the Clean Air Act Science Advisory 
Committee, Judge Williams concluded that EPA had provided “no intelligible principle by which 
to identify a stopping point” for its air quality standards.
405  Unfortunately, Williams’ insight 
came accompanied with a novel constitutional argument that the Supreme Court quickly 
rejected, which may have made the significance of Williams’ core observation easier to discount.   
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, interpreted the Clean Air Act in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(reporting that from 1979-1990, EPA’s rules were affirmed in their entirety in 51 percent of the adjudicated cases); 
Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 
621, 636-39 (1994) (overall agency rules are held upheld in their entirety in over 50 percent of the cases decided by 
the D.C. Circuit). Moreover, these judicial remands do not appear to be too demanding, as EPA is usually able to 
take action to see that its original decision can be carried out. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals through 
Informal Rulemaking, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000). 
403  For a discussion of the distinction between offering “a reason” and offering “a good reason,” see Frederick 
Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636 (1995) (“[A] judge who says she has decided for the plaintiff 
because it is raining in Calcutta offers a reason...even though the reason is unconnected to any sound basis for 
decisions...[A]lthough it is a bad reason, it still exhibits the feature ... of offering a justification or explanation for the 
result reached.”).   EPA has prepared lengthy documents that purport to offer a justification or explanation for its 
NAAQS, but because EPA has not adopted any principle with respect to the core policy issues, and because science 
by itself cannot address these issues, the agency’s proffered explanation is akin to the judge deciding for the plaintiff 
because it is raining in Calcutta. 
404  Wagner, supra note 9, at 1664 (noting “the tendency of many courts to defer to the agency as expert when the 
issue is framed as scientific in nature”). 
405  American Trucking, 175 F. 3d at 1037.   81
such a way as to preclude the Administrator from considering costs.
406  The Court concluded that 
the Act directed EPA to use “information about health effects ... to identify the maximum 
airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the 
concentration to provide an ‘adequate’ margin of safety, and set the standard at that level.”
407  
The Court held that this prosaic understanding of the statute provided adequate guidance to 
sustain the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act.   Dismissing concerns about the inability to 
take a principled health-only approach for non-threshold pollutants, the Court declared that it 
was simply “not conclusive for delegation purposes” that ozone and PM were non-threshold 
pollutants with health effects occurring at levels below EPA’s promulgated standards.
408  With 
the Supreme Court effectively affirming the incoherent approach embedded in the longstanding 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, it was not surprising that the D.C. Circuit should, on remand, 
uphold EPA’s revised standards under the arbitrary and capricious test and defer ultimately to the 
agency’s “expert judgment.”
409  In the end, EPA prevailed and secured judicial approval for its 
explicitly ad hoc decisionmaking. 
    If judicial review is no longer a viable option to ensure coherent reasoning by EPA about 
its NAAQS decisions, another possible option to consider would be for EPA professionals to 
commit themselves to candor about the role and limits of science in making risk management 
decisions.  The Agency has, after all, recently initiated several efforts to improve its scientific 
                                                           
406  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465.  The Supreme Court drew extensively on the legislative history of the Clean Air Act 
to conclude that EPA may not consider technological or economic feasibility on setting NAAQS.  Id. at 490-92.  For 
example, the Court explained:  
“[T]he legislative history shows that Congress intended the statute to be ‘technology forcing.’ Senator 
Edmund Muskie, the primary sponsor of the 1970 amendments  to the Act, introduced them by saying 
that Congress’ primary responsibility in drafting the Act was not ‘to be limited by what is or appears to be 
technologically or economically feasible,’ but ‘to establish what the public interest requires to protect the 
health of persons,’ even if that means that ‘industries will be asked to do what seems to be impossible at 
the present time.’ 116 Cong. Rec. 32901-32902 (1970).” 
Id. at 490-91 (emphasis added by Court). 
407  Id.  Interestingly, this language by the Court would indicate that EPA must take a “two-step” approach according 
to the statute in setting its air quality standards, first identifying a “safe” level and then adding an adequate margin of 
safety.  In the past, EPA has expressly rejected any need to follow this “two-step” or any other consistent approach 
in setting its air quality standards.  See infra note 184-88. 
408  Id. at 475. 
409  American Trucking, 283 F.3d at 372-373 (finding that it did not “have any basis for concluding that EPA’s 
decision was unreasonable or unsupported by the record”).  For a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s approach 
to the statutory interpretation issue, see Pierce, supra note 134, at 1251 (“[T]he Court seemed to announce and to 
apply a new canon that is inherently inconsistent with all of the pre-existing law applicable to interpretation of 
agency-administered regulatory statutes.”).    82
analysis.
410  The Agency has made reliance on “sound science” one of its agency-wide strategic 
goals,
411 and it has created an office of science advisor
412 and taken steps to ensure that agency 
analysis meets the standards for reliable scientific evidence provided in the Information Quality 
Act.
413  These efforts to improve the quality of the science used by the Agency are certainly 
important in their own right, but by themselves they will not likely prevent any tendency in the 
future for the Agency to stretch the limits of what science can bear.
414  On the contrary, calls for 
a “science-based” approach to risk regulation, however warranted, can mistakenly reinforce the 
tendency of EPA and other agencies to cloak their policy decisions in scientific terms.
415  What 
the Agency needs is not just “sound science,” but sound policy reasoning about its risk 
management decisions.
416  Part of the mandate of the Science Advisor at EPA should be to point 
                                                           
410  For a discussion of the need to improve scientific analysis and its role within EPA decisionmaking, see E. 
Donald Elliott, The Science Debacle at EPA, in Science Agencies and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd? (E. Donald 
Elliott, Alan Charles Raul, Richard J. Pierce Jr., Thomas O. McGarity, and Wendy E. Wagner (moderator), 31 
ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,125 (January 2001). 
411  EPA, FY 2003 Annual Performance Plan, available on-line at: 
http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/budget/2003/2003ap/2003ap.htm (last accessed Oct. 14, 2002). 
412  EPA, Whitman Appoints Gilman Science Advisor, available on-line at: http://www.epa.gov/ord/htm/sci-
advi.htm (last accessed Oct. 14, 2002) (quoting Administrator Whitman as directing the EPA Science Advisor to 
“ensure that the highest quality science is better integrated into the agency’s programs, policies and decisions.”). 
413  Pub. L. 106-554.  See EPA, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 2, 2002), available on-line at: 
http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/EPA-OEI-IQG-FINAL-10.2.pdf (last accessed on Oct. 26, 2002). 
414  That said, one recent proposal for improving science at EPA would also encourage science advisors to make 
explicit policy recommendations, under the theory that allowing scientists to express policy advice openly might 
discourage disingenuousness.  E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA, L. & CONT. PROB. 20-22 
(forthcoming).  Elliott argues that “[i]f told that it is improper to make policy recommendations, scientific groups are 
much more likely to smuggle in their policy predilections covertly, either consciously or unconsciously.”  Id. at 22.  
He believes “[w]e would be far better advised to invite scientific advisory bodies to separate  their scientific 
conclusions from their policy recommendations, but to empower them to address both.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
415  See, e.g., OMB, OMB Announces Science-Based Regulatory Review Framework, Sept. 25, 2001 (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress 
/2001-38.html).  Even though those who call for a ‘science-based’ approach to regulation generally mean to increase 
the rigor and reliability of scientific research that forms the basis of agency risk assessments (surely a noteworthy 
aim), such calls may unintentionally increase incentives for couching policy decisions in terms of “listening to the 
science.”  See supra Part I.A.  See generally Kunreuther & Slovic, supra note 108, at 123 (“[T]echnical analysis is 
vital for making risk decisions better informed, more consistent, and more accountable. However, value conflicts 
and pervasive distrust in risk management cannot be reduced by technical analysis. Trying to address risk 
controversies with more science, in fact, is likely to exacerbate conflict.”). 
416  See supra Parts I.B and III.A.  In setting environmental standards, “[v]alue judgments must be made about how 
much health protection is feasible and affordable and who should pay the costs of cleanup.”  John D. Graham, 
Science and Environmental Regulation, in JOHN D. GRAHAM,  ED., HARNESSING SCIENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 1, 2 (1991)  Making these judgments requires thinking hard about risk management principles, even 
more than perfecting scientific techniques.  Obviously, the Agency needs to invest in both.   83
out to the Administrator when the Agency is over-emphasizing the role of science in justifying 
its policy recommendations. 
    Even with better and more circumspect scientific advice, however, the Agency still may 
shirk from providing consistent reasons for its risk management decisions.  After all, EPA has 
already had the benefit of science advisors who have explained that the choice of where to set 
new standards is not a question that science could answer.
417   In its recent NAAQS rulemakings, 
CASAC clearly explained to the Administrator that the decision about what alternative standard 
it selected was a “policy judgment.” 
418  In other recent regulatory proceedings, EPA’s science 
advisory committees have similarly advised EPA of the limitations of science within regulatory 
decision-making, specifically warning EPA when the Agency was proposing to over-emphasize 
science in its regulatory decisions.
419  Notwithstanding the sound advice it has received about the 
limits of science, EPA still has used science as a fig leaf for its policy choices.
420 
    If neither science advisors nor judicial overseers can ensure that EPA will strive for a 
principled risk management decisionmaking, perhaps we should simply accept that EPA will set 
its standards on an ad hoc basis and therefore take steps to enhance the democratic basis for the 
policy choices embedded in the Agency’s risk management.
421  After all, even if it makes sense 
to delegate to agencies on issues needing scientific expertise, it is much harder to see that 
agencies like EPA possess comparable expertise when it comes to making societal policy 
judgments, such as determining what level of risk should be deemed acceptable.  Consequently, 
even if agency expertise is needed to assess and characterize risks, the policy judgments 
embedded within any risk management decision arguably should be made by a more 
                                                           
417  See supra notes 143-44, 177, 292 and accompanying text. 
418  See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
419  For example, in commenting on EPA’s proposed methodology for setting “residual risk” standards for hazardous 
air pollutants, the Interim Chair of EPA’s Scientific Advisory Board (“SAB”) advised the Administrator on behalf of 
the SAB Executive Committee that “while we certainly endorse the concept of science-based decisionmaking at the 
Agency, we also recognize that no one is well served by asking science to take on an impossible task.”  Letter from 
Dr. Morton Lippmann, Interim Chair, Science Advisory Board to Hon. Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA, of 
July 25, 2000 re: Executive Committee Commentary on Residual Risk Program (EPA-SAB-EC-COM-00-005). 
420  Wagner, supra note 9. 
421  A major thrust of contemporary administrative law in the United States has been to foster a more pluralistic and 
transparent process by which agencies develop regulations.  Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).   84
democratically accountable decisionmaker or through more directly democratic means.
422  Dean 
Elena Kagan, for example, has argued that the President should play a greater role in regulatory 
decisionmaking because agencies possess no special knowledge when it comes to making value 
judgments and because the President is more directly accountable to the entire citizenry.
423   
    Yet even those who favor greater involvement by the President or the Congress in 
regulatory decisionmaking still acknowledge a need for relying on agency expertise, particularly 
on scientific questions.
424  As Dean Kagan writes, “there is no good reason for a President to 
displace or ignore purely scientific determinations,” for “[t]he exercise of presidential power in 
this context would threaten a kind of impartiality and objectivity in decisionmaking that 
conduces to both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the administrative process.”
425  As result, 
rather than supporting acceptance of the approach EPA took to explaining its air quality 
standards, arguments for improving the democratic basis for the policy choices in risk 
management actually make it all the more imperative that regulatory agencies openly 
acknowledge the limitations of science in risk management.
426  Using science to justify non-
scientific decisions only serves to diminish the potential for greater democratic accountability, 
because it shields the rationale for an agency’s decision from the public and from the political 
institutions that are more directly accountable to the public.
427    
                                                           
422  For the standard exposition of this general argument, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE 
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979).  For a contrasting view, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: 
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
423  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332 (2001) (“Agency experts have neither 
democratic warrant nor special competence to make the value judgments – the essentially political choices – that 
underlie most administrative policymaking.”).  Reliance on political intervention as a reason for administrative 
policymaking would represent a shift in the traditional direction of administrative law, which has generally favored 
independent reasoning by agency decisionmakers.  See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 21 (“[A] retreat to political will or 
intuition is almost always unavailable to modern administrative decisionmakers.  The electoral connection is 
generally unavailable as a justification for administrative action.”). 
424  Id. at 2353 (“However much political judgment pervades administration and however much political actors 
should take the lead as to these questions, an important place for substantive expertise remains in generating sound 
regulatory decisions.”). 
425  Id. at 2357. 
426  Id. at 2332 (“[T]he need for transparency, as an aid to holding governmental decisionmakers to account, here 
reaches its apex.”); GRAHAM, GREEN & ROBERTS, supra note 89, at 218 (“[S]cience cannot answer the ultimate 
regulatory questions.... Only by recognizing the limited role of science as resolver of conflict can [the policy 
considerations underlying regulatory decisions] be addressed explicitly and democratically.”). 
427  See Wagner, supra note 9, at 1617 (“Although camouflaging controversial policy decisions as science assists the 
agency in evading various  political, legal, and institutional forces, doing so ultimately delays and distorts the 
standard-setting mission, leaving in its wake a dysfunctional regulatory program.”).   85
    Given the way EPA has proceeded in its NAAQS rulemakings, citizens are left with a 
fundamental question unanswered: What is the justification for the way EPA revised its ozone 
and particulate standards?
428  Those who will continue to suffer from environmentally-induced 
respiratory problems or whose family members will die prematurely due to the levels of 
pollution permitted under EPA’s standards can reasonably demand a clear, coherent reason for 
why the Agency did not set standards lower in the face of evidence of remaining health 
effects.
429  Similarly, those who lose out on jobs or forego an increased standard of living as the 
result of the costs imposed by the revised standards can also reasonably expect a clear and candid 
explanation.
430  Yet right now, EPA cannot say anything sensible to those who will be affected 
by the air quality standards it sets.  The Agency is locked into a fictional framework that 
presumes that pollutants have clear threshold health effects (when they do not) and that costs can 
be ignored (when they cannot).
431  The law now prohibits the Agency from saying clearly why it 
draws the line where it does. 
    How can EPA achieve greater candor and consistency in its NAAQS rulemakings?   
Given the prevailing legal structure as well as the incentives agencies have to hide behind the 
perceived objectivity of science, it seems unlikely that improvements will result from anything 
other than legislative change.
432  Since EPA has no strong incentive not to continue to fall back 
on its scientific rhetoric rather than to develop principled policy reasoning, legislative change 
                                                           
428  See  SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 330, at 240-41 (“EPA’s own public justification was ... in 
important respects vague and conclusory....Hence any reader is likely to be puzzled about exactly why EPA chose 
the particular regulations it did – about why it did not regulate either somewhat more or somewhat less.”).  Dean 
Kagan argues that sometimes presidential intervention should count as an answer to a question such as this one.  
Kagan, supra note 423, at 2382.  But in the case of EPA’s NAAQS revisions, even that answer was not offered and 
instead the Agency sought to shield itself within the cloak of science.  See supra Part I.A.  See also Kagan, supra 
note 423, at 2356-57 (noting President Clinton’s “frequent practice of sidestepping involvement” in cases where 
regulators would “confront the question, which science alone cannot answer, of how to make determinate judgments 
regarding the protection of health and safety in the face both of scientific uncertainty and competing political 
interests”). 
429  See Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21 Envtl. L. 1321, 1340 (1991) 
(“When the decision is being made by an administrator or a judge, we would like to have a little more guidance than 
simply the decision maker’s gut reaction.  Too many different kinds of people get jobs as administrators and judges 
for us to simply trust their intuitions.”) 
430  SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 330, at 7-8 (“When the costs of regulation are high, real people will be 
hurt, through increased prices, decreased wages, and even greater unemployment....[T]he costs should be placed ‘on-
screen,’ so that if they are to be incurred, it is with knowledge and approval rather than ignorance and wishful 
thinking.”). 
431  See supra notes 133-36, 164, 365, 375-77, 382 and accompanying text.   86
will need to do more than simply reject the current interpretation of section 109 and free up EPA 
to adopt a more principled approach.  It seems unlikely that EPA would take up such an initiative 
on its own accord.  For this reason, legislative amendments are only likely to spur meaningful 
change if they either provide EPA with a preferred policy approach, such as by directing EPA to 
balance benefits and costs, or if they impose a mandate on EPA to articulate a principled 
approach in explaining its NAAQS decisionmaking.   
  Legislative  change  will  not  come easily, to be sure, but it may become more viable when 
the absurdity of the Clean Air Act’s out-moded legislative model becomes evident to those 
across the political spectrum.  This was the case with the Delaney Clause, which Congress 
amended after many years once the Act was interpreted to require the elimination of all cancer 
risks from pesticide residues in food.
433  If the Clean Air Act follows a course similar to that 
taken with the Delaney Clause, then ever-advancing knowledge about the adverse effects from 
still lower levels of air pollutants may force the EPA and Congress to confront the absurdity of 
the current interpretation of the Clean Air Act.  For example, the recent identification of genetic 
susceptibilities to pollutants such as particulate matter and ozone may well only heighten the 
demand under the existing statutory framework to set even more stringent standards.
434   As 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
432  Without some external mandate, “no rational agency or administrative official acting in her own self-interest 
would expose the underlying policy choices when faced with the numerous benefits of engaging in the science 
charade and the high price to be paid for proceeding any other way.”  See Wagner, supra note 9, at 1651  
433  The Delaney Clause, adopted in the late fifties, required agencies to prohibit all carcinogens in food additives. 21 
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A). For decades, EPA and the Food and Drug Administration attempted to evade the harsh and 
unrealistic absolutism of the Delaney Clause by applying various exceptions and limitations. See Richard A. Merrill,  
FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to 
Scientific Progress? 5 YALE J. REG. 1 (1988); Edward Dunkelberger & Richard A. Merrill, The Delaney Paradox 
Reexamined: Regulating Pesticides in Processed Foods, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 411 (1993).  Once the courts had 
confirmed that the Delaney Clause would require zero-risk standards that would impose unacceptable burdens on 
society, Congress stepped in to amend the food safety laws.  See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9
th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting agency’s interpretation of Delaney Clause intended “to bring about a more sensible application of the 
regulatory scheme” because “[r]evising the existing statutory scheme ... is neither our function nor the function of 
the EPA.”); Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996); James Smart, All the 
Stars in the Heavens Were in the Right Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 273 (1998); James S. Turner, Delaney Lives! Reports of Delaney's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 28 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003 (1998). 
434   Yoshinori Ohtsuka, et al., Genetic Linkage Analysis of Susceptibility to Particle Exposure in Mice, 22 AM. J. 
RESPIR. CELL MOL. BIOL. 574 (2000); George D. Leikauf et al., Pathogenomic Mechanisms for Particulate Matter 
Induction of Acute Lung Injury and Inflammation in Mice, Health Effects Institute Research Report No. 1065 (Dec. 
2001); Steven R. Kleeberger et al., Linkage Analysis of Susceptibility to Ozone-Induced Lung Inflammation in 
Inbred Mice, 17 NATURE GENETICS 475 (1997); Enrico Bergamaschi et al., Polymorphism of Quinone-Metabolizing 
Enzymes and Susceptibility to Ozone-Induced Acute Effects, 163 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 1426 (2001); 
William F. McDonnell, Individual Variability in Human Lung Function Responses to Ozone Exposure, 2 ENVTL. 
TOXICOL. PHARMACOL. 171, 175 (1996) (finding widespread inter-individual variation in response to ozone   87
scientific research continues to document the public health effects that EPA already 
acknowledges remain under its revised standards, the pressures to lower air quality standards 
ever closer to zero will persist and seem likely only to increase over time, as will of course, the 
costs for complying with more stringent standards.  Perhaps fortunately, at least for those who 
value reason and candor in governmental policymaking, this dynamic will eventually result in a 
broader recognition of the need for statutory reform.   If this is correct, then perhaps it will only 
be a matter of time before Congress steps in and adopts a more realistic legislative approach that 




    The recent revisions of the ozone and PM standards confirm what has been widely known 
since at least the mid-1970s, namely that section 109 of the Clean Air Act is not realistic.
435  As 
scientific knowledge has expanded, health risks have been identified at decreasing levels.  In 
light of this evolving evidence, it is no longer possible to select a standard that protects the public 
health, with an adequate margin of safety, from all the adverse effects of non-threshold 
pollutants, at least not without imposing dire economic costs on the nation.
436 As a practical 
matter, EPA has had little choice but to disregard evidence about substantial adverse effects on a 
public whose health the Agency is directed by law to protect.   
    But EPA has been neither candid nor consistent about the policy choices it has made in 
revising the nation’s air quality standards.  The Agency has so far been successful in shielding its 
policy decisions behind the language of science and expertise, with the kind of consequences we 
have highlighted in this article for the aspirations of consistent and principled public 
management.  These consequences are the less widely-acknowledged, but no less significant, 
lessons to be drawn from the EPA’s recent experience in revising its air quality standards.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
exposure, but only speculating that genetic factors may explain some of this variation).  As the susceptible 
subgroups carrying these genetic variants become characterized better, EPA will likely be confronted with an even 
clearer choice either to set more stringent standards to protect such sensitive subgroups, perhaps even adopting 
standards approaching zero, or to recognize that other factors such as costs need to be taken into consideration in 
providing a rationale for decisions about standards set at levels above zero.  See Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and 
Toxic Substances:  Part II - Genetic Susceptibility to Environmental Agents, ENVTL. L. REPTR. (forthcoming). 
435    Even members of Congress have acknowledged the disingenuousness of the Clean Air Act’s framework during 
past deliberations over earlier legislative amendments.  See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.  
436  See supra notes 164, 312, 373 and accompanying text.   88
Although these rulemakings will likely be remembered for the vigorous arguments that they 
engendered about the nondelegation doctrine,
437 the more enduring and significant lesson for 
administrative law from these cases concerns the limitations of science in justifying risk 
management decisions.  When agencies rely on science to explain the policy decisions they 
make, they not only escape from fulfilling their duty to provide a principled account of their 
decision-making, they also can find themselves submitting to expediency and post hoc 
rationalization in their efforts to defend their actions.   
    The ozone and particulate rulemakings reveal that EPA’s invocation of science enabled it 
to brush aside numerous inconsistent positions and incoherent results.  The same kind of 
scientific evidence that EPA relied on to tighten its standards also indicated that significant 
adverse effects – including in the case of fine PM, substantial mortality – would persist even at 
the levels of exposure permitted by the revised standards.
438  EPA failed to offer any meaningful 
rationale for its decisions that could justify both the enormous costs of these rules as well as the 
significant adverse effects  that they would still permit to be imposed on the public.  Without 
providing any justification, EPA adopted positions in these rulemakings that shifted from earlier 
positions the Agency had taken -- both in other NAAQS rulemakings as well as even earlier in 
these same proceedings.
439 
    We have argued that the courts’ acceptance of a dysfunctional legislative framework 
means that, to achieve greater consistency in air quality standard setting, Congress will need to 
compel the EPA to come clean about what science can and cannot say and about what policy 
principles justify its standards.  The Agency cannot simply “listen to the science” to tell it how to 
make policy choices about how many adverse health effects or how much regulatory cost should 
be tolerated in society.  Risk management calls for value judgments about which it is both 
possible and desirable for public officials to defend through policy analysis and normative 
reasoning.
440   
                                                           
437 See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 16 (noting the tendency to focus on the constitutional issues raised in the 
litigation over EPA’s revised standards). 
438  See supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
439  See supra Part II. 
440  Brown, supra note 37 (“The attempt to expunge values is not only doomed to failure or partiality but is harmful 
to the objectivity and usefulness of the resulting endeavor”); Mashaw, supra note 1, at 26 (“‘Expertise’ is no longer 
a protective shield to be worn like a sacred vestament.  It is a competence to be demonstrated by cogent reason-
giving.”).   89
    It will probably take new legislation before EPA will begin to adopt a more principled 
approach to setting air quality standards, but the lessons from the recent experience at EPA need 
not await future legislation to be applied in other contexts.  Whenever decisionmakers in any 
policy setting find themselves tempted to “listen to the science,” they should be careful to 
consider what science really can and cannot tell them.  Embedded within any bare claim that a 
policy decision is “based on” science, or that science “leads to” a particular policy choice, will be 
some underlying normative position.
441  If the core normative dimension to any policy decision 
is camouflaged in science, the resulting policy outcomes, as well as any explanations or 
rationalizations offered in their defense, will be more likely to be inconsistent if not 
unreasonable.   To be sure, high-quality scientific analysis is vitally needed to inform 
decisionmakers about policy problems and to predict the consequences of different solutions, but 
appeals to science are no substitute for clear and careful reasoning about the normative choices 
inherent public policymaking. 
 
                                                           
441  Mashaw, supra note 1, at 32-33 (“Administrators by and large claim not to be making value judgments....But we 
know this administrative claim to be hollow.”). 